

The Impact of Communist Party Membership on Wealth Distribution and Accumulation in Urban China

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The Impact of Communist Party Membership on Wealth Distribution and Accumulation in Urban China

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Abstract: This paper provides the first in-depth investigation into the evolution of the wealth gap between CCP and non-CCP households in urban China from 1995 to 2017. We apply unconditional quantile regression (UQR) to analyze the variations in the premiums of party membership across the wealth distribution. Our results show that although the *average* wealth gap between CCP and non-CCP households remained substantial and consistent throughout the period, there have been significant shifts in the returns structure of party membership over time. Prior to the housing reform in the 1990s, the highest wealth premiums of CCP households were primarily concentrated in the middle of the distribution, but now they are concentrated at the bottom of the distribution. This is mainly attributed to the fact that CCP households at the lower end of the net wealth distribution are more inclined to possess real estate assets, which tend to have higher value compared to those owned by non-CCP households. These effects fade out in the top half of the net wealth distribution, where the differences between CCP and non-CCP households become less apparent. Furthermore, by utilizing a balanced household panel from 2013 to 2017, we were able to track wealth accumulation at the household level. Our findings indicate that CCP households accumulate wealth faster than non-CCP households due to larger capital gains, and the differences between the two groups increase along the net wealth distribution.

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1 Introduction

Following the economic reform, China has undergone one of the most significant economic booms in the world. Starting from the 1990s, China has gone through a remarkable transformation, progressing from a poor and egalitarian society to an upper-middle-income country with levels of economic inequality comparable to those of the United States [Piketty et al., 2019]. Several studies find that political status and connection might play a key role in explaining existing inequalities, in both developed and developing countries [Johnson and Mitton, 2003, Khwaja and Mian, 2005, Faccio, 2006, Yang et al., 2021]. In the context of China, there is growing interest among economists and other social scientists in measuring the economic returns of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) membership [Szelényi, 1987, Nee, 1989, 1991, 1996, Rona-Tas, 1994, Walder, 1996, Morduch and Sicular, 2000, Dickson and Rublee, 2000, Li et al., 2007, Appleton et al., 2009, McLaughlin, 2017, Gu and Zheng, 2018, Guo and Sun, 2019, Nikolov et al., 2020]. The existing literature mainly focuses on examining the impact of party membership on labor wages and earnings. The majority of studies suggest the existence of a wage premium for party members compared to non-members [Ma and Iwasaki, 2021]. However, there is still a debate regarding the magnitude of the premium and the causal mechanisms behind it. Recent studies have confirmed significant direct and indirect economic benefits for party members. For instance, McLaughlin [2017] estimates a party wage premium ranging from 7 to 29% using survey data from urban China. Nikolov et al. [2020] also find that CCP members earn about 20% higher monthly earnings than non-members, which can be attributed to members' improved access to government jobs, higher-ranking positions within job hierarchies, and an overall improvement in social status. Other studies, such as Li et al. [2007], Gu and Zheng [2018], and Guo and Sun [2019] suggest that the economic returns to party membership are primarily due to self-selection effects since more talented individuals are more likely to join the party. Nevertheless, Guo and Sun [2019] acknowledge the significant indirect effects of party membership, as CCP members are more likely to work in state-owned enterprises and obtain permanent urban residency.

While the correct causal estimation of the average effect of CCP membership on labour income remains the most debated issue in the literature, very little is known about the disparities in *wealth* between CCP and non-CCP households. A few exceptions, Meng [2007] and Xie and Jin [2015], using cross-sectional urban survey data, find a significant impact of CCP membership on the average household wealth. However, there is a dearth of in-depth investigation into the evolution of wealth disparities since 2003, mainly due to data constraints. Our paper aims to bridge this gap in the literature by presenting the first comprehensive study on the wealth gap evolution between CCP and non-CCP households in urban China since the 1990s. Our contribution distinguishes itself in three aspects.

First, we rely on two main data sources, the Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) and the China Household Finance Survey (CHFS), that have been carefully harmonized in order to guarantee wealth information comparable over the period 1995-2017. The period under investigation is particularly interesting because China undertook a process of deep economic transformation. Private wealth experienced rapid and diffused growth, fostered by structural reforms [Novokmet et al., 2018, Piketty et al., 2019, Yang et al., 2021, Song et al., 2011]. In particular, starting in the early 1990s, housing reforms initiated the privatization of housing wealth, which

was previously publicly owned. Housing ownership was transferred at heavily subsidized prices to the occupying tenants, most of whom were employed in the public sector [Meng, 2007, Xie and Jin, 2015, Song and Xie, 2014]. By 2002, 85% of urban housing was privately owned [Piketty et al., 2019] and the real estate market subsequently boomed.¹ The rapid growth experienced by the Chinese economy, however, came together with rising inequality. While a growing body of literature examines the evolution of *income* inequality in China (Zhang [2021]), only a few studies focus on the long term evolution of wealth inequality.² We, therefore, contribute to the current literature by introducing an important political dimension to the analysis of wealth inequality since the 1990s and by relying on a novel harmonized data framework.

Second, we apply unconditional quantile regression (UQR) to analyze the heterogeneity in the returns of party membership along the income and wealth distributions. Our results show that although the *average* wealth gap between CCP and non-CCP households remained substantial and consistent throughout the period, there have been significant shifts in the returns structure of party membership over time. Prior to the housing reform in the 1990s, the highest wealth premiums of CCP households were primarily concentrated in the middle of the distribution, but now they are concentrated at the bottom of the distribution. This shift can be largely attributed to the fact that CCP households at the lower end of the net wealth distribution are more inclined to possess real estate assets, which tend to have higher value compared to those owned by non-CCP households. Our findings suggest that these differences could stem from CCP households having had privileged access to housing investments during the housing reform, compared to non-CCP households.

Finally, our study contributes to the empirical literature on wealth accumulation and distribution by examining the impact of political and human capital on household wealth growth in China between 2013 and 2017, which is a topic that has not been extensively studied in the literature [Kuhn et al., 2020, Garbinti et al., 2021, Fagereng et al., 2020, Bach et al., 2020, Saez and Zucman, 2016]. Specifically, we find that political capital, as measured by CCP status, plays a significant role in wealth growth for households in the top half of the distribution. CCP households experienced substantially higher net wealth growth than non-CCP households, with the difference explained by larger capital gains rather than savings. The impact of human capital on wealth accumulation is much smaller in magnitude, affecting wealth accumulation only through savings. To our knowledge, our study provides the first comprehensive examination of the impact of CCP status on household wealth accumulation across the wealth distribution. Furthermore, our findings contribute to the ongoing debate about the social consequences of economic transformation in former communist societies, which were stimulated by Nee’s seminal work on market transition theory [Nee, 1989, 1991, 1996].³ Previous studies in this strand of literature mostly rely on income as proxy of socioeconomic attainment, which might not fully capture the return of political capital [Song and Xie,

¹Section 2.2 summarizes the main features of the housing reform, while a dedicated paragraph in Appendix A.2 describes the history of China’s urban housing in greater details.

²Among the few exceptions, see Piketty et al. [2019] and Li and Wan [2015]

³The dominant line of inquiry has centered on the question of how economic payoffs of human capital (i.e. education) relative to political capital (i.e. CCP membership) have evolved over time [Dickson and Rublee, 2000, Cao and Nee, 2000, Wu, 2019]. Market transition theory proposed that the emerging market economy would undermine the socialist redistributive system, leading to a decline in returns to political capital and an increase in returns to human capital [Cao and Nee, 2000, Nee, 1989, 1991, 1996]. On the other hand, empirical studies have found overwhelming evidence of persistence of political capital in determining the socioeconomic attainment [Bian and Logan, 1996, Walder, 1995, 2002, Walder and Zhao, 2006, Wu, 2002, Zhou and Xie, 2019].

2014].⁴ We contribute to this literature by providing a unique piece of evidence that examines the impact of political and human capital on wealth accumulation during the post-reform period of China (2013-2017).

While our analytical framework allows us to study in detail the observable wealth gap between CCP and non-CCP households, it is difficult to ascribe a *causal* interpretation of the party membership coefficient. As pointed out in the literature, party membership is not random. Further, un-observable characteristics of the household members, such as ability, ambition, and social networks, might lead more talented individuals to join the party and, at the same, these qualities are likely to correlate with individual earnings and, consequently, with household wealth. Positive selection of talented individuals as CCP members might, therefore, explain substantial income and wealth differences with the non-CCP counterpart. Aware of these limitations in the interpretation of the results, we believe that our findings still provide an important description of large and sizable inequalities within the Chinese society and we invite future research to investigate to what extent such gaps are driven by selection biases.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly summarizes the institutional background of party membership and briefly introduces the main features of the real estate privatization process. Section 3 discusses data sources and harmonization processes. Section 4.1 describes the methodology and Section 5 discusses the main results. Section 6 discusses several caveats of the analysis and potential extensions. Section 7 concludes.

2 Background

2.1 The Chinese Communist Party


Since 1949, the CCP has been the ruling and dominant party in China. At the end of 2016 the party counted over 89 million members making it the second largest party in the world [Gu and Zheng, 2018]. Figure 1 illustrates the trend of CCP members among the adult population in China from 1988. At the national level, as depicted by the light blue line, the share of CCP members has remained relatively stable, fluctuating between 11% and 16%. Meanwhile, the share of CCP members in urban China (the black line) is considerably higher than in rural China (the grey line), with a significant decrease from 27% to 15% after 2002. This decline can be largely attributed to the rapid urbanization process that has taken place in China since the 1990s.⁵

Membership is, however, conditional on a stringent selection process, where applicants have to successfully complete several evaluation steps including composing a formal motivation letter, demonstrate active participation in local political activities, follow specific classes, and pass a final assessment [Nikolov et al., 2020]. The whole application process, therefore, requires special effort over an extended period of time, typically longer than 4 years [Ma and Iwasaki, 2021]. Nevertheless, obtaining the CCP membership is considered to be the first step in becoming a part of the Chinese administrative elite [Nikolov et al., 2020].

Thus, the economic benefits could derive from several factors. First, party membership increases social capital

⁴Other proxies include house [Song and Xie, 2014] and managerial positions [Walder et al., 2000]

⁵During the urbanization, citizens previously residing in rural areas have been able to obtain urban residency, resulting in a mechanical reduction in the share of CCP members in urban areas



Notes: The estimation of shares of CCP members utilizes different waves of nationally representative survey - the Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP). All the urban sample include rural-urban migrants except CHIP 2002. The adult population includes individuals who are 20 years old or above. % of CCP among adults in the national level is estimated using the rural and urban adult population from NBS.

Figure 1: Share of CCP members among adult population

via political connections and social networking. Most importantly, these connections might involve higher-status individuals who can provide referrals for high-status jobs [Bian, 1994]. Secondly, some high-paying jobs are only available to party members, such as employment opportunities in local administrative offices or higher-level jobs in state-owned enterprises [Nikolov et al., 2020]. McLaughlin [2017] documents that affiliation with the party brings higher paying jobs through the job assignment program, which was particularly pervasive before the 1990s.

2.2 Housing Reforms in China

The history of China's urban housing can be summarized into three significant phases: 1949-1978 (pre-reform period); 1979-1998 (housing reforming period); and 1999-present (post-reform period). While in the following paragraph we summarize the main features of three phases, a more detailed explanation is provided in Appendix A.2.

Since the Chinese Communist party came to power in 1949, urban private housing was gradually nationalized and, by 1978, 78.4% of the urban housing stock was publicly owned [侯渐珉, 1999, p.11]. The housing units were allocated, usually free or at a highly subsidized price, to state employees as in-kind compensation. The quality (location, size, housing condition) of the allocated housing largely depended upon the worker's administrative rank [Song and Xie, 2014].

The mounting pressure in the public housing system at the end of 1970s, especially due to housing shortages, led to a series of housing privatization reforms in the following two decades. Nationwide housing reforms began in 1991, when the property rights of privatized housing were officially recognized. In this early phase, privatization of public housing occurred as the lump-sum transfer of wealth in the form of discounted sales of public housing apartments to residing tenants, who were mostly workers in the public sector. The private housing obtained during such privatization period are often called *welfare housing* (‘福利房’), since these housing were initially distributed to the public as a type of welfare instead of a commodity. Since such allocation of public housing (location, size, condition) was concentrated in public sectors (i.e. governmental institutions and state-owned companies), based on the administrative rank of the employee, understandably the housing reform brought a windfall to those individuals working in the public sectors or having strong political connections (CCP members or government officials).

