

## The far-right donation gap

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# The Far-Right Donation Gap\*

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## Abstract

We document a widespread decline in the share of donors to charities in Western countries over the past decade, and show that this can be in part explained by a lower propensity to donate among far-right voters. Focusing on France, we first conduct a large-scale survey ( $N = 12,600$ ) and show that far-right voters are significantly less likely to report a charitable donation than the rest of the population, conditional on a rich set of controls. Second, using administrative tax data for the universe of French municipalities ( $N \simeq 33,000$ ) combined with electoral results, we find that the negative relationship between vote shares for the far right and charitable donations holds in a broad range of specifications, at both the extensive and the intensive margin, and controlling for municipality fixed effects. Third, we exploit unique geo-localized donation data from several charities and document similar patterns. All evidence points towards a drop in the propensity to donate driven by a shift in social norms that threatens general acceptance of the charitable sector.

**Keywords:** charitable giving, political donations, far-right, social norms, underlying preferences, communal moral values, universalist moral values.

**JEL No:** H24, H31, L38.

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
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# 1 Introduction

Although the 21st century is often being presented as the “age of philanthropy”<sup>1</sup> with an unprecedented increase in the amount of charitable giving, the *share* of the population donating to charities is declining in many Western democracies (see Figure 1). This drop – concomitant with the electoral rise of far-right parties in many of these countries – poses a threat to the charitable business, as giving increasingly relies on a small number of individuals. In this paper, we provide novel evidence on the relationship between political ideology and charitable donations. Specifically, drawing on insights from rich survey data, geo-localized tax data, and charity records, we show a significant and persistent donation gap among individuals who align themselves with far-right political ideologies. We investigate whether this gap may lead to a further reduction in charities’ donor base in the years to come.

Figure 1: An overall decline in the share of donors to charities



**Notes:** The figure plots the evolution of the share of households making a donation to charities. Sub-figure 1a reports this share for France using administrative tax data from Cagé and Guillot (2021) on the share of donors declaring a charitable donation on their tax return. Sub-figure 1b reports this share for Germany and the US using respectively the Deutscher Spendenrat and the Panel Study on Income Dynamics. Sub-figure 1c reports this share using household survey data for Netherlands (GINPS), Sweden (Giva Sveriges) and the UK (GSS).

To document what we call the “far-right donation gap” – the fact that far-right voters are

<sup>1</sup>See e.g. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jun/18/a-million-dollars-a-minute-the-rise-and-rise-of-philanthropy>.

significantly less likely to donate to charities than other citizens, even relative to people who abstain – we proceed in three steps. First, we run a large-scale pre-registered survey ( $N = 12,600$ ) one week before the 2022 presidential elections in France, where we ask respondents about their past and future donations. According to our findings, Marine Le Pen’s (far-right) voters are 6 percentage points less likely to make a charitable donation than citizens who abstain, and Eric Zemmour’s (far-right) voters are 4 percentage points less likely. In contrast, both Jean-Luc Mélenchon (left) and Emmanuel Macron’s (center) voters as well as supporters of all the other parties on the left and right of the political spectrum are more likely than abstainers – by 6 to 20 percentage points – to contribute money to a charity. Thus, while voting is generally associated with a higher propensity to donate relative to abstention, the reverse is true for far-right voters (Yen and Zampelli, 2014).<sup>2</sup>

On top of income, these findings are robust to controlling for a large number of demographic observables, such as the age of the surveyed individuals, their gender, marital status, religion, life satisfaction, trust, pessimism, as well as the size of the city where they live. It is also robust to using the surveyed individuals’ self-placement on a left-right scale, furthermore showing that the negative relationship between far-right voting and donations we document is specific to right-wing extremism and not to political extremism in general. More importantly, the size of the far-right effect does not vary when we control for additional observables, suggesting that the far-right donors gap is structural. We are also able to reproduce the same finding using survey data for Germany, suggesting that the far-right donation gap is not specific to France.

Survey data may suffer from a number of concerns, in particular regarding social desirability bias in reporting. To address these concerns, we leverage detailed administrative data on tax-deducted charitable contributions (Cagé and Guillot, 2021) for 33,037 French municipalities<sup>3</sup> between 2013 and 2019, and compare them with the vote shares obtained by each of the candidates in these municipalities in the first round of the presidential elections, controlling for a large set of city-level socio-demographic variables, including the local supply of charities. We find that a 10% increase in the vote share obtained by Le Pen in a municipality compared to abstention is associated with a 1.9% decrease in the share of households declaring a charitable donation on their tax return. Importantly, the magnitude of the estimated effect is consistent with the one we obtain when using the survey data; furthermore, we show that this effect happens at both the intensive and the extensive margin. We also find that this finding is robust to using the panel dimension of the administrative tax data – with two

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<sup>2</sup>Unfortunately, we do not have information on whether far-right voters devote more or less time (e.g. through volunteering) to charities compared to other voters. We indeed only have information on monetary contributions. However, in the last section of the paper, when dealing with external validity, we show that the probability of making a blood donation is also lower for far-right voters in Germany.

<sup>3</sup>This represents nearly the universe of French municipalities ( $\simeq 36,000$ ), except the very small ones due to statistical secrecy.

presidential elections that took place during our period of interest (in 2012 and 2017) – and thus to controlling for municipality fixed effects.

While most individuals declare their donations on their tax form to benefit from tax deductions, not all of them do so. To overcome this limitation of the administrative data, we finally obtain detailed information on donations received (with the precise date of the donation and the location of the donor) by three large charities in France: Action Contre la Faim (ACF), SOS Méditerranée (SOSM), and Oxfam. Using these data – we similarly merge with the electoral results at the local level – we find that a 10% increase in Le Pen’s vote share in a municipality compared to abstention is associated with a 1.9% (ACF) to 0.15% (Oxfam) percent decrease in the amount donated to these charities per household. In other words, even if the magnitude of the elasticity of the donations with respect to Le Pen’s vote is smaller for smaller charities like Oxfam and SOSM, the far-right donation gap remains both economically and statistically significant independently of the data source or of the estimation methods used.

What explains the negative relationship between far-right ideology and charitable giving? As highlighted above, our results are robust to controlling for pessimism, unhappiness, and (the lack of) trust at the individual level. Thus, while these factors have been associated with far-right voting (see e.g. Algan et al., 2017, 2019; Giuliano and Wacziarg, 2020; Guriev and Papaioannou, 2022), they cannot drive our findings. This suggests that there may be some unobservable characteristics that are simultaneously associated with far-right voting and a lower probability of making a charitable donation.

Inspired by the far-right criticism of charities as “*universalism without borders*,” we hypothesize – in the spirit of Enke (2020) – that far-right voting is associated with a lower propensity to donate to charities through the underlying moral values of far-right voters, specifically a sense of “communal” morality, which allocates more altruism to the in-group members than to the out-group members of society.<sup>4</sup> On the one hand, an individual displaying communal morality would be less likely to donate to “distant” charities, since the identity of the recipient is by definition unknown and likely to be out-group; on the other hand, the individual would also be more likely to identify with the far-right parties.<sup>5</sup>

We provide evidence in support of the communal morality hypothesis using information from the supply side of charity. Using the National Directory of Associations, we locate all the existing charities on the French territories. We separate the charities into “global” and “non-global” using their stated purpose: a charity is categorized “global” if its purpose explicitly mentions places in a foreign country or contains keywords such as “global” or “universal”. We

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<sup>4</sup>Moral values correspond to people’s deep beliefs about what is right and wrong. See also Enke et al. (2020).

<sup>5</sup>In the context of multi-party election systems such as the ones we observe in the majority of the Western democracies – and contrarily to the US – we think that it is the far right that appeals to people holding communal morality rather than the traditional right. We come back to this point below.

show that the interaction between the far-right effect and the percentage of global charities in a municipality is statistically significant and negative: in municipalities where charities have a globalist outlook, the far-right donors gap is wider. On the contrary, in municipalities that contain more non-global (local) charities, far-right voters are less hesitant to donate, with the reverse being true for more centrist voters.

In addition, we discuss anecdotal evidence that far-right politicians have become increasingly critical of the charitable sector and its “universalism without borders,” in particular compared to other parties. We next show for a sub-sample of the municipalities included in our tax data that the elasticity of charitable donations with respect to political donations is negatively associated with the far-right vote. In other words, the higher the far-right vote, the more political and charitable donations are negatively associated, suggesting that far-right voters perceive them more as substitutes than the rest of the population. This is in line with the reading that far-right voters substitute charitable donations with financing far-right politicians that push their communal values through policy.

We also show that the far-right donation effect is not driven by social desirability. It is indeed stronger in municipalities where the share of far-right voters is smaller (i.e. in municipalities where voters should theoretically suffer from more stigma if they do not donate).

Finally, we discuss the decomposition and implications of the far-right donation gap. First, while the far-right donation gap persists when we exploit the panel dimension of our tax data and control for municipality fixed effects, it is smaller in magnitude. Second, we show that the donation gap is not only driven by people who are newly converted to the far-right ideology but also by those whose affiliation with the far-right is more deep-rooted. In particular, we show that cities that voted more for the far right in 2012 experienced a much sharper drop between 2013 and 2019 in the share of households donating unexplained by changes in city-level characteristics. We provide additional evidence using survey data and show that the 2022 far-right donation gap is largely driven by people who were already voting for Le Pen in the previous 2017 presidential elections. These results point toward the fact that the decreasing trend in charitable contributors is driven by both the *intensification* of the existing preferences of people with communal morality, as well as by the *adoption* of people who did not possess communal morality before. Given the increasingly persistent electoral success of far-right parties, this poses a threat to the charitable sector in two ways. On the one hand, the stronger and more persistent the electoral success of far-right parties, the greater the chance that donations will decline. On the other hand, a shrinking donor base at the extensive margin may undermine the democratic legitimacy of large public subsidies that benefit charities in most countries.