In 1998, the state council issued the official termination of in-kind allocations of publicly owned housing. According to the plan, after 1998, all newly built houses would be privatized and old public housing would be gradually privatized. The housing privatization reform resulted in a vigorous and fast-growing urban housing market. By 2002, 85% of urban housing was privately-owned [Piketty et al., 2019]. Consequentially, housing prices escalated rapidly after 2003, further triggering the problem of housing affordability. The central and local governments, therefore, implemented a large set of affordability-enacting policies that provided ground for the development of ‘economically affordable housing’ (经济适用房) designed to benefit all the low-to-medium income urban households, instead of only the employees of the state-owned enterprises and governmental institutions. These programs are still in place as of 2023. Nevertheless, the affordable housing system in China targets only urban residents who have city residence permits as part of its household registration system (commonly known as the *hukou* system). Migrant workers, floating populations, and others citizens without urban residence permits are not covered.

Another core policy for the transition is the establishment of the housing fund for urban employees at the end of 1990s, which was designed for the purpose of housing purchase and renovation. The Housing Fund is a form of social insurance paid by both employers and employees and it ranges from 10% to 40% (depending on the city) of employee’s gross wage. Such funds are allocated in the employee personal account and can only be withdrawn for housing related expenses (i.e. down payment, construction, purchase, property renovation, and paying back a mortgage). According to the 2017 National Housing Fund Report⁶, in 2017, the total housing fund stock, income, and outflow account for 6.3%, 2.3%, and 1.6% of China’s GDP, respectively. In 2020, 50% of the employees registered in the housing fund system worked in the public sectors, whose employees cover only 13% of total employees in urban China.⁷

⁶published by Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development, Ministry of Finance, and People’s Bank of China ([Link](#)).

⁷National Housing Provident Fund 2020 Annual Report

3 Data

3.1 Data and Variables Definition

Our analysis is based on two national representative surveys, namely the Urban Chinese Household Income Project (UCHIP) and the China Household Finance Survey (CHFS).

UCHIP surveys are repeated cross-section surveys drawn from a much larger sample of the Urban Household Survey conducted annually by the National Bureau of Statistics. More precisely, we use urban samples of two CHIP waves in 1995 and 2002. The 1995 survey covers 11 provinces consisting of 6,835 households, while the 2002 survey covers 12 provinces consisting of 6,931 households.

CHFS is the largest panel survey on household income and wealth in China, conducted by the Southwest University of Finance and Economics biennially since 2011. Since the first wave (CHFS 2011), the sample size has been continuously expanding. So far micro data from the first 4 waves are publicly accessible, namely CHFS 2011, 2013, 2015, and 2017. In the 2017 wave, the sample comprises more than 40,000 households from 367 counties in 29 provinces. Because of a major sample re-design, we excluded the first CHFS wave from our working sample.

Both surveys provide detailed information on household wealth including financial assets and debts, housing wealth, assets for household production and business activities, as well as information on income and expenditure. Together, CHIP and CHFS represent a unique source of information for analysing wealth composition and distribution in urban China over a 20 year time span.

In our analysis we define:⁸

- *Household Total Income* as the sum of total net wages and salaries, pensions and annuities, net income from self-employment, farming and business activities, rental income, income from financial actives (interests and dividends), income from governmental transfers, as well as income from donations and presents. In both samples, information refer to the total revenues earned in the year before the interview.
- *Gross Household Wealth* as the sum of all assets owned by the household. Specifically, we distinguish six main assets categories: safe and risky financial wealth, housing wealth, housing funds, business wealth, and other assets. Safe financial wealth includes cash, deposits, and funds owned by the household. Risky financial wealth includes the current market value of bonds, financial products, loans, and stocks owned by the household. Housing Wealth is defined as the sum of the current market value of the three most valuable houses owned by the household. Business wealth includes the share of assets owned by the family invested in business activities, including individual business, leasing, transportation, online stores, and enterprises. Other Assets includes the current value of land and agricultural machinery. We exclude from the household wealth both durable goods and social security wealth.
- *Household Debt* consists of the outstanding loans owned by the household from housing, financial investments, education, medical care, business, and agricultural activities owned by the household.

⁸Table 7 in Appendix A.1 defines the main wealth and income aggregates in our sample highlighting whether differences exists between the definitions applied in CHIP and CHFS.

	CHIP		CHFS			Panel
	1995	2002	2013	2015	2017	
N of Individuals	16,396	16,415	50,444	70,235	67,477	19,595
N of HHs	6,931	6,835	19,192	25,613	27,244	77,40
Average Age	43.55	45.00	46.27	47.39	49.95	50.87
% of Females	0.51	0.51	0.51	0.51	0.51	0.51
% of High-Educated	0.08	0.09	0.13	0.15	0.13	0.13
% of Low-Educated	0.65	0.63	0.54	0.48	0.54	0.54
% of Employed Individuals	0.90	0.62	0.58	0.57	0.58	0.57
% of CCP Individuals	0.24	0.27	0.17	0.20	0.18	0.19
<i>Non-missing Rate</i>	<i>1.00</i>	<i>0.98</i>	<i>0.73</i>	<i>0.70</i>	<i>0.72</i>	<i>0.76</i>
% of HHs with at least one CCP	0.46	0.50	0.29	0.28	0.27	0.31
<i>Non-missing Rate</i>	<i>1.00</i>	<i>1.00</i>	<i>1.00</i>	<i>1.00</i>	<i>0.99</i>	<i>1.00</i>

Notes: Estimations are based CHIP (1995, 2002) and CHFS (2013, 2015, and 2017). We include in the calculation all individuals aged 20 belonging to the urban sample. Estimates are weighted using sample weights.

Table 1: Descriptive statistics.

- *Net household wealth* as the consolidated value of the household balance sheet by subtracting debt from assets.

From the CHFS waves, we have detailed information on household consumption. Therefore, we express total household consumption as the average yearly expenditure for food, utilities, necessities, housing related expenses, transportation, communication, entertainment, clothing, education, travels, and medical reasons. Thus, we are able to define household savings as the difference between income and consumption.

We adjust all data for inflation using the consumer price index (CPI) and report results in 2017 euros.⁹ Throughout the analysis, we rely on the household sample weights provided by CHIP and CHFS. We eventually trim the distribution at the 1st and 99th percentile of the net wealth distribution in each year in order to avoid outliers.

Table 1 provides the main descriptive statics of our working sample, where we include all individuals surveyed who are older than 20. The first two columns provide information on the CHIP sample for 1995 and 2002, respectively. The central three columns report information on the CHFS sample for 2013, 2015, and 2017, respectively. The last column, instead, reports the main descriptive for a 4-years *panel* dataset comprising all those households that can be *continuously observable* in the 2013, 2015, and 2017 CHFS survey waves. This allows us to study in Section 5.4 the wealth accumulation process of a sub-set of 7.740 families, estimating the contributions of savings and capital gain to the net wealth growth of CCP and non-CCP households.

⁹We use the CPI time series provided the World Bank.

3.2 Definition of the CCP Status

Party membership is asked in both CHIP and CHFS. However, some differences between the two data-sources must be clarified.

First, while in CHIP party affiliation of each household member is collected, in CHFS, instead, party membership is asked only to the survey respondent and to the respondent's partner. If the respondent changes between one survey wave and the other, the new respondent's and the new partners' information is provided, while the older respondent and older partner party membership information is registered from the previous survey wave. Nevertheless, missing rates, as shown in Table 1, range between 27-30% among the population older than 20 years old. This is due to the fact that CHFS does not provide party membership information about other individuals living in the HH besides the respondent and the respondent's partner.¹⁰ While such limitation might increase some sample selection issues, in Figure 9 in Appendix A.1 we show that no substantial differences exist in the main socio-economic characteristics between the full sample and the sub-sample with available CCP information. The majority of cases with missing information on political affiliation comes from individuals between 15 and 29 years old living at their parents' house who are less likely to be party members and who are less likely to be primary breadwinners in the household. The sub-population with missing information on political affiliation that is older than 30 is marginal and it is represented by adult individuals, other than the partner, who live together with the respondent.

Based on the political affiliation of the respondent and the respondent's partner in each year, we classify an household as CCP if at least one of the two is affiliated with the CCP.¹¹ Because of the missing information about the political affiliation of the other adults in the household, in the CHFS waves we might underestimate the presence of CCP members within the household and identify as non-CCP households where only members other than the respondent or the respondent's partner are affiliated with CCP (false negative).¹²

We maintain, however, that the risk of generating false negatives is relative small. Only a small proportion (9-11%) of our sample could be misclassified as non-CCP, specifically households containing adults other than the survey respondent and their partner, for whom CCP status information is unavailable. Moreover, it is worth emphasizing that CHFS interviewers are instructed to choose the family member who is most knowledgeable about the family's financial status as the survey respondent. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the respondent and their partner have a greater influence on the household's wealth compared to other members. Despite the possibility of misidentifying some CCP households as non-CCP households, the fact remains that on average, CCP households own more wealth and experience faster wealth growth than non-CCP households. Therefore, any measurement error in identifying CCP households as non-CCP households would only result in a conservative estimate of the difference between the two groups in terms of household wealth and wealth growth.

The sample design is responsible for the second significant contrast between CHFS and CHIP. While the CHFS

¹⁰CHFS then asks all respondents younger than 60 whether their parents are CCP members or not. However, the same information is not provided for partners.

¹¹In the case a household is in the sample for more survey waves and the survey respondent changes over time, we identify a household as CCP if at least one individual currently living in the household has ever declared to be a CCP member.

¹²Cases of false positives are instead unfeasible, as long as the household provided truthful information.

urban sample encompasses both urban residents and rural-urban migrants, who are involved in non-agricultural professions for at least six months, while the UCHIP 2002 only includes urban residents.¹³ However, the impact of excluding rural-urban migration on the share of CCP individuals in urban China is relatively small. We estimated the proportion of CCP members in urban China using the 2013 CHIP survey (CHIP 2013), both with and without rural-urban migrants. The results showed that including migrants in the estimation, the share of CCP members among individuals aged 20 in CHIP 2013 was 18.3%, consistent with estimates from CHFS 2013 presented in Table 1. Excluding migrants from the sample, the CCP share among urban residents in CHIP 2013 was 19.7%, indicating that the effect of rural-urban migrants is relatively minor. This difference is expected to be even smaller for UCHIP 2002, as the size of the rural-urban migration sample in 2002 is much smaller than in 2013.

As mentioned previously, the decline in the share of CCP individuals between 2002 and 2013, from 27% to 19.5% of the urban population, is largely attributed to the rapid urbanization process in China since the 1990s. The proportion of people residing in urban areas has increased from 17.9% in 1978 to 57.4% in 2016, with an acceleration in urbanization since 2003. [Yang et al., 2019]. Through this process, citizens previously residing in rural areas have been able to acquire urban residency. As the share of CCP members among rural residents is much lower than among urban residents¹⁴, the intense urbanization process has contributed to a mechanical reduction in the CCP share in urban areas.

4 Methodology

4.1 Estimating the CCP Returns along the Wealth Distribution

We apply Unconditional Quantile Regressions [Firpo et al., 2009, 2018] at the HH-level in order to understand the (descriptive) effect of CCP along the net wealth distribution once controlling for HH socio-demographic characteristics. Unconditional Quantile Regressions consists in regressing recentred influence functions (RIF) of the unconditional quantile on a set of covariates. Influence functions measure the dependence of given distributional statistics on the values of any observation in the sample and are typically used for robustness analysis in statistics. By definition, influence functions have zero expected value. Adding back the target statistics to the influence function (re-centring) yields the RIF. Since RIF can be calculated for most of the distributional statistics, it is possible to create a vector that assigns to each observation in the sample its influence on the statistics of interest - in our specific case, the percentiles of the net wealth distribution - and run OLS regression on a set of covariates. The estimated regression coefficients can be interpreted as the marginal effect on the unconditional quantile of a small location shift in the distribution of covariates, holding everything else constant. We provide a detailed explanation of the methodology applied to quantile regression in Appendix A.3.

The main regression model takes the following form:

¹³the UCHIP 1995 included rural-urban migrants in the sample.

¹⁴According to CHIP 2013 and CHFS 2013, the share of CCP members in rural areas is only 5-6% of the total rural population, compared to 17% in urban areas.

$$NW_t^q = E[Rif(NW_{it}, q_t^q)] = \alpha^q + \delta^q CCP_{it} + X_{it}'\beta^q + \epsilon_{it}^q \quad (1)$$

Where NW_t^P is q -th percentile of the Net Wealth distribution in time t , CCP_{it} is our key covariates of interest and represents a dummy equal to one if at least one member of the HH is a CCP member, and X_{it} is a vector of household characteristics. We follow Gradín [2016] and define these characteristics as within-household proportions in order to take into account the situation of all household members and not only the household head or survey respondent. We control for the household age composition by measuring the number individuals aged 0-15, 16 -24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, and 65-older as a proportion of the number of household members. Similarly, we control for the proportion of adults in the household who are married or in a consensual union and for the share of adults who have completed low, medium, or high education. As for labour-related variables, we consider the share of adult women in the household who are actively working, the share of adults who work as self-employed, the share of those who work in the public sector, and the share of those who work in highly paid abstract occupations (as managers, legislators, technicians, or other professionals). We estimate equation 1 on the urban CHIP and CHFS year-specific samples, trimming the distribution of net wealth at the 1st and 99th percentiles.

δ^q is the unconditional quantile partial effect (UQPE) of CCP membership on the q -th percentile of the net wealth distribution and represents the key coefficient of interest for the analysis. The coefficient should read as the effect on quantile q of marginally increasing the probability of observing CCP members in the sample. If, for example, δ^q is equal to 0.5, it means that, if the proportion of CCP households increases by 1%, the net wealth at the q -th percentile would increase by 0.5% ($0.01*0.5*100$).

While the model in equation 1 provides a simple framework to estimate and show the net wealth gap between CCP and non-CCP households across the whole distribution, it is not informative about the sources of such wealth gaps. We then explore in greater details if substantial differences emerge between CCP and non-CCP households in housing investment, which represents the main private wealth component in urban China.

We first study whether significant differences between CCP and non-CCP households exist in the probability of owning real estate. To do so, we run a probit model where the dependent variable takes value 1 if, at time t , household i owns housing assets, 0 otherwise. We control for the household's political affiliation, CCP_{it} and the vector of household characteristics X_{it} , as defined in equation 1. We test the model in all CHIP and CHFS survey waves and across different net wealth bins separately (i.e. in the bottom 50%, mid 40%¹⁵, and top 10% of the net wealth distribution). The key parameter of interest is the estimated CCP_{it} coefficient, which reads as the difference in the probability of owning a house between CCP and non-CCP households in a given year at the bottom, at the upper-middle and at the top of the net wealth distribution.

Then, among those households that own housing assets, we study whether CCP and non-CCP households differ in the type and quality of housing investment. We exploit detailed information provided in CHFS, since interviewed households were asked if the (most valuable) house they own was privately purchased on the real estate market, inherited or donated, self-built, or obtained via housing policy programs. Most notably, in the

¹⁵We refer to mid 40% as the portion of the net wealth distribution between the 50-th and 90-th percentile.

case of a household getting their house via a policy program, we are able to distinguish whether the house was purchased during the housing reform in the 1990s (welfare housing) or if it happened later via the affordable housing programs.¹⁶ Thus, among those households owning an house, we run separate probit models for each of the possibilities in which the households could get the house according to the CHFS questionnaire. We control for the household’s political affiliation, CCP_{it} , the vector of household characteristics X_{it} , and 29 province fixed-effects.

We then try to quantify whether the different purchasing options (private market, self-build, policy programs during and after the housing reform) affect the value of housing wealth in order to better characterize the observable differences in housing investment strategies between CCP and non-CCP households. To do so, we exploit information on the price paid when the house was originally purchased and the current value of the house.¹⁷ We then regress the CPI-adjusted house (log-) purchasing price and current (log-) value on CCP membership. We control for a set of dummies indicating whether the house was obtained via welfare housing, via post-reform policy programs, if it was inherited or self-built. These dummy coefficients read as the percentage difference in the outcome variable (purchasing price or current value) of getting the house via the corresponding channel with respect to the purchase of the house via the real estate market that serves as the reference category. We further control for a set of 29 provincial dummies, a set of year-dummies for indicating when the house was purchased, and the vector X_{it} of HH-characteristics.

Subsequently, we study whether CCP and non-CCP households differ in the availability of housing funds. In CHFS, respondents are asked to declare their current housing funds accounts and what was the average housing funds contribution in the year before the interview. Thus, we are able to test through OLS regression differences in current housing funds availability and in contributions between CCP and non-CCP members. Besides party membership, we control for gender, education, age, occupation, and type of employer of the respondent. We include a set of 29 province fixed effects. The coefficient associated with party membership reads as the percentage difference in the average value of the current housing funds account and the value of the average housing funds contribution between CCP and non CCP members.

4.2 Wealth Accumulation

The most prominent advantage of CHFS is that its panel structure enables us to conduct detailed analysis on wealth accumulation at household level, which, to date, has not been explored in the context of China.

Following Saez and Zucman [2016] and Kuhn et al. [2020] we characterize the law of motion of wealth of household i as following:

$$W_{t+1}^i = (1 + q_t^i)W_t^i + S_t^i = (1 + q_t^i + \sigma_t^i)W_t^i \quad (2)$$

Where: W_t^i donates net wealth of household i in year t ; S_t^i donates savings of household i in year t and it is calculated as all sources of after tax yearly incomes subtracted by yearly consumption; $\sigma_t^i = \frac{S_t^i}{W_t^i}$ donates the

¹⁶See Appendix A.2 for a detailed timeline of housing reforms in China.

¹⁷All monetary unites are at 2017 prices. We use the CPI time series provided by the World Bank.

contribution of savings to the growth of net wealth (saving effect); q_t^i = donates the contribution of capital gain to the growth of net wealth (price effect). Accordingly, the net wealth growth rate of household i in year t , nw_t^i can be decomposed in the sum of two main components: savings, σ_t^i , and capital gains, q_t^i , as following:

$$nw_t^i = \frac{W_{t+1}^i}{W_t^i} - 1 = q_t^i + \sigma_t^i \quad (3)$$

Using the model described above, we perform a decomposition analysis of Chinese household wealth growth between 2013 and 2017. Additionally, we create a reduced-form model to investigate the effects of political and human capital on wealth accumulation across different net wealth bins in the 2013 distribution. Specifically, we analyze the bottom 50%, middle 40%, top 10%, and top 5% of the distribution.

$$Y_i^\tau = \alpha^\tau + \delta^\tau CCP_i^\tau + \gamma^\tau Hed_i^\tau + \beta^\tau X_i^\tau + \epsilon_i^\tau \quad (4)$$

The set of outcome variables, denoted as Y_i^τ , consists of three measures: nw_i^τ , σ_i^τ , and q_i^τ , where τ refers to the different wealth bins. Net wealth growth ratio, nw_i , is computed as the difference in net wealth between household i in 2013 and 2017. The saving rate, σ_i , is determined by the difference between total income and consumption of household i in 2013 and 2017 relative to net wealth levels in 2013. Capital gains, q_i , are calculated as the residual of Equation 4.2.

Following the literature¹⁸, we classify the covariates of interest into two types of capitals: the political capital vs. human capital.

Based on the existing literature on market transition theory¹⁹, we categorize the relevant covariates into two types of capital: political capital and human capital. Political capital is measured by the CCP household dummy variable, CCP_i^τ , while the higher education dummy variable, $Hedu_i^\tau$, serves as a proxy for human capital. Specifically, $Hedu_i^\tau$ takes on a value of 1 if at least one member of household i has completed tertiary education. X_i is a set of control variables that accounts for household member characteristics, including the proportion of self-employed adults, public sector workers, professionals, individuals in administrative or managerial positions, children under 16 years old, married adults, economically active adults, female workers, and individuals in different age groups. We include province fixed effects in all of our regressions. Given that housing constitutes the majority of household wealth and that housing prices vary greatly across provinces, we cluster the standard errors at the provincial level. All control variables are measured at 2013 levels.

¹⁸See, Lin and Bian [1991], Nee [1989, 1991, 1996], Walder [1995], Walder et al. [2000], Song and Xie [2014]

¹⁹See, Lin and Bian [1991], Nee [1989, 1991, 1996], Walder [1995], Walder et al. [2000], Song and Xie [2014]

5 Results

5.1 Wealth in China - Descriptive Statistics

The following paragraph describes the evolution of private wealth and wealth inequality in Urban China over the observation period of 1995-2017. The upper panel of Table 2 reports the average household net wealth expressed in 2017 euros by income groups, as well the evolution of Gini index in urban China in 1995, 2002, 2013, and 2017 based on two national representative household survey, namely CHIP and CHFS. Building on these results, the lower panel of Table 2 reports the growth rate of household net wealth in Urban China from the period from 1995 to 2002, 2002 to 2013, and 2013 to 2017.

In 1995, average net wealth per household in urban China was about €6,000. Average net wealth within the top 5% of the distribution was about €39,000, within the bottom 50% of the distribution was €1,160, about one-fifth of the overall average. The 1995–2002 period saw a significant rise the absolute wealth levels in all wealth groups, though the real rate of wealth growth becomes increasingly lower toward the top of the wealth distribution. Average net wealth per household in 2002 increased to €24,000. The annual growth rate was about 34% within the bottom 50% of the distribution, 24% in the middle 40% (between the 50-th and 90-th percentile) and 17% in the top 10%. The Gini coefficient decreased correspondingly from 0.59 to 0.47. The significant rise in household wealth as well as the decrease of the wealth inequality in this period is mainly due to the rapid privatization of public housing between 1998 and 2003, when occupying tenants, mainly working in the public sector, were allowed to purchase the housing allocated to them by their working unit [Meng, 2007]. Since access to privatization programs was relatively equal for urban residents working in the public sector, the rapid increase in housing wealth among the urban residents led to a drop in household wealth inequality between 1995 and 2002.

Between 2002 and 2013, urban China was characterized by a rapid increase in household wealth and a drastic widening of the wealth inequality due to the booming real estate market and the rapid escalation of housing prices [Knight et al., 2017, Li and Wan, 2015]. In 2013, overall average net wealth per household was €104,700; but within the bottom 50% of the distribution it was €18,600 and within the top 5% of the distribution it was €711,100. From 2002 to 2013, the annual growth rate of real wealth for the top 5% was 23.3%, whereas this figure fell to 14.8% for the upper-middle 40% and 7.8% for the bottom 50%. The Gini coefficient increases sharply from 0.49 in 2002 to 0.64 in 2013.

From the 2013 to 2017, we observe a moderate increase in household wealth with a stabilized trend of wealth inequality. In 2017, overall average net wealth per household increased to €138,600; within the bottom 50% of the distribution, it increased to €25,800, while within the top 5% of the distribution, it increased to €941,500. Annual growth rate of real wealth for the bottom 50% of the distribution was 5.6%, which is slightly higher than the growth rate in the upper-middle 40%, the top 10%, and top 5% of the distribution, which are about 4.8%.