**Literature review** This paper contributes to the nascent literature that highlights the role of political preferences in the decision to give money to a non-profit organization. While there is a large literature investigating the determinants of charitable donations (among others Andreoni, 1989; Andreoni et al., 2017; Dawood, 2015), the focus has mostly been on the overall rise of the charitable sector, with little attention to the fact that the *share of donors* among citizens has actually been decreasing in recent years. At the same time, a number of important determinants of charitable donations have been raised, both theoretically and empirically: pure altruism versus a warm-glow effect (Andreoni, 1990), reputation concerns (Tirole and Bénabou, 2006), price of giving (Randolph, 1995; Fack and Landais, 2010, 2016), and others.<sup>6</sup>

From a political economy perspective, we still know little about the relationship between charitable giving and political preferences of voters. Some papers have started to address this relationship between political affiliation and charitable giving. Alzuabi et al. (2022) use a large-scale household longitudinal survey in the UK to show that aligning with Labour vs the Conservative party is negatively associated with both the probability of donating money to charities and the proportion of income donated to charities. Yen and Zampelli (2014) use panel data to document the relationship between political preferences, tax burden and charitable contributions in the US; they show that Republican counties tend to report higher contributions than Democrats. Paarlberg et al. (2019), however, find no evidence of a positive relationship between political conservatism and the probability of giving in the US, suggesting that multi-party systems such as France may provide a better ground to understand the relationship between political preferences and giving. These papers link the relationship between political preferences and the donation behavior to three main factors: religious identity, preferences for government redistribution, and communication of economic status (see e.g. Brooks, 2007; Margolis and Sances, 2017; Yang and Liu, 2021). We are, to the extent of our knowledge, the first to provide evidence – using both survey and tax data – on the evolution of the share of charitable donors and its relationship to the electoral rise of the far right and of communal moral values. This is particularly relevant given that a shrinking donor base echoed by a rise of the far right might undermine public support for the generous subsidies that are granted to charities, often in the form of tax advantages that overproportionally benefit richer donors (Reich, 2018).

Finally, compared to Enke (2020) and Enke et al. (2020) who first emphasized the difference between universalist and communal moral values, our contribution is threefold. First, we exploit the multi-party electoral system in France, which allows us to show that the donation

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<sup>6</sup>On the role played by the price of a donation, see also Karlan and List (2007) and Rondeau and List (2008) using lab-field experiments. Karlan and List (2020) investigate the role played by leading donors, and Eckel and Grossman (2003), Eckel and Grossman (2006), and Eckel and Grossman (2008) investigate the relative efficiency of matching vs rebate.

gap is specific to the far right as opposed to the right or to extreme parties in general. Second, we make an important methodological contribution by highlighting the need to combine survey data with administrative and charity-level data to cross-validate results and overcome various measurement errors related to social desirability and reporting. Third, we leverage the time series of our data to compare the co-evolution of donation behavior and political preferences over time.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 below, we present the three novel databases we build for this study. Section 3 presents our main findings on the negative relationship between far-right voting and political donations. In Section 4, we discuss several mechanisms that could explain this result and highlight in particular the role played by communal values. Section 5 discusses the policy implications of our results as well as their external validity, and Section 6 concludes.

## 2 Data

In this section, we briefly introduce the different data sources we use in this paper. Summary statistics and a more detailed description of the data are provided in the online Appendix.

### 2.1 Survey data

We ran a pre-registered survey between April 2 and April 4, 2022, as a part of the 2022 French Electoral Survey (“*L’Enquête Electorale Française*”), a monthly panel run from September 2021 to June 2022 jointly by the survey company Ipsos, the newspaper *Le Monde* and the CEVIPOF at Sciences Po Paris.<sup>7</sup>

The data contains 12,600 individuals representative of the French voting-age population, for which we have detailed socio-demographic characteristics (including gender, age, education, location, profession, religion, and income; see online Appendix Table A.1 for descriptive statistics). Respondents are also asked about their political preferences, such as their projected vote in the 2022 presidential elections and their self-reported vote in the 2017 presidential elections (see online Appendix Table A.2 for summary statistics). As part of this research project, we added to this standard electoral survey a novel module on past and future charitable and political donations. Specifically, we introduce the following questions:<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>The survey was pre-registered at the AER RCT Registry: AEARCTR-0009023. The first part of the survey is about the reported donations (past and future) of the surveyed individuals and is at the core of this research paper. The second part is an experiment aimed at understanding the role played by tax deductions and belongs to a different research project.