Figure 2 illustrates the composition of private wealth, divided by deciles of the gross wealth distribution, for each year in our sample. To better understand the rapid expansion of Chinese private wealth, particularly in housing, gross wealth is categorized into six main components, as described in Section 1: safe and risky financial wealth, housing funds, housing wealth, business wealth, and other assets. The data reveal that the housing reform

Average HH Net Wealth				
	1995	2002	2013	2017
Full Population	6,024	24,069	104,628	138,607
Bottom 50%	1,160	7,893	18,640	25,813
Mililde 40%	6,731	29,767	108,876	143,668
Top 10%	27,564	82,924	518,208	682,705
Top 5%	38,765	104,745	711,143	941,472
Gini	0.59	0.49	0.64	0.64
N HHs	6,719	6,629	17,237	24,011


Annual growth rate of Net Wealth				
	1995-2002	2002-2013	2013-2017	1995-2017
Full Population	22.6%	16.8%	4.8%	15.2%
Bottom 50%	34.4%	7.8%	5.6%	15.0%
Mililde 40%	24.1%	14.8%	4.7%	14.8%
Top 10%	17.0%	22.2%	4.7%	15.5%
Top 5%	15.3%	23.3%	4.8%	15.4%

Share of total accumulated growth				
	1995-2002	2002-2013	2013-2017	1995-2017
Full Population	100%	100%	100%	100%
Bottom 50%	21.1%	6%	11%	9%
Mililde 40%	49.9%	39%	41%	41%
Top 10%	29.0%	55%	48%	49%
Top 5%	17.3%	38%	34%	34%

Notes: Estimations are based CHIP (1995, 2002) and CHFS (2013, 2015, and 2017). Wealth is ranked using the net wealth level in each survey year. Only households living in urban areas with non-negative net wealth are included. Durables are not treated as fixed assets and excluded from net wealth. Monetary units are expressed in 2017 euros.

Table 2: Net wealth in China 1995-2017

had a significant impact on the distribution of assets from 1995 to 2002, with housing becoming the predominant asset across all deciles. The percentage of household owing an apartment rose from 28% in 1995 to 62% in 2002, and subsequently stabilized at 84-89% between 2013 and 2017, as shown in the first column of Table 3. Over the same period, real estate assets also became increasingly important, rising from 50% of gross wealth of urban households in 1995 to 81%-85% in the 2013-2017 period. Such findings are consistent with the estimates of Li and Wan [2015].



Notes: Compiled by authors based on CHIP (1995 and 2002) and CHFS (2013, 2015, and 2017) urban samples. All calculations are weighted with sample weights. Wealth is ranked using the gross wealth level in survey year. Only households living in urban areas with non-negative gross wealth are included. Durables are not treated as fixed assets and excluded from gross wealth. Wealth is ranked using the gross wealth level in survey year. Monetary units are expressed in 2017 euros.

Figure 2: Total gross wealth composition by decile

	Overall	Bottom 25%	P25-P50	P50-P90	Top 10%
CHIP 1995					
Housing onwership	0.28	0.11	0.12	0.41	0.59
Housing wealth share	0.50	0.06	0.09	0.44	0.69
<i>N</i>	<i>6,795</i>				
CHIP 2002					
Housing onwership	0.62	0.26	0.66	0.76	0.80
Housing wealth share	0.61	0.35	0.60	0.62	0.64
<i>N</i>	<i>6,704</i>				
CHFS 2013					
Housing onwership	0.84	0.46	0.94	0.99	0.99
Housing wealth share	0.84	0.62	0.81	0.84	0.84
<i>N</i>	<i>17,053</i>				
CHFS 2015					
Housing onwership	0.89	0.59	0.97	0.99	1.00
Housing wealth share	0.81	0.73	0.82	0.81	0.82
<i>N</i>	<i>22,139</i>				
CHFS 2017					
Housing onwership	0.88	0.59	0.97	0.99	1.00
Housing wealth share	0.85	0.68	0.81	0.83	0.88
<i>N</i>	<i>23,723</i>				

Notes: Estimations are based CHIP (1995, 2002) and CHFS (2013, 2015, and 2017). Wealth is ranked using the net wealth level in each corresponding survey year. Only households living in urban areas with non-negative net wealth are included. Durables are not treated as fixed assets and excluded from net wealth. Monetary units are expressed in 2017 euros.

Table 3: Descriptive information on housing in the estimation sample

5.2 CCP Premia - Descriptive Statistics

So far we described the evolution of private wealth in China. We now turn our attention to analyse the evolution of the socio-demographic and economic differences between CCP and non-CCP households in urban China over the 1995-2017 period.

We first investigate whether substantial differences exist in the socio-demographic characteristics between CCP members and non-members. To do so we run separate probit models for each survey wave in our working sample, where the dependent variable takes value 1 if the individual is member of the party, 0 otherwise. We control for individuals' gender, education level, age, and employment status.²⁰

Table 4 summarizes the results. Estimates show that in urban China, CCP members are more likely to be men, older than 50, with high education in all survey waves under observation. In particular, the possibility for CCP members with higher education background has been rising significantly over time. Among employed individuals, we observe that CCP members are more likely to work in the public sector and in managerial occupations. Such results are consistent with main findings in the existing literature [Dickson and Rublee, 2000, Appleton et al., 2009, Yan, 2019].

	CHIP			CHFS	
	1995	2002	2013	2015	2017
Female	-0.11 ***	-0.09 ***	-0.09 ***	-0.11 ***	-0.11 ***
Low Education	-0.09 ***	-0.15 ***	-0.16 ***	-0.17 ***	-0.17 ***
High Education	0.06 ***	0.07 ***	0.16 ***	0.17 ***	0.15 ***
age 20-30	-0.17 ***	-0.18 ***	-0.05 ***	-0.07 ***	-0.07 ***
age 30-40	-0.07 ***	-0.09 ***	-0.03 ***	-0.03 ***	-0.03 ***
age 50-60	0.05 ***	0.09 ***	0.05 ***	0.04 ***	0.04 ***
age above 60	0.05 ***	0.17 ***	0.19 ***	0.19 ***	0.16 ***
Not in the Labour Force or Unemployed	0.03	-0.02	-0.01 *	-0.02 ***	-0.03 ***
Currently working as Self-employed	0.04	-0.09 ***	-0.03 ***	-0.04 ***	-0.04 ***
Currently working as Managers	0.39 ***	0.28 ***	0.14 ***	0.16 ***	0.23 ***
Currently working in the Public Sector	0.12 ***	0.04 ***	0.11 ***	0.12 ***	0.10 ***
N	13,782	11,062	36,795	47,758	48,594


Notes: Table reports the estimates from wave-specific Probit models. Estimations are based CHIP (1995, 2002) and CHFS (2013, 2015, and 2017). Only individuals aged 20 and above living in urban areas are included. Sample weights are applied to estimation. Statically significant effects at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level are indicated with "**", "***", "****" respectively.

Table 4: Socio-economic determinants of CCP membership

²⁰In particular we distinguishing whether the individual is outside the labour force, unemployed, or, in case the individual is currently employed, if the worker is self-employed, employed in the public sector, or employed in managerial occupations.

Figure 3 shows the concentration of households with at least one CCP member along the net wealth distribution. The share of CCP households is increasing along deciles of the net wealth distribution in all the years considered in our analysis indicating the presence of large wealth gaps.²¹ For instance, in 2017, urban households containing at least one CCP member made up 27% of all urban households.

The CCP share, however, ranges from 14% in the first decile of the net wealth distribution to 40% in the last. As explained in Section 3.2, the drop in CCP share between 2002 and 2013 can be attributed to the rapid process of urbanization experienced in China combined with minor sampling differences between CHIP and CHFS.



Notes: Compiled by authors based on CHIP (1995 and 2002) and CHFS (2013, 2015, and 2017) urban samples. All calculations are weighted with sample weights. Wealth is ranked using the net wealth level in the corresponding survey year. Only households living in urban areas with non-negative net wealth are included. Durables are not treated as fixed assets and excluded from net wealth. The CCP share is highlighted in red.

Figure 3: CCP share over the Net Wealth Deciles

The skewed distribution of the CCP households along the net wealth distribution indicates a large and significant wealth gap between CCP and non-CCP households. Figure 4 presents the evolution of the un-adjusted wealth gap between 1995 and 2017, with solid lines indicating the mean and median net wealth levels in 2017 euros for CCP (in red) and non-CCP households (in blue) over time. The dashed line shows the estimated un-adjusted wealth gap for each year, along with bootstrapped confidence intervals. Table 8 in Appendix A.1 complements the figure showing un-adjusted gaps in different wealth and income components between CCP and non-CCP households observable across our working sample.


The figure confirms large and persistent wealth and income differences. These differences in average wealth

²¹Similar findings can be seen across the total household total income distribution as shown in Figure 10 in Appendix A.1

gaps strongly increase between 1995 and 2002, going from 20% to around 45%; it then slightly increases between 2002 and 2013 and remained stable thereafter. Wealth gaps at the median, instead, remain large (around 60%) and relatively stable across the entire observational period.


In order to explore the sources of such gaps in detail, Figure 5 explores average housing wealth (on the left) and participation in housing investments (on the right) of CCP and non-CCP households.

From figure 5, it is possible to see that housing wealth between 1995 and 2002 contributed to fostering the increase in the wealth gaps between CCP and non-CCP households. While, in 1995, we do not observe differences in the housing investment values between CCP and non-CCP households (dashed line in the left-hand panel), after the urban housing reform (1994-2002), CCP households own consistently higher housing assets. From 0 in 1995, the housing wealth gap increased to about 30% in 2002 and stabilized around 40-42% during the 2013-17 period. At the same time, housing ownership between CCP and non-CCP household remained stable over the observation period, with CCP households more likely than non-CCP households to own housing wealth by 6 to 8 percentage points (dashed line in the right-hand panel). Nevertheless, the sharp increase in the difference of housing asset value between CCP and non-CCP, suggests that CCP households were able to get the most valuable houses during the housing reform period, generating a substantial and persistent wealth gap in the average value of housing assets.



Notes: Compiled by authors based on CHIP (1995 and 2002) and CHFS (2013, 2015, and 2017) urban samples. All calculations are weighted with sample weights. The left-hand panel show evolution of average net wealth in 2017 euros (x1000) with a solid red (blue) line for CCP (non-CCP) households living in Urban China. The dashed line reports the wealth gap calculated as the difference between average net wealth in CCP households and non-CCP households over the average net wealth in non-CCP households. Bootstrapped (500 repetitions) confidence intervals are displayed. The right-hand panel replicates the one on the left using median instead of average wealth.

Figure 4: Un-adjusted CCP wealth gap



Notes: Compiled by authors based on CHIP (1995 and 2002) and CHFS (2013, 2015, and 2017) urban samples. All calculations are weighted with sample weights. The figure shows asset value (on the left) and participation rates (on the right) of CCP and non-CCP households for housing wealth. Solid red lines refer to CCP households, while solid blue lines refer to non-CCP ones. The dashed lines report the gap in participation rates and in asset value for each outcome considered. Asset Value is expressed in in 2017 euros (x1000). Bootstrapped (500 repetitions) confidence intervals are displayed.

Figure 5: Housing assets current gross value and participation rates of CCP and non-CCP households

5.3 Estimating the CCP Premium along the Wealth Distribution

5.3.1 Unconditional Quantile Regression

The wealth gaps reported in Figure 4 and discussed in the previous paragraph do not account for (a) potential compositional differences in socio-demographic characteristics between CCP and non-CCP households, or for (b) potential heterogeneity along wealth distribution. In the following section, we then apply UQR, as explained in Section 4.1, in order to qualify whether these gaps are statically significant and homogeneous across the whole net wealth distribution once we control for differences in the socio-demographic characteristics between CCP and non-CCP households.²²

Figure 6 reports in blue the unconditional partial effect of CCP membership on the percentiles of the 1995, 2002, 2013, 2015, and 2017 net wealth distributions and the respective 95% confidence intervals.²³ The dashed green line represents the OLS estimate of equation 1.


While OLS predicts an average 21-24% net wealth gap that remained constant across all the period of observation, the unconditional quantile regression coefficients show highly heterogeneous CCP premia along the net wealth distribution. Interestingly, in 1995 the CCP coefficient presents an inverse-U shape, indicating that the greatest advantages, in relative terms, for CCP households were concentrated at the middle of the net wealth distribution and faded away in the tails. The interpretation of the unconditional quantile regression coefficients suggests that, if the share of CCP household marginally increases in a given percentile, the net wealth in that percentile would increase generating the highest returns for percentiles at the middle of the distribution. Starting in the 2002, however, the CCP premium at the middle of the net wealth distribution started to fall, while the effect in the bottom tail started to become more important. After 2013, the estimated CCP coefficients show a clear decreasing pattern along the net wealth distribution, pointing to greater advantages for households in the bottom 50% of the net wealth distribution. The same pattern is observed in 2015 and 2017.

These results show that between 1995 and 2017, although the *average* wealth gap between CCP and non-CCP household did not change, the returns structure from political membership has deeply changed. In the mid-1990s, the largest returns were at the middle of the net wealth distribution, while, as of 2017, it is the lower class that benefits the most, in relative terms, from the party membership. These findings are particularly interesting if compared with the unconditional quantile regression on household labour incomes shown in Figure 13 in Appendix A.4.2. According to our findings, the average CCP premia on labour HH increased between 1995 and 2002, increasing from 13% to 16%, then decreasing thereafter and stabilizing around 7-8% in the 2010s. Thus, our findings suggest that income gaps between CCP and non-CCP households are lower than wealth differences. Moreover, different from net wealth, CCP returns on income are highly constant across the income distribution, showing little heterogeneity.

In the following paragraphs we explore potential mechanisms that can explain why the net wealth return

²²Appendix A.4 provide a detailed discussion on CCP premia on individual labour earnings and on HH total income.

²³Figure 11 in Appendix A.1 provides the unconditional quantile estimates for the coefficients of the other covariates in equation 1.



Notes: Compiled by authors based on CHIP (1995 and 2002) and CHFS (2013, 2015, and 2017) urban samples. All calculations are weighted with sample weights. The figure displays the estimated UQR coefficient for Party membership in blue with the relative Confidence intervals. The green dash line shows estimates from OLS regression.

Figure 6: Unconditional quantile regression - CCP membership

structure of CCP membership changed between 1995 and 2017. In particular, we study in greater detail if substantial differences emerge in housing investment between CCP and non-CCP households and how this evolved over time. The attention to housing assets is justified by the deep transformation experienced by urban China over the period under observation. Between 1995 and 2017, housing investment was fostered by a series of structural reforms, ultimately becoming the main driver of private wealth growth, as previously shown and discussed in Figure 2 and in Table 3.


5.3.2 CCP Membership and Housing Market

We first estimate whether CCP membership is correlated with a higher probability of owning an house, once socio-demographic characteristics of the household are accounted for. Housing accounts for the lion's share of household wealth composition in urban China. However, at the bottom of the net wealth distribution, where RIF effects are the strongest, housing ownership is more dispersed. Therefore, in the bottom 50% of the distribution, if CCP members are more likely than non-members to own housing assets, this might explain the high CCP returns found via UQR.

Figure 7 reports the CCP coefficient estimated in each bin of the wave-specific net wealth distribution and the corresponding confidence intervals at 95% significance level. The coefficient reads as the difference in probability of owning an house between CCP and non-CCP households, *ceteris paribus*. In the figure, each year-specific panel reports, with a round marker, the CCP coefficient calculated on the *full* sample, while the effects at the different net wealth bins are shown with triangle-shaped markers.

In 1995, overall, CCP households were 8.6 percentage points more likely to own housing assets than non-CCP households. However, this estimate masks great heterogeneity and our results show that the statically significant differences can be found only in the top-half of the net wealth distribution. It is important to remember that, in 1995, the housing reform was in an early stage and only 28% of households in urban China owned private housing; see Table 3. In the 2000s, at the beginning of the post-reform period, the differences in the housing ownership started to change substantially. In 2002, already 62% of households in urban China owned some housing assets, with the differences between CCP and non-CCP households starting to reduce. On average, in 2002, CCP households were 6.5 percentage points more likely to own housing assets than non-CCP households. Moreover, versus 1995, in 2002 the CCP-ownership premium is found to be relatively constant across the whole distribution. After 2013, 85-89% of households in urban China owned housing assets. While, the CCP households are still more likely to own housing assets than non-CCP households, statically significant differences can only be observed at the bottom of the net wealth distribution.

Thus, according to Figure 7, between 1995 and 2017, the CCP housing ownership premium flipped. In 1995, housing ownership was rare and CCP membership was only correlated with an increased probability of owning some housing assets in the top-half of the distribution. In the 2013-2017 period, instead, housing ownership is diffused and CCP membership is correlated with increased probability of owning some housing assets only in the bottom-half of the distribution. At the bottom of the net wealth distribution, housing investment remains dispersed: in 2017 more than 40% of households in the bottom 25% of the net wealth distribution did not own



Notes: Compiled by authors based on CHIP (1995 and 2002) and CHFS (2013, 2015, and 2017) urban samples. All calculations are weighted with sample weights. The figure reports the effect of CCP membership on the probability of owning housing assets estimated via year-specific probit models. In each panel, the round marker shows results on the overall yearly-specific sample, while the triangle-shaped markers show results for sub-samples of the net wealth distribution (i.e. bottom 50%, middle 40% and top 10%).

Figure 7: Difference in the probability of owning an house between CCP and non-CCP households for different net wealth bins.

their house, while in the top half of the distribution, housing ownership is around 98%. In such a scenario, the fact that CCP households are more likely to own their house at the bottom of the distribution with respect to non-members helps explain the high CCP returns found in Figure 6.

Another important aspect to analyse in order to better characterize the net wealth gap between CCP and non-CCP households, is whether substantial differences exist in the *type* and *quality* of the housing assets that the two groups own. We begin our investigation exploiting detailed information provided in the CHFS 2013, 2015, and 2017 survey waves, where the interviewed households were asked if the (most valuable) house they own was privately purchased on the real estate market, inherited or donated, self-built, or obtained via public housing policies. In the latter case, the CHFS also distinguishes between houses obtained through governmental programs during (1979-1998) and after (1999 onwards) the housing reform period. As explained in Section 2.2 and further described in the dedicated Appendix A.2, keeping the two periods separated is important. The reform period was characterized by *welfare housing*, where publicly-owned houses were allocated to urban workers depending on the worker's administrative rank [Song and Xie, 2014] and households living in publicly-owned houses were allowed to buy the house at an advantageous transaction price with respect to the actual market price. Thus, in such a scenario, party membership might have represented a strong political connection in order to obtain and later purchase the house at a favourable price. After 1998, the 'economically affordable houses' program was introduced and it was designed to benefit all low-to-medium income households. Therefore, in such a context, the political advantage from party membership become less relevant.

The type of housing investment (private market, self-build, policy programs during and after the housing reform) might affect its quality and determine substantial differences in the purchasing price and current market value of the house. Thus, we want to understand whether CCP and non-CCP had differing accesses to the real estate assets they own and, if this is the case, what are the consequences in term of current value.

First, we run a separate probability model for each investment option in order to test differences between CCP and non-CCP households conditional on a rich set of covariates, as explained in the mythological section 4.1. The upper panel of Table 9 reports the average partial effect (APE) of CCP membership on the different investment options for 2013.²⁴ The coefficients read as the difference in probability between CCP and non-CCP households of getting their house via the model-specific outcome. The third column reports the overall effect, while columns 4 to 7 report the effect estimated within three main net wealth bins, i.e. the bottom 50%, the upper-middle 40% and the top 10%.

Results show relevant and statically significant differences in the way CCP and non-CCP households obtain their houses. We observe that CCP households are less likely to self-build their house and more likely to inherit, while no statically significant differences are found in the access to the private real estate market. Most notably, the greatest differences between CCP and non-CCP households are in the access to housing policy. We find that, among those households that got their current house before 1998, CCP households are overall 12 percentage points more likely to have obtained their current house through welfare housing than non-CCP households. These differences are statically significant and constant across the entire net wealth distribution.²⁵ However, such

²⁴Similar results are obtained for 2017 and available in Table 9 in Appendix A.1.

²⁵As robustness check, we run the same probability models on the sub-set of CCP and non-CCP households

Probit - How did HHs got the main house?		Average Partial Effect	Overall	Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top10%	N
<i>RE market</i>	CCP		0.01	0.00	-0.00	0.10 ***	13,583
<i>Housing Policy - before 98</i>	CCP		0.12 ***	0.11 ***	0.12 ***	0.09 **	4,475
<i>Housing Policy - after 98</i>	CCP		-0.01	-0.03 **	0.00		8,503
<i>Self-built</i>	CCP		-0.08 ***	-0.06 ***	-0.09 ***	-0.09 ***	13,583
<i>Inheritance</i>	CCP		0.03 ***	0.01	0.04 ***	0.01	13,583
OLS		β	Overall	Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top10%	N
<i>Purchasing Price of House</i>	Housing Policy - before 98		-0.03 ***	-0.32 ***	-0.09 ***	-0.05 ***	9,822
	Housing Policy - after 98		-0.02 ***	-0.21	-0.03 ***	-0.03 ***	9,822
	Self-built		-0.02 ***	-0.32 ***	-0.04 ***	-0.02 ***	9,822
	Inheritance	
<i>Current Value</i>	Housing Policy - before 98		0.01 **	0.21 ***	-0.00	-0.00	13,326
	Housing Policy - after 98		-0.01 ***	-0.20 ***	-0.01 ***	-0.01 **	13,326
	Self-built		-0.01 ***	-0.36 ***	-0.01 ***	-0.00	13,326
	Inheritance		-0.00	-0.18 ***	0.00	0.00	13,326
OLS		β	Overall	Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top10%	N
<i>(log-) Current Housing Funds Account</i>	CCP		0.02	-0.04	0.10	-0.03	3,527
<i>(log-) Average Housing Fund yearly Contribution</i>	CCP		0.12 ***	0.01	0.15 ***	0.13 **	4,238

Notes: Estimations are based on CHFS 2013. Wealth is ranked using the net wealth level in each survey year. Only households living in urban areas with non-negative net wealth are included. Statically significant effects at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level are indicated with "*", "**", "***" respectively.

Table 5: Housing investment - 2013 sample

differences vanish among those households that obtained their house via a policy program after 1999.²⁶

These findings confirm large disparities in the targeted group of the housing policy programs before and after 1998, showing that in 2013 and later CHFS waves, CCP households are more likely to have obtained their house via welfare housing.²⁷

We then test whether statically significant differences exist in the purchasing price and current value of houses obtained via the different investment options (private market, self-build, policy programs during and after the housing reform) via OLS, controlling for a rich set of covariates as explained in Section 4.1. The key parameters of interest are four dummy variables, equal to one depending if the house was self-built, inherited, or obtained via a policy program during or after the housing reform, respectively. The estimated coefficients are reported in the middle panel of Table 9 and they read as the percentage difference in the outcome variable (purchasing price or current value) of getting the house via the corresponding investment channel with respect to purchasing the house via the real estate market, which serves as reference category.

We find significant differences in both the purchasing price and the current value of houses obtained via the different investment channels. Obtaining an house via housing policy (both before and after 1998) is significantly cheaper than purchasing it via the private real estate market and these differences are particularly large for the

²⁶We did not include in the estimation those households that declared to have their house in 1998 in order to avoid potential overlaps.

²⁷While it might be tempting to interpret such findings as the result of a privileged access to the housing market guaranteed to CCP households via housing policy before 1998, we invite the reader to interpret the results with caution. Due to data limitations, we know how and when households obtained their houses, but we do not know when CCP membership was achieved. Therefore, we are not able to disentangle if, at the time of the housing investment, the political affiliation of the household was different than what is observed in 2013.

bottom 50% of the net wealth distribution. The same holds true for houses that are self-built. Nevertheless, the most interesting results concern the comparisons of current value of houses obtained through the different purchasing options. While small differences can be observed overall, for the bottom 50% of the net wealth distribution, the different purchasing options determine very different outcomes. Most notably, the current value of houses obtained via housing public policy differ substantially if the house was obtained before (via welfare housing programs) or after 1998 (via the affordable housing program). As of 2017, welfare housing is found to be the most valuable source of housing investment for households belonging to the bottom 50% of the net wealth distribution. Specifically, those households that obtained a house via welfare housing and belong to the bottom 50% of the net wealth distribution in 2013 are found to own houses that are about 21% *more* valuable than houses purchased via the private market. At the same time, those households that obtained their house via affordable housing are found to own houses that are about 20% *less* valuable than houses purchased via the private market by similar households. Self-built houses are found to be, instead, the least valuable source of housing investment. In the top 50% of the net wealth distribution such differences vanish. Results using the net wealth distribution in 2017 are reported in Table 9 in Appendix A.1 and confirm these findings.