<sup>8</sup>In the questionnaire, we distinguish non-profit organizations (in French, “*associations*”) from foundations (in French, “*fondations*”) given that they are formally two different legal forms of non-profits, which may create confusion (e.g. citizens may think that they make a donation to a “foundation” that formally is an “association” and the reverse; the main differences between the two come from the bylaws as well as from somehow different tax deductions – in particular with respect to the wealth tax). We ask specifically about



- Of the following organizations, have you made a donation in the last 12 month to [*a non-profit organization/a foundation/the Téléthon/A political party or movement/An electoral campaign*]?
- If yes, what was the overall amount of your donations?
- If yes, did you report this donation on your income tax return?
- Do you plan to make a donation in the next 12 months to [*a non-profit organization/a foundation/the Téléthon/A political party or movement/An electoral campaign*]?
- If yes, how much do you plan to donate?

Table 1 reports summary statistics on these variables. 43% of the surveyed individuals report a charitable donation in the past 12 months, while about 5% of the individuals report a political donation. Among those who report a donation, the average amount donated (combining both charitable and political donations<sup>9</sup>) is €249. 28% of the surveyed respondents in our sample also report having declared this donation on their income tax return.<sup>10</sup>

Our data may suffer from a reporting bias that has been well-documented in the existing literature; because of social desirability, surveyed individuals tend to over-report donations (see e.g. Bekkers and Wiepking, 2011). Indeed, only about 10 to 12% of households in France report on average a donation every year on their income tax return as observed in the fiscal data (Cagé and Guillot, 2021). Note, however, that part of the gap between the fiscal data and the reported donations in the survey may also come from the fact that most households (as encompassed in the tax data) include several individuals, while the survey data is at the individual level. Importantly, note also that the magnitude of the total amount of donations implied by the survey declaration matches approximately the official numbers (€5.9 billion vs €5.1 billion).<sup>11</sup> To address the bias that may come from social desirability, we nonetheless complement our survey data with administration tax data and charitable-level donation information.

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the Téléthon given it is the most famous French non-profit organization.

<sup>9</sup>Unfortunately, given the strong space (and monetary) constraints associated with the fact of adding a new module to the existing “*Enquête électorale*” (with 12,600 surveyed individuals), we were not able to ask individuals separately for the amount of their charitable donations vs. the amount of their political donations. Hence, when presenting the results using the survey data, we will focus on the extensive margin, i.e. on the probability of making a donation. However, the administrative tax data allows us to also consider the intensive margin (i.e. the average amount given).

<sup>10</sup>Charitable and political giving can indeed benefit in France from a nonrefundable income tax credit equal to 66% of the gift (see e.g. Fack and Landais, 2010; Cagé and Guillot, 2021).

<sup>11</sup>According to *France Générosité* (<https://www.francegenerosites.org/chiffres-cles/>), charitable donations in France in 2021 are around €5 billions; political donations could reach around €100 million during election years (Cagé, 2018; Cagé, 2022), leading to a total amount of individual-level donations of €5.1 billions.

Table 1: Summary statistics: Past and future (self-reported) donations

	Mean	St.Dev
<b>Have you made a donation in the past 12 months to</b>		
A non-profit organization	0.31	0.46
A foundation	0.15	0.36
The telethon	0.10	0.30
A charitable donation (overall)	0.43	0.49
A political party	0.04	0.21
An electoral campaign	0.02	0.14
I have not made any donation	0.55	0.50
<b>Amount given in the past 12 months</b>		
Amount of donations (including the 0s)	113	422
Amount of donations (cond. on giving)	249	600
=1 if declared the donation(s)	0.63	0.48
<b>Have you declared a donation in the past 12 months to</b>		
A non-profit organization	0.22	0.41
A foundation	0.10	0.30
The telethon	0.07	0.25
A charitable donation (overall)	0.28	0.45
A political party	0.03	0.17
An electoral campaign	0.01	0.11
<b>Do you plan to make a donation in the next 12 months to</b>		
A non-profit organization	0.31	0.46
A foundation	0.15	0.36
The telethon	0.10	0.30
A political party	0.03	0.18
An electoral campaign	0.01	0.11
Total amount I plan to give	228.13	501.22
I don't plan to make a donation	0.57	0.50
Observations	12,600	

**Notes:** The table reports summary statistics for the surveyed individuals as part of the *Enquête Electorale Française* (see the text for more details). An observation is an individual.

## 2.2 Administrative tax data

We use administrative tax data from Cagé and Guillot (2021), which include the total amount of charitable donations declared by households aggregated at the municipality/year level in France between 2013 and 2019 – our data include 33,037 municipalities, which represents nearly the universe of French municipalities ( $\simeq 36,000$ ), except the very small ones due to statistical secrecy. Specifically, the data include all charitable donations that benefit from a 66% tax deduction.

These administrative tax data also include municipality/year information on the number of tax households, the reference tax income of the households, the total amount of tax paid, the numbers of retired persons and the total pension. We complement it with census data that allow us to control for the demographics of the municipalities, including the age of the population, the average education, the share of foreigners, etc. Online Appendix Table A.4 presents summary statistics on these variables.

The administrative tax data contain information on the aggregate amount donated, but do not report the precise destination of the donations.<sup>12</sup> Furthermore, some households may decide not to report their donations, in particular if they are not eligible to the tax deductions (see e.g. Fack and Landais, 2010). To overcome these limitations, we thus finally reach out to individual charities to obtain their donation data.

## 2.3 Charity-level data

We obtained access to detailed donation data from three different charities: Action Contre la Faim (ACF), SOS Méditerranée (SOSM), and Oxfam.

**Action Contre la Faim** ACF is a non-governmental organization that fights hunger in the world.<sup>13</sup> It provided us with data on all the donations it received from France between 2010 and 2022, with detailed information on the date of the donation as well as on the location of the donor. Overall, the dataset includes more than 4 million observations, and accounts for around €40-50 million in donations every year .

**SOS Méditerranée** SOSM is a European, maritime-humanitarian search and rescue organization established in 2015, currently operating in the Mediterranean sea in international

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<sup>12</sup>Apart from setting apart the charities that help people in need under the “Coluche” label (see above), and disentangling between charitable and political donations.

<sup>13</sup>According to its website, . *“its mission is to save lives eradicating hunger through the prevention, detection, and treatment of malnutrition, in particular during and after emergency situations caused by conflicts and natural disasters.”* The organization was created in 1979 by a number of French intellectuals, and is structured on an international network. It provides a coordinated response in nearly 50 countries (see online Appendix Figure B.1 for an illustration).

waters north of Libya.<sup>14</sup> It provided us with annual information on all donations received since its creation in 2015, with information on the city of the donors. We focus on all donations coming from Metropolitan France.

**Oxfam** Oxfam is a British-founded confederation of 21 independent charitable organizations focusing on the alleviation of global poverty, founded in 1942 and led by Oxfam International. We obtain data from Oxfam France, the French section of Oxfam International, covering 2009-2022.<sup>15</sup>

As we did for the administrative tax data, we merge these data from ACF, SOSM and Oxfam with municipality/year-level covariates, and compute the amount of donations made per tax household (see online Appendix Table A.5 for summary statistics). Online Appendix Figure B.2 plots the temporal evolution of these donations.

## 2.4 Additional data

**Electoral data** For each municipality, we obtain the election results for the first round of the 2012, 2017 and 2022 presidential elections from the Interior Ministry. We label the political ideology of each candidate in accordance with the political party for which they ran. Throughout the analysis, we focus on the vote shares obtained by each candidate as a share of the total number of registered voters, thus taking abstention as the reference category. We focus on presidential elections for the sake of comparison between municipalities (contrarily to other elections, the same candidates are indeed running in all the municipalities during presidential elections).

**National Directory of Associations** To gain insights into the supply side of charities, we rely on the French national directory of associations (*“Répertoire National des Associations,”* RNA), the repository of all the non-profit organizations. By law, all French non-profit organizations are included in this dataset, which contains a unique identifier for each of them, as well as their stated purpose.

While an association has to make a declaration to the RNA at the time of its creation, many associations that cease to be active do not report their dissolution. As a result, the RNA contains 2 million observations, of which 1.5 million non-profit organizations marked active in 2018, i.e. significantly more than the INSEE’s estimation of 1.2 million active non-profit

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<sup>14</sup>The organization chartered the Aquarius and more recently the Ocean Viking in order to rescue people fleeing by sea from Libya who are at risk of drowning. It was founded by German former captain Klaus Vogel and Frenchwoman Sophie Beau after the Italian navy ended the rescue Operation Mare Nostrum in 2014. It has headquarters in Marseille (France), Milan (Italy), Frankfurt (Germany), and Geneva (Switzerland).

<sup>15</sup>Oxfam France, was founded in 1988 – under the name “Agir ici pour un monde solidaire” – and became part of Oxfam International in 2003 (first as an observer and then as a member in 2006).

organizations.<sup>16</sup> Hence, while the RNA can be used as a proxy for the overall stock of global vs. local non-profits at the municipality level in France (see Section 4.1 below), it cannot be used to accurately measure the annual variation in the local supply of associations.

### 3 Empirical estimation: The far-right donation gap

In this section, we document a negative relationship between support for the far-right and donations to charities. We first consider the extensive margin, i.e. the propensity to donate to charities, and then turn to the intensive margin.

#### 3.1 Far-right ideology and the propensity to donate to charities

##### 3.1.1 Evidence from survey data

To estimate the relationship between electoral support for the far right and the propensity to donate to charities, we first rely on the individual-level survey data described in Section 2.1. We estimate the following model:

$$Donation_i = \pi_0 + \mathbf{Vote}_i \pi_1 + \mathbf{X}_i' \pi_2 + \epsilon_i \quad (1)$$

where  $i$  indexes the surveyed individuals, and  $Donation_i$  is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent reports that she has made a charitable donation in the past 12 months, and to zero otherwise.