All together, these results show that, at the bottom of the net wealth distribution, CCP households are more likely to own real estate assets than non-CCP households and the houses that they own are more valuable. In particular, we find that CCP households are more likely than non-CCP households to have acquired their current houses during the housing reform period, obtaining (currently) high-value houses at much cheaper prices than what is offered in the private real estate market. Non-CCP households, instead, invested more in self-built housing that, according to our estimates, represents the least remunerative source of housing investment, especially at the bottom of the net wealth distribution. These effects fade out in top half of the net wealth distribution where the differences between CCP and non-CCP households, as well as the differences between the different channels of housing investments decline.

Next, we explore whether substantial differences exists between CCP members and non-members in their availability of Housing Funds. Given that we know that CCP members are positively selected into better paid jobs (see Table 4), then party membership might be correlated with greater housing funds availability, which represents an important income source that CCP members might rely on for investing in housing wealth.

The lowest panel in Table 9 reports the OLS estimates of the CCP membership dummy on the (log-) current balance of housing funds and on the average (log-) monthly housing funds payment, once households characteristics are controlled for. The third column of Table 9 reports estimates on the overall sample, while, in columns 4 to 7, we complement the analysis looking at potential heterogeneity across the net wealth distribution: below the median, between the median and the 90th percentile, and above the 90th percentile.

According to our estimates, CCP households pay a 12 percentage points higher housing funds contribution than non-CCP ones. This finding can be explained by the positive selection of CCP individuals into better jobs and confirmed by higher contributions, *ceteris paribus*. We confirm heterogeneous effects of the CCP memberships along the net wealth distribution. Statically significant differences can only be found in the top half of the net wealth distribution, where CCP households are found to pay between 13 and 15 percentage points higher housing

funds contribution. Nevertheless, such greater contribution among CCP households does not translate into larger housing fund accounts versus non-CCP households. We interpret this finding as suggestive evidence that CCP households at the top of the distribution use their funds relatively more than non-CCP households.

5.4 Wealth Accumulation

In this section, we begin our investigation by examining the differences in wealth accumulation between households affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and those that are not. To carry out our analysis, we use the CHFS dataset to construct a balanced panel spanning 4 years, from 2013 to 2017, with detailed information on household income, consumption, and wealth. From this data, we calculate the net wealth growth rate nw_t^i for each household and break it down into two components: the saving effect $\sigma_t^i = \frac{S_t^i}{W_t^i}$ and the capital gain effect q_t^i , which is the residual. We exclude households with extreme values for q_t^i and σ_t^i , resulting in a final sample of 6,803 households, representing approximately 40% of the total urban households in the 2013 sample.²⁸

Table 6 presents a summary of the wealth accumulation by wealth groups. We observe substantial differences in net wealth growth between CCP and non-CCP households. Over the 4-year period, CCP households' net wealth grew, on average, 9 percentage more than non-CCP households in the full sample (0.58 vs. 0.49). The difference in growth rates increases markedly along the distribution, with a 9-percentage-point difference in the bottom 50% versus a 27-percentage-point difference in the top 5%. Consequently, wealth has become increasingly concentrated among CCP households, particularly those at the top of the distribution. Our estimates show that in the top 5% the share of net wealth held by CCP households increased by 6 percentage points from 41% to 47% in just 4 years. Moreover, at the lower end of the distribution, the difference in wealth growth between CCP and non-CCP households is almost entirely driven by the difference in the saving effect (σ) (9-percentage-point difference in the bottom 50% can be decomposed into -4-percentage-point difference in capital gain and 13-percentage-points difference in saving). In contrast, at the top of the distribution, it is the difference in capital gains (q) that accounts for the majority of the heterogeneity (23-percentage-point difference in capital gain versus 5-percentage-points difference in saving).

Furthermore, we examine the impact of political and human capital on the accumulation of wealth. To do this, we use a reduced form model to estimate the growth of wealth across different net worth bins of the 2013 distribution, namely the bottom 50%, middle 40%, top 10%, and top 5%. The results are presented in Figure 8. Our analysis indicates that political capital, as measured by CCP status, is a significant factor in wealth growth. Specifically, we found that CCP membership has a noteworthy effect on net wealth growth, particularly among individuals in the upper half of the distribution. This effect becomes more pronounced as we move up the wealth distribution, ranging from 14 percentage points for the middle 40% to 24 percentage points for the top 5% (as illustrated in Figure 8). However, we did not find a significant association between human capital and wealth growth.

²⁸We did not include CHFS 2011, due to its small sample size. We dropped observations with negative net wealth in 2013. The absolute value of q_t^i and σ_t^i can be extremely large (i.e., bigger than 10,000%) for some households, mainly owing to small initial net wealth in 2013. We thus exclude the outliers by restricting our sample to the households with between -500% and 500% net wealth growth rate nw_t^i .

Upon examining the regression results for capital gains (shown in the right-hand panel of Figure 8), we discover outcomes that are comparable to those observed in wealth growth. Political capital plays a significant role in capital gains in the upper half of the distribution, with its effect increasing as wealth distribution rises. Conversely, human capital does not have a significant impact on capital gains. Regarding savings (the left-hand panel of Figure 8), the coefficients for both political and human capital are considerably smaller in magnitude than those for capital gains. Human capital has a significant effect on savings in the middle 40% and top 10% of net wealth bins, but it does not significantly influence capital gains. For comprehensive regression results see figure 12 in Appendix A.1.

In conclusion, our research indicates that political capital has a significant impact on wealth accumulation in urban China through capital gains, while human capital affects wealth accumulation through the saving effect.

	Full population			Bottom 50%			Middle 40%			Top 10%			Top 5%		
	Non-CCP	CCP	Δ	Non-CCP	CCP	Δ	Non-CCP	CCP	Δ	Non-CCP	CCP	Δ	Non-CCP	CCP	Δ
Average wealth accumulation ratio by HH type															
<i>nw</i>	0.49	0.58	0.09	0.58	0.67	0.09	0.41	0.53	0.12	0.42	0.57	0.16	0.08	0.35	0.27
<i>q</i>	0.29	0.33	0.03	0.31	0.27	-0.04	0.30	0.38	0.08	0.34	0.43	0.09	0.02	0.25	0.23
σ	0.19	0.25	0.06	0.27	0.40	0.13	0.11	0.15	0.05	0.08	0.14	0.06	0.06	0.10	0.05
Cumulative wealth share by HH type															
<i>2013</i>	0.63	0.37		0.71	0.29		0.64	0.36		0.64	0.36		0.59	0.41	
<i>2017</i>	0.61	0.39		0.70	0.30		0.62	0.38		0.62	0.38		0.53	0.47	
Population share by HH type															
<i>2013</i>	0.67	0.33		0.73	0.27		0.62	0.38		0.59	0.41		0.52	0.48	


Notes: Estimations are based on CHFS. We include in the calculation all households that are continuously observed in 2013 2015 and 2017. Sample weights are applied. nw_i , σ_i , and q_i are defined as explain in Section 4.2 and reported in the table as the average in each population sub-sample. $N=6,803$.

Table 6: Descriptive statistics.

6 Qualifications

This section qualifies the results of this chapter by discussing data restrictions, methodological limitations, and their implications for our results.

Although considerable effort was devoted to harmonizing two high-quality representative samples (CHIP and CHFS), several data limitations may raise some concerns. First, wealth information is self-reported by survey respondents. Although surveys provide detailed socio-economic characteristics of households, self-reported valuations may suffer from measurement error, especially when it comes to current market value evaluations of assets (e.g., the current value of a house). Additionally, it is well established that survey data often misreports



Notes: Notes. CEstimations are based on CHFS. We include in the calculation all households that are continuously observed in 2013 2015 and 2017. Sample weights are applied. nw_i , σ_i , and q_i are defined as explain in Section 4.2. $N=6,803$.

Figure 8: Wealth Accumulation - OLS over panel 2013-2017.

wealth at the top of the distribution.²⁹ Unfortunately, the lack of comparable external data sources for private wealth in China makes the validation of our findings difficult.

Secondly, as discussed in Section 3.2, in the CHFS survey waves, the information on political affiliation is only available for the survey respondent and respondent’s partner, potentially generating false negative problems (i.e. households where some members other than the respondent and the respondent’s partner are affiliated with CCP, but do not appear in the data). However, in our study, we demonstrate that the risk of false negatives is minimal, with only 9-11% of households potentially misclassified. Meanwhile, we argue that false negative issue will leads to the lower bound estimate of the difference between the two groups concerning household wealth and wealth growth.

Thirdly, neither CHIP nor CHFS provide information on *when* the individual joined the party. Such information might be crucial to distinguish between ‘junior’ CCP members, who joined the party only recently, and ‘senior’ members. Since, according to previous literature, the membership premium derives from the increased social capital and political network of CCP individuals with respect to non-CCP ones, it is reasonable to assume that the wealth benefits from party membership will increase with the seniority in the party. Thus, detailed information about the timing of the affiliation would improve the quality of the estimation and allow for a more rigorous investigation of the potential determinants of the party premium.

Methodologically, instead, the principle limitation of the study is that it is difficult to ascribe a *causal* interpretation to our findings. The study lacks a structured identification strategy that consistently accounts for potential selection biases in party membership. As documented in previous literature in Sections 2.1 and 5.2 of the current study, party membership is not random: un-observable characteristics of the household members might lead more talented individuals to join the party. Thus, in such a scenario, net wealth gaps in earnings and wealth might be partially explained by differences in the average ability between CCP and non-CCP members. In Section A.4.1 in the Appendix, we show that large differences in labour earnings persists when potential endogeneity in the CCP membership is accounted for, consistent with McLaughlin [2017]. Such findings corroborate the idea that political affiliation *causally* determine economic returns for CCP members, despite potential positive selection biases. In our study, however, the identification of wealth gap is not robust to selection biases and we invite the reader to interpret our findings as a first description of important and large inequalities.

7 Conclusion

In this paper, we examine the evolution of the wealth gap between CCP and non-CCP households in urban China since the 1990s. For our investigation, we rely on two main data sources, the CHIP and the CHFS, which we carefully harmonized in order to provide a comparable data framework that ranges over a period of deep economic transformation for the China. Next, we apply unconditional quantile regressions to study potential heterogeneity across the net wealth distribution and its evolution over time. Overall, CCP households are estimated to enjoy net wealth premiums between 21 and 24%. However, while the average wealth gap is constant over the 1995-2017

²⁹See, for example, Schröder et al. [2020].

period, the returns structure of political membership has deeply changed over time. While in the 1990s, the highest wealth advantages for party members, in relative terms, were concentrated at the middle of the distribution, in 2017 the largest differences in wealth between CCP and non-CCP households are found to be in the bottom 50% of the distribution.

We show that the privatization of the housing market, especially after the housing reform, granted equal access to housing wealth for both CCP and non-CCP families, reducing the differences in the middle and at the top of the wealth distribution. However, strong differences between the housing investment of CCP and non-CCP households continue to persist at the bottom of the net wealth distribution, where CCP are found (a) to be more likely to own housing real estate assets than non-CCP households and (b) the houses that they own are more valuable.

Furthermore, by utilizing a balanced household panel from 2013 to 2017, we show that political capital, as measured by CCP status, has a notable effect on wealth growth in the upper half of the wealth distribution, which has increased across wealth quantiles. The greater wealth growth of CCP households in the upper half of the distribution is mainly due to larger capital gains. As for savings, only slight differences between CCP and non-CCP households are observed. Human capital affects wealth accumulation through savings, but its influence in magnitude is rather small.

In conclusion, this article represents the first in-depth descriptive analysis of the net wealth gap between CCP and non-CCP households in urban China, documenting large and persistent inequalities. We invite future research to investigate to what extent such gaps are robust to potential selection biases embedded in CCP membership.

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
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
Appendix A Appendix

A.1 Figures and Tables




Notes: Compiled by authors based on CHFS (2013, 2015, and 2017) urban sample. All calculations are weighted with sample weights. For each year in CHFS, the figure shows the distributions of age, labour earnings, and pension incomes for the full sample (black line), the sub-sample that have available party membership information (red line), and for the sub-sample in which party membership is not available (light blue line).

Figure 9: Validation




Notes. Compiled by authors based on CHFS data for the household population in urban China.