$\mathbf{Vote}_i'$  is a vector of indicator variables that represent the candidate that the respondent intends to vote for in the 2022 presidential elections. Twelve candidates ran in the first round of the elections, out of which three can be classified as far-right: Nicolas Dupont-Aignan (who obtained 2.06% of the casted votes), Eric Zemmour (7.07%) and Marine Le Pen (23.15%). The omitted category is abstention.


$\mathbf{X}_i'$  is a vector of controls including demographics (gender, age, marital status, residential area), the respondent's income bracket, her religion, life satisfaction, trust in political actors (such as the president, the mayor of the municipality where she lives, the media and the political parties) and trust in various members of the society (such as family members, strangers, and people of different nationalities and religions) (see Section 2.1 above and Appendix Table A.3). We include these controls one at a time.

Figure 2 reports the results of the estimation (see online Appendix Table A.6 for the associated regression table).<sup>17</sup> We first report the raw relationship between far-right support and the propensity to donate (black dots) and then progressively introduce the controls. As

<sup>16</sup><https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/5365639>.

<sup>17</sup>Figure 2 reports the coefficients we obtain when estimating an OLS model. We show in the Appendix that the results are robust to rather using a Probit model (given the use of indicator variables); see below.

Figure 2: The far-right donation gap: Evidence from self-reported donations (2022 electoral survey)



**Notes:** The figure reports the results of the estimation of equation (1), using an OLS model. An observation is an individual ( $N = 12,600$ ) and the corresponding regression coefficients are reported in the online Appendix Table A.6. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. The “other left” candidates include the candidate from the French communist party (Fabien Roussel, 2.28%) of the votes, the candidate of the *Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste* (Philippe Poutou, 0.77%), the candidate of the Socialist party (Anne Hidalgo, 1.75%), and the candidate of *Lutte Ouvrière* (Nathalie Arthaud, 0.56%). The “other right” candidates include the candidate of *Les Républicains* (Valérie Pécresse, 4.78%).

highlighted above, the omitted category is abstention. We find that respondents who intend to vote for Le Pen report on average a 4 to 6% lower probability of having made a donation than people who abstained. This result is significant at the 5% level. Zemmour’s voters also tend to give less than abstainers – and than supporters of other candidates (except Le Pen) – but to a lower extent. We find no statistically significant effect for Nicolas Dupont-Aignan’s supporters (not reported), but there are very few (Dupont-Aignan only obtained 2.06% of the votes in the first round of the elections).

Importantly, this gap in the propensity to donate between far-right citizens and other voters does not disappear or change in magnitude when we add controls. On the other hand, for other candidates, we see a drop in the conditional propensity to donate, in particular when we control for income. In other words, the observable characteristics such as income and life satisfaction can partly explain why supporters of other parties donate more than abstainers, but cannot rationalize why far-right supporters contribute less.

**Robustness** We find similar results if, rather than using the expected votes, we use a self-evaluated political preference scale from 0 (Left) to 10 (Right) as the independent variable; the results are reported in the online Appendix Table A.7.

Moreover, the results are robust to using a Logit or a Probit specification rather than a linear probability model (online Appendix Tables A.8 and A.9) and to using intended future donations instead of reported past donations (Table A.10).

Finally, we investigate the external validity of this finding using the German Socioeconomic Panel, a large household panel in Germany that records voting intentions and various self-reported donation behavior between 2010 and 2020. Besides donations to charities, we can investigate donations for refugees and blood donations. We run the same specification as for the French survey data and reported the results in the online Appendix Figure B.3 and Table A.11. We find that supporters of the far-right *Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD) party differ similarly from other voters and are 10-25 % less likely to report donations, although the difference is not significantly different from unaligned voters. Perhaps unsurprisingly, AfD voters are even less likely to have donated – money or in kind – for refugees following the arrival of large numbers of refugees in 2015. The right panel of Figure B.3 suggests that AfD voters are even less likely to donate blood than other voters. Blood donations are a good proxy of a time-intensive, pro-social, in-kind donations with little to no direct interaction with the beneficiary.

However, since the survey data rely on self-reported donations, there could be a concern over misreporting, in particular due to the social desirability bias.<sup>18</sup> To deal with this, we turn to the use of the administrative tax data.

### 3.1.2 Evidence from administrative tax data

We validate the survey analysis with administrative tax data on the annual share of households in a municipality that report a charitable donation in their tax declaration. We merge this share with the municipality-level electoral results. Specifically, we estimate the following model:

$$Donors_{c(d),t} = \pi_0 + \mathbf{Elections}'_{c(d)}\pi_1 + \mathbf{X}'_{c(d),t}\pi_2 + \gamma_d + \omega_t + \epsilon_{c(d),t} \quad (2)$$

where  $c$  indexes the municipalities,  $d$  the departments and  $t$  the years.

The dependent variable,  $Donors_{c(d),t}$ , is the share of households that deducted a charitable donation on their tax return in city  $c$  in year  $t$ . The tax data is available annually from 2013 to 2019. Two presidential elections took place around this time period – in 2012 and in 2017. We take the average share of households donating between 2013 and 2016 and compare it to the

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<sup>18</sup>Especially given the comparison between our data and administrative tax data discussed in Section 2 above.

2012 election results; and between 2017 and 2019 and relate it to the 2017 election results.<sup>19</sup> In our preferred estimation strategy, we use the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformation of the share of households and of the vote shares.<sup>20</sup> Standard errors are clustered at the level of the departments.

The main independent variable,  $\mathbf{Elections}'_{c(d)}$ , is a vector of the (IHS transformations of the) vote shares obtained by the candidates in the 2012 and 2017 presidential elections, with the share of the registered voters abstaining as the reference category.  $\mathbf{X}'_{c(d),t}$  is a time-varying vector of municipality-level controls – which, as before, we introduce sequentially – and includes measures of demographics, median income, inequality, the share and structure of the foreign population, the local employment structure, the average education levels as well as the number of tax households and pensions (see Section 2.2 for details on the set of controls included and Appendix Table A.4 for summary statistics). Finally, we control for time ( $\omega_t$ ) and department ( $\gamma_d$ ) fixed effects.

Figure 3 reports the results of the estimation of equation (2) separately for the 2012 presidential elections (sub-Figure 3a) and for the 2017 presidential elections (sub-Figure 3b).<sup>21</sup> The patterns we obtain are consistent with the survey-level results: both in 2012 and 2017, municipalities with a higher vote share for Le Pen also have a lower share of households declaring a donation to charities. In terms of magnitude, with respect to abstention, a one-percent increase in the vote share for Le Pen in 2012 is associated with a 0.19 to 0.17% decrease in the share of donors. This finding is robust to controlling for the local socioeconomic conditions, and the magnitude is roughly similar for the 2017 elections (0.19 to 0.21% decrease).

Note also that the magnitude of the estimates is consistent with the one we obtain when using the survey data. As reported in Figure 3, a 1% increase in the vote share for Le Pen is associated with a decrease of around 0.2% in the share of donors, which implies that moving from abstaining to voting Le Pen (i.e. a 100% increase in the vote share for Le Pen) leads to a 20% decrease in the share of donors. According to the survey data, the share of donors among abstainers is equal to 35.4%; hence, a 20% drop would decrease this share to 28.3%, i.e. a drop of 7 percentage points in the share of donors, consistent with the fact that, according to our survey estimations, Le Pen’s voters are around 6 percentage points less likely to make a charitable donation than abstainers. Hence, it is thus unlikely that the reported difference between far-right voters and the rest of the population comes from a reporting bias.

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
<sup>19</sup>In the robustness section below, we show that our results hold if we take instead the sum of the share of donors, or if we consider each year separately. In Section 3.2, we present the results of the estimation if we introduce municipality fixed effects.

<sup>20</sup>This accounts for outliers and zero values, which we do observe in the voting data for some candidates given the high granularity of the municipality-level data.

<sup>21</sup>The corresponding regression tables are reported in the online Appendix (respectively Table A.12 and A.13).



Figure 3: The far-right donation gap: Evidence from administrative tax data and electoral results



**Notes:** The figure reports with 95% confidence intervals the results of the estimation of equation (2), using an OLS model. An observation is a city and the corresponding regression coefficients are reported in the online Appendix Tables A.12 (sub-Figure 3a) and A.13 (sub-Figure 3b). Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. The omitted category is abstention.

**Robustness** The estimates presented in Figure 3 are robust to using the level (rather than the IHS transformation) of both the dependent and the independent variables (see online Appendix Tables A.14 and A.15). They are also robust to using the sum rather than the mean of the share of donors between two presidential elections (online Appendix Tables A.16 and A.17), and hold when breaking the tax data down annually (online Appendix Table A.18). We further show that our results are robust to dropping the municipalities in the eight electoral districts that had elected a far-right representative in the 2017 election to remove any potential direct influence of elected politicians on our estimates (online Appendix Table A.19). Finally, as we will discuss in more detail in Section 5.1, this finding is qualitatively similar when controlling for municipality fixed effects.

### 3.2 Far-right ideology and the overall amount of donations

Until now, we have focused on the extensive margin of charitable donations – whether individuals have made (or reported) a donation – independently of the amount of this donation. We now turn to the intensive margin, i.e. investigate how much individuals contributed conditional on making a donation.

To do so, we estimate equation (2), but use as the dependent variable the total amount of charitable donations reported in municipality  $c$  in year  $t$ , normalized by the number of households in the municipality. First, we use the overall amount reported in the tax data (covering the time period 2013-2019); second, we proceed similarly but instead consider alternatively the donations received by ACF (2012-2022), Oxfam (2012-2022), and SOSM (2015-2022<sup>22</sup>).