Figure 10: CCP distribution over the total HH income deciles



Notes: Compiled by authors based on CHIP (1995 and 2002) and CHFS (2013, 2015, and 2017) urban sample. All calculations are weighted with sample weights. The figure compliments Figure 6 and displays the estimated UQR coefficient for the covariates X in equation 1.

Figure 11: Unconditional quantile regression - covariates effect



Notes: Estimations are based on CHFS. We include in the calculation all households that are continuously observed in 2013 2015 and 2017. Sample weights are applied. nw_i , σ_i , and q_i are defined as explain in Section 4.2. The table complements Figure 8 and reports the estimated coefficient from equation 4.2 of the other main covariates. Specifically, *Self-employed*, *Public Sector*, *Abstract Occ*, *Married*, *Active Rate*, refer to the share of adult members in the households that are self-employed, working in public sector, employed in abstract occupations (technicians, professionals, and directors), married, active on the labor market respectively. *Children* refers to the share of households members below 16, while *Active women* refers to the share of adult women currently active in the labour market. $N=6,803$.

Figure 12: Wealth Accumulation - OLS over panel 2013-2017 - Covariates

Wealth Aggregate	Wealth Component	Description	Differences between CHFS and CHIP
Gross Wealth	<i>Safe, Financial Wealth</i> <i>Risky, Financial Assets</i> <i>Housing Wealth</i> <i>Business Wealth</i> <i>Other Assets</i>	Cash, Deposits and Funds (excluding the housing fund) owned by the HH. Bonds, Financial products, Loans and Stocks owned by the HH Current account of housing Funds Current market value of the most valuable 3 houses owned by the HH Family share of the total assets (at current market value) invested in production and operation of industry and commerce, including individual business, leasing, transportation, online stores, and enterprises. Assets include project-related shops, cash deposits, inventory, office equipment, machinery, or mechanical means of transportation. these do not include the value of the project-related houses owned by business owner. Land Assets, Assets invested in agricultural machinery	In CHIP, house wealth only of the most valuable one?!!
Debt	<i>Financial Debt</i> <i>Educational Debt</i> <i>Housing Debt</i> <i>Production Debt</i> <i>Medical Debt</i>	Outstanding debt for the investment in financial products (stocks, bonds, financial products, ...) Outstanding debt for investment in education Outstanding debt on the 3 most valuable houses owned by the HH Outstanding Debt for agricultural and business related activities owned by the HH. Debt for medical care	Not available in CHIP In CHIP w/d first house considered ????? Excluded from CHFS. Information is discontinuous across CHFS waves.
Net Wealth	<i>Gross Wealth - Debt</i>		
Income Aggregate	Income Component	Description	Differences between CHFS and CHIP
Total Income	Net Labour Income Transfer Income Business Income Other Income	deducted by insurances and housing fund, bonuses, subsidies, and subsidy in kind received last year Income from pension and annuity and governmental subsidies received last year After-tax income from business related activities in which the HH is directly involved. It includes the after-tax income from agricultural activities in which the HH is directly involved, income from rents, income from financial activities, presents and donations received.	In CHIP we only have Pre-tax information In CHIP it is deducted by income tax, social contribution, subsidies and housing fund contribution In CHIP the information is available only pre-tax In CHIP it is only available the income from rents and dividends
Consumption		Average monthly consumption in food, utilities, necessities housing related expenses, transportations, communication, entertainment, clothing expenses. (multiplied by 12). Yearly expenses in education, travels, for medical reasons.	In CHIP it is not available

Table 7: Variable definition

	CHIP			CHFS	
	1995	2002	2013	2015	2017
Net Wealth	0.24	0.44	0.51	0.52	0.52
Gross Wealth	0.24	0.44	0.52	0.53	0.52
Safe Financial Wealth	0.31	0.42	0.82	0.67	0.69
Risky Financial Wealth	0.42	0.31	0.49	0.49	0.61
House Funds		0.28	0.75	0.67	0.63
House Wealth	-0.00	0.32	0.43	0.42	0.44
Business Wealth	0.06	0.11	-0.09	0.38	0.24
Total HH Income	0.25	0.38	0.49	0.43	0.49
Total HH Labour Income	0.18	0.36	0.39	0.31	0.41
Total HH Transfer Income	0.54	0.57	0.96	0.79	0.89
Total HH Business Income	-0.88	-0.19	-0.18	0.19	-0.05
Total HH Debt	0.23	0.62	0.63	0.52	0.54
Total HH Consumption			0.24	0.18	0.25
Total HH Savings			0.34	0.33	0.37
Δ Housing Ownership	0.06	0.08	0.08	0.06	0.06
N HHs	6,795	6,705	17,053	22,139	23,723

Notes: Estimations are based CHIP (1995, 2002) and CHFS (2013, 2015, and 2017). Only households living in urban areas with non-negative net wealth are included. Variables definition is available in Table 7. Outcome gaps are calculated as difference of the yearly-specific average outcome between CCP and non-CCP households over the average outcome non-CCP households. The sample is trimmed at the 1-st and 99-th percentile of the yearly-specific Net wealth distribution.

Table 8: Un-adjusted wealth and income gaps

Probit - How did HHs got the main house?	Average Partial Effect	Overall	Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%	N
<i>RE market</i>	CCP	0.03 ***	0.08 ***	0.01	-0.01	19,494
<i>Housing Policy - before 98</i>	CCP	0.06 ***	0.07 ***	0.05 **	0.07 *	6,007
<i>Housing Policy - after 98</i>	CCP	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.01	12,806
<i>Self-built</i>	CCP	-0.06 ***	-0.09 ***	-0.04 ***	-0.01	19,494
<i>Inheritance</i>	CCP	-0.02 ***	-0.03 ***	-0.02 ***	-0.01 *	19,494
OLS	β	Overall	Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%	N
<i>Purchasing Price of the House</i>	Housing Policy - before 98	-0.02 ***	-0.75 ***	-0.05 ***	-0.02 ***	
	Housing Policy - after 98	-0.02 ***	-0.91 ***	-0.04 ***	-0.02 ***	
	Self-built	-0.01 ***	-0.46 ***	-0.01 ***	-0.01 ***	
	Inheritance	15,988
<i>Current Value</i>	Housing Policy - before 98	0.01 ***	0.23 ***	0.01 **	0.00	
	Housing Policy - after 98	-0.01 ***	-0.26 ***	0.00	-0.00 *	
	Self-built	-0.01 ***	-0.50 ***	-0.01 **	0.00 ***	
	Inheritance	-0.02 ***	-0.54 ***	0.00	0.00	18,825
OLS	β	Overall	Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%	N
<i>(log-) Current Account in Housing Funds</i>	CCP	0.17 ***	0.16 **	0.18 ***	0.11	6,263
<i>(log-) Average Housing Funds Contribution</i>		0.11 ***	0.03	0.13 ***	0.14 ***	6,544

Notes: Estimations are based on CHFS 2017. Wealth is ranked using the net wealth level in each survey year. Only households living in urban areas with non-negative net wealth are included. Statically significant effects at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level are indicated with "**", "***", "****" respectively.

Table 9: Housing investment - 2017 sample

A.2 Historical Perspective on Housing Reforms in China.

The history of China's urban housing can be divided into three significant phases: 1949-1978 (pre-reform period); 1979-1998 (housing reforming period); 1999-present (post-reform period).

A.2.1 Housing socialist transformation (1949-1978): nationalization and public housing.

Nationalization: Before 1949, housing in China was mostly private owned. After the Chinese Communist party came to power, urban private housing was gradually nationalized. Until 1955, the share of private housing in urban China was still significant. For example, the ratio of private to total housing was 54% in Beijing, 66% in Shanghai, 54% in Tianjin, 78% in Jinan, 61% in Nanjing, and 86% in Suzhou [侯浙珉, 1999, p.9]. The socialist transformation of private housing was completed only at the end of 1958. In addition to retaining part of the privately-owned self-occupied housing, most of rental housing was confiscated. By 1978, 78.4% of the urban housing stock was publicly owned housing [侯浙珉, 1999, p.11].

Public housing: As urban housing became predominately owned by the state or state-run work units, the state took responsibility for providing and managing urban housing. The housing units were allocated, usually free or at a highly subsidized price, to state employees as in-kind compensation. The quality (location, size, housing condition) of the allocated housing largely depended upon the worker's administrative rank [Song and Xie, 2014]. Given such heavy subsidies, the nominal rent collected did not even cover the cost of basic maintenance of the housing, thus housing investment decreased considerably while urban living conditions were continuously deteriorating. The living area per capita in urban China decreased from 4.5 sqm in the early 1950s to 3.6 sqm in the 1970s [Tong and Hays, 1996].

A.2.2 Housing reforming period (1979-1998): from public housing to privatization

The mounting pressure in public housing system at the end of 1970s, especially the housing supply shortage, led to a series of housing privatization reforms in the 1980s and 1990s. In the early stage of urban housing reforms in 1980s, the government took a progressive approach by implementing experimental reform in selected cities [Wang and Murie, 2000], while nationwide housing reform began in 1991, when the property rights of privatized housing were officially recognized. In 1994, the government established a more comprehensive framework to facilitate the privatization of public housing stocks. Dwelling units previously owned by public employers were **sold** to residing employees at heavily subsidized prices. Meanwhile, private firms were allowed to enter the real estate industry and construct commercial houses for the first time. Consequentially, in the late 1980s, the real estate industry and private housing markets started to grow rapidly, with the per capita housing floor space rising from 5.2 sq meters in 1985 to 8.5 sq meters in 1996 Fu et al. [2000, p. 64]. By 2002, 85% of urban housing was privately-owned [Piketty et al., 2019]. Box A.2.2 summarizes the major house reform policies adopted in this period.

Box C.2: House Reform Policies (1983-1998)

- In 1983, the State Council issued a regulation on urban private housing, which establishes the first legal protection for households to own, purchase, sell, and rent private homes in urban areas. ('Regulations on urban private housing', State Council [1983], No.194).
- In 1988 housing commercialization was officially announced as the goal of housing reform by the State Council. ('Implementation plan for a gradual housing system reform in cities and towns', State Council [1988] No. 11)
- In 1991, the property rights of privatized housing were officially recognized. ('The resolutions of the state council about actively and appropriately carry out urban housing reform', State Council [1991] No. 30)
- In 1994, the State Council further deepening the housing reform by advocating a transition from in-kind allocation of publicly owned housing (福利房) to commercial urban housing (商品房). ('The decision on deepening the urban housing reform', State Council [1994] No. 43)
- In 1998, the State Council announced the official termination of in-kind allocations of publicly owned housing. ('A notification on further deepening the reform of the urban housing system and accelerating housing construction', State Council [1998] No. 23)

In this phase, privatization of public housing substantially occurred as lumpsum transfer of wealth in the form of discounted sales of public housing apartments to residing tenants, who were mostly workers or officials in the public sector. The private housing obtained during this privatization period is typically called purchased public housing (已购工房) or Housing-reform house (房改房), while in our research we use the term *welfare housing*, since these housing were initially distributed to the public as a type of welfare instead of a commodity. Since the initial allocation of the public housing (location, size, condition) was concentrated in public sectors (i.e. governmental institutions and state-owned companies), based on the administrative rank of the employee, understandably the housing reform has typically brought a windfall to those individuals working in the public sectors or having strong political connections (CCP members or government officials).

Another core policy for the transition is the establishment of the housing fund for urban employees at the end of 1990, which was designed for the purpose of housing purchase and renovation.³⁰ The housing fund has played the significant role in both housing reform and development of real estate' markets in China. However, there has been a growing concern on regressive distributional function [Lu and Wan, 2021]. Similar to the privatization of public housing, since the establishment of housing fund system, its coverage concentrates on public sectors, which is almost entirely located in urban China. Despite the expansion of the system to the private sector in the following decades, its coverage is still highly skewed. In 2020, residents in rural China and self-employed workers were still excluded from the system. In 2020, 50% of the employees registered in the housing fund system work in the public sectors, whose employees covers only 13% of total employees in urban China.³¹

³⁰The rates of housing fund range from 10% to 40% of employee's gross wage, split equally between employer and employee.

³¹National Housing Provident Fund 2020 Annual Report.

A.2.3 Post housing reform period (1999-present)

In 1998, the state council issued the official termination of in-kind allocations of publicly owned housing. According to the plan, after 1998 all newly built houses would be commercialized and old public housing would be gradually commercialized. The volume of private housing built as a share of the total annual flow supply more than doubled from 30.7% in 1997 to 72.4% in 2007 [Li et al., 2020].

The housing reform resulted in a vigorous and fast-growing urban housing market; consequentially, housing prices escalated rapidly after 2003, further exacerbating the problem of housing affordability. The central and local governments, therefore, implemented a large set of affordability-enacting policies³² that provided ground for the development of the ‘economically affordable housing’ (经济适用房).³³ The price of ‘economically affordable housing’ is substantially lower than the market price,³⁴ and, compared to welfare housing, the ‘economically affordable houses’ are designed to benefit all low-to-medium income urban households and not just the employees of the state-owned enterprises and governmental institutions. Nevertheless, in 2023 the affordable housing system in China is targeted only at urban residents who have city residence permits as part of its household registration system (commonly known as the hukou system). Migrant workers, floating populations, and others without urban residence permits are not covered.

³²In 2007, the State Council issued ‘Several Opinions on Solving the Housing Difficulties of Urban Low-income Households’; in 2008, the Central Work Conference on Economic Policy of the CCP emphasized the critical importance of alleviating housing poverty and developing the real estate market.

³³See ‘Notice of the Ministry of construction, the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of State Land and Resources and the People’s Bank of China about Issuing the Administrative Measures for Economically Affordable Houses’ (2004)

³⁴In order to construct the ‘economically affordable housing’, governments usually appropriate state-owned land to real estate developers at zero or very low price and then direct them to take responsibility of the finance and construction. The profit for real estate developers is capped around 3% to make sure the affordability of the ‘economically affordable houses’ for most low-to-medium households. For example, as a type of ‘economically affordable housing’, ‘Capped Price Housing (限价房)’ is sold at around 70% of the market price.

A.3 RIF-Regression Methods

Assume a generic wage structure function that depends on some observed components, X_i , some unobserved components, ϵ_i , and time, $t = 0, 1$:

$$Y_{it} = g_t(X_i, \epsilon_i) \quad (5)$$

From observed data on (Y, T, X) , we can identify the distributions of $Y_t|T = t \stackrel{d}{\sim} F_t$ for $t = 0, 1$. The framework proposed by Firpo et al. [2009, 2018] is a generalization of Oaxaca-Blinder that allows the estimation of a broad set of distributional parameters $v_t = v(F_t)$ including quantiles, variance, and the Gini Index under very general assumptions about the earnings setting equation 5. The central innovation is the use of Recentered Influence Functions (RIF). RIFs give the influence that each observation has on the calculation of $v(F_t)$ and have the property of integrating up to the parameter of interest $v(F_t)$. Therefore, it is possible to express group/time specific functions, v_1 and v_0 , as conditional expectations:

$$v(F_t) = E[RIF(y_t, v_t, F_t)|X, T = t] \quad (6)$$

In the specific case of quantiles, RIF is defined as:³⁵

$$RIF(t; q_t^p) = q_t^p + \frac{p - I[y \leq q_t^p]}{f_Y(q_t^p)} \quad (7)$$

$$E[RIF(y_t, q_t, F_t)|T = 1] = \frac{1}{f_Y(q_t^p)} Pr[Y > q_t^p | X = x] + (q_t^p - \frac{1-p}{f_Y(q_t^p)}) \quad (8)$$

$$= c_{1,p} Pr[Y > q_t^p | X = x] + c_{2,p} \quad (9)$$

In the above equations, q_t^p is the value of the p -quantiles of Y and $f_Y(q_t^p)$ is the estimated kernel density evaluated in q_t^p . Thus, RIF can be seen more intuitively as the estimation of a conditional probability model of being below or above the quantile q_t^p , re-scaled by a factor $c_{1,p}$, to reflect the relative importance of the quantile to the distribution, and re-centred by a constant $c_{2,p}$.

Firpo et al. [2009, 2018] prove that when using the estimated \widehat{RIF}_{it} as a dependent variable in a linear model, it is possible to estimate coefficients via standard OLS:

$$E[RIF(y_t, v_t, F_t)|X, T = t] = X_t' \widehat{\gamma}_t^v \quad (10)$$

$$\widehat{\gamma}_t^v = E[XX'|T = t]^{-1} E[RIF(y_t, v_t, F_t)|X, T = t] \quad (11)$$

X_t is a vector of covariates that entails dummies for the occupational class, as described in the sections above, and socio-demographic controls. γ_t^v represents the unconditional marginal effect of X on $v(F_t)$, and has to be interpreted as the marginal effect on the unconditional quantile of a small location shift in the distribution of covariates, holding everything else constant.

³⁵See Firpo et al. [2018] for more detailed information about RIF estimation of quantiles.

A.4 CCP premia on Income

A.4.1 CCP average Premia

In this section, we replicate previous literature analysis on CCP labour earnings premia. We do so to show that previous literature results are confirmed using CHFS. To isolate the influence of membership on wages and earnings, we estimate regressions models that control for the observable characteristics of the individual. We begin with a simple OLS regression that takes the following form:

$$\ln(y_{it}) = \alpha + \delta CCP_{it} + X'_{it}\beta + \epsilon_{it} \quad (12)$$

where y_{it} is net monthly labour earnings of currently employed workers, CCP_{it} is a dummy indicator for worker's party membership, X_{it} is a vector of covariates including age (5 main classes), a gender dummy, a married dummy, a dummy indicating the presence of children in the HH, worker's education dummies (3 main class), occupation (5 classes), and a public sector dummy. We use the same model to test also hourly wage premia, using hourly wages as y_{it} . We test equation 12 on currently working individuals living in urban China.

OLS presents different problems. First, as seen in the Probit tables 4, CCP members are more likely to be highly educated, work in public sector, and in high-paying occupations. This evidences suggest the presence of relevant selection biases in the membership process. In particular, if the likelihood to join the CCP is determined by unobservable characterises, the OLS estimates will be biased.³⁶ Two main empirical strategies are proposed by previous literature in order to deal with such potential endogeneity problems:

- *Propensity Score Matching (PSM)*: it consists of first estimating a propensity score, i.e. the probability of being a CCP member, using linear probability models. Then, based on the propensity scores, observations are matched and distinguished into a control group (i.e., non-party members) that is directly comparable to the treatment group (i.e., party members) based on observable characteristics. Next, the CCP premia is estimated as the average treatment effect. Such methodology should resolve problems of selection due to observable characteristics and is widely used in the literature on CCP premia estimation [McLaughlin, 2017, Guo and Sun, 2019, Nikolov et al., 2020].
- *IV with Endogenous Dummy regressor*: IVs are designed to solve selection based on observable characteristics. Following Appleton et al. [2009], McLaughlin [2017], Nikolov et al. [2020], we instrument the individual's party affiliation with parental membership and apply two-stage least squares [Wooldridge, 2002]. Parental membership is claimed to be a valid instrument since it is likely to predict individual membership via either demand factors (for example, parents act as role models) or supply factors (parents vouch for one's character) [Appleton et al., 2009], and may not have strong direct effects on own wages. Both Appleton et al. [2009] and McLaughlin [2017] provide extensive tests for the validity of the instrument. CHFS asks about parental CCP membership only to the direct survey respondent, implying a considerable sample restriction in the estimation of the 2sls.

Results for OLS, IV and PSM are displayed in the Table 10.

³⁶Exploiting the panel structure of our data, theoretically individual fixed effects models should solve these issues. However, this cannot be applied to the case of CCP membership since only a marginal fraction of the sample become CCP members within the time span in the data, having too little variation to exploit for a consistent estimation.

	2013		2015		2017	
	δ^{CCP}	N	δ^{CCP}	N	δ^{CCP}	N
<i>(log-) Monthly Gross Labor Earnings</i>						
OLS	0.08 ***	10,709	0.09 ***	14,359	0.05 ***	14,024
IV	0.80 ***	5,198	0.97 ***	6,543	0.48 ***	6,167
PSM	0.10 ***	10,709	0.06 **	14,359	0.07 ***	14,024
<i>(log-) Hourly Gross Wage Earnings</i>						
OLS	0.07 ***	10,395	0.09 ***	14,065	0.04 ***	14,022
IV	0.60 ***	5,031	0.74 ***	6,430	0.26 *	6,150
PSM	0.10 ***	10,395	0.05	14,065	0.05 **	14,022

Notes: Table reports the estimates from wave-specific OLS, PSM and IV models. Estimations are based on CHFS (2013, 2015, and 2017). Only individuals currently working aged 15 and above living in urban areas are included. Earnings and wages are trimmed at the 1-st and 99-th percentiles and do not include negative values. Sample weights are applied to estimation. Statically significant effects at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level are indicated with “*”, “**”, “***” respectively.

Table 10: CCP premia on individual labour earnings and wages.

First, It is immediate to see that in all the specifications CCP premia are found positive and statistically significant. Specifically, OLS and PSM estimates range between 5 and 10%.

Second, IV estimates are much higher. Similar results are found in McLaughlin [2017], with the author explaining that ‘*the instrumental variable estimator does not measure the average treatment effect, but estimates the local average treatment effect (LATE) for the sub-population of treated individuals for whom parental party membership causes them to be members. [...] If there is a concern that the OLS estimate is biased upward because of the ability and family background omitted variables, the IV estimate should be smaller in magnitude. However, it appears that the IV estimate is not consistent with the upward bias concern in OLS because IV estimates are larger compared to OLS estimates*’ (page 11).

Overall we learn that CCP membership does generate positive earnings and wage premia and, although there are might be selection mechanisms in CCP affiliation, OLS estimates can be considered trustworthy. Results are in line with the literature [McLaughlin, 2017, Nikolov et al., 2020].

A.4.2 CCP heterogeneous Returns


We next focus on the CCP returns on HH labour income for households that are currently active in the labour market. To do so, we apply RIF unconditional quantile regressions at the household level that take the following form:

$$Y_t^q = E[Rif(Y_{it}, q_t^q)] = \alpha^q + \delta^q CCP_{it} + X_{it}'\beta^q + \epsilon_{it}^q \quad (13)$$

where Y_t^q is q -th percentile of the household income distribution, CCP_{it} is a dummy indicating if at least one individual belonging to household is a CCP member, and X_{it} is defined as in equation 13.


In Figure 13 we report with solid blue lines the estimated δ^q coefficients and the relative 95% confidence intervals from equation 13. We report OLS estimates with dashed green lines. Interestingly, we observe a 7 – 13% CCP premia on HH income that is constant across the whole distribution and relatively stable across the years analyzed. Figure 14 compares the CCP returns on different HH Income aggregates. In particular, in red we report

UQR estimates of CCP membership on HH labour income; in orange estimates on HH labour and business income; and in light blue estimates on total HH incomes (from labour, business, transfers, and other sources). The dash green line reports estimates on HH Net Wealth as estimated in Figure 6. Interestingly, the CCP premia doubles once we also account for pension incomes and the CCP effect decreases along the household income distribution with the largest returns concentrated at the bottom of the distribution. While these findings corroborate the evidence of positive returns for CCP members, they also suggest that the effect is stronger for older generations that are now retired versus those that are still active in the labour market.



Notes: Compiled by authors based on CHIP (1995 and 2002) and CHFS (2013, 2015, and 2017) urban samples. All calculations are weighted with sample weights. The figure displays the estimated UQR coefficient for party membership in blue with the relative confidence intervals. The green dash line shows estimates from OLS regression.

Figure 13: Unconditional quantile regression on HH labour income - CCP membership



Notes: Compiled by authors based on CHIP (1995 and 2002) and CHFS (2013, 2015, and 2017) urban samples. All calculations are weighted with sample weights. The figure displays the estimated UQR coefficient for Party membership in blue with the relative Confidence intervals on different HH income aggregates: labour HH income in red, labour and business HH income in orange, total HH income in light blue. The dash green line reports estimates on HH Net Wealth as in Figure 6. The green dash line shows estimates from OLS regression.

Figure 14: Unconditional quantile regression CCP membership effects