Table 2 presents the results. A 1% increase in Le Pen’s vote share is associated with a 0.2% decrease in the total amount of charitable donations declared on the tax forms (Column (1)). The magnitude of the results is roughly similar if we consider the donations made to Action Contre La Faim (Column (2)). We also observe a statistically significant drop for the donations received by Oxfam (Column (3)) and SOSM (Column (4)), but the magnitude is much smaller.

This lower magnitude is in part due to the fact that both SOSM and Oxfam (France) are relatively small charities, which have less variability in the donations they receive. Online Appendix Table A.21 reports the standardized coefficients. A one standard-deviation increase in the vote share for Le Pen is associated with a 0.05 standard-deviation decrease in the total donations made to Oxfam and SOSM. While smaller, this is qualitatively similar to the 0.09 standard-deviation decrease observed for the donations declared on the tax form.

Finally, we are well aware of the fact that both SOSM and Oxfam, and to a certain extent ACF, may be perceived as rather left-wing associations. It would be of interest to investigate in the future whether these findings based on charity records also hold with more right-wing

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<sup>22</sup>SOS Méditerranée was indeed created in 2015 and we thus do not have donation data before this date.

Table 2: Far-right ideology and the overall amount of donations

	(1) Tax data	(2) ACF	(3) Ofxam	(4) SOSM
LFI (Rad. Left)	-0.032** (0.013)	0.026*** (0.010)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.012** (0.005)
PS (Left)	0.048*** (0.011)	0.051*** (0.009)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.003)
LREM (Center)	0.108*** (0.011)	0.052*** (0.011)	0.004* (0.002)	0.007 (0.005)
LR (Right)	0.142*** (0.019)	0.043*** (0.014)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.005)
DLF (Rad. Right)	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.003* (0.002)	-0.013*** (0.004)
FN (Rad. Right)	-0.219*** (0.021)	-0.198*** (0.017)	-0.017*** (0.004)	-0.031*** (0.007)
Department FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Election FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	57,349	57,349	57,349	27,561
Clusters (Departments)	101	101	101	95
Mean DepVar	4.23	0.58	0.03	0.04
Sd DepVar	0.59	0.49	0.11	0.14

**Notes:** \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Models are estimated using an OLS (standard errors clustered at department level between parentheses). An observation is a city/election, and all the specifications include city and election fixed effects. Controls are city-level controls and include local demographics, income, share of foreigners, employment, education and taxes. The dependent variable is the (IHS transformation of) the total amount of charitable donations reported in municipality  $c$  in year  $t$ , normalized by the number of households in the municipality. In Column (1), we consider the amount declared in the tax data; in Column (2), the donations received by *Action contre la Faim* (ACF); in Column (3), the donations received by *Oxfam*; and in Column (4), the donations received by *SOS Méditerranée* (SOSM). The independent variable is a vector of the (IHS transformations of the) vote shares obtained by the different candidates in the 2012 and 2017 presidential elections, except for column (4) since SOSM was founded only in 2015. The omitted category is abstention.

ones. Unfortunately, very few charities are willing to share their donation-level information, and we leave this question for future research.

## 4 Mechanisms

In the section above, we show that far-right voters are consistently less likely to donate to charities than other citizens, including those who abstain in elections. Not only is this donation gap robust to controlling for a wide range of covariates (including demographics, income, religion, and various measures of social capital), but the magnitude of the far-right effect – in stark contrast to other political affiliations – is nearly unchanged when we introduce these controls. This seems to suggest that the link between far-right voting and a lower propensity to donate is structural and exhibits something deeper about voters’ beliefs.

In this section, we suggest that the far-right donation gap may be partly explained by differences in people’s moral views: far-right ideologies appeal more to people who hold a “communal” morality that emphasizes in-group identity (as defined by Enke, 2020) and are thus averse to donating to “distant” charities where the identity of the recipient cannot be controlled. We show evidence for this in two ways. First, we leverage data on the *supply-side of charities*, by exploiting city-level variations in the number of charities that focus on global issues. Second, we present evidence on the *supply side of politics*, and document that in recent years far-right politicians have increasingly attacked the charitable sector. We then show that the higher the far-right vote share in a municipality, the higher the substitutability between charitable and political donations, suggesting that far-right voters instead donate to politicians that claim to support communal values through policy.

We also address and reject the hypotheses that the far-right donation gap is driven by the social desirability of donating, which makes us confident that it is indeed changes in underlying social norms that is driving the gap.

### 4.1 Local vs. global charities

The concept of universalist vs. communal moral values is described in details in Enke (2020), who also shows that universalist moral values are often strongly positively correlated to donations to “global” charities. On the contrary, voters with communal moral values seem to value authority and in-group identity and to be inherently averse to contributing to “distant” charities. In a multi-party political system such as France, such values would more likely serve as the psychological foundation for voting far-right.

To investigate whether the universalist vs. communal morality cleavage may explain the far-right donation gap, we provide evidence based on the composition of the supply of charities. Information about the supply of charitable associations at the municipality level come from

the national directory of associations (see Section 2 above for a brief description of the data). We characterize charitable associations by their mission statement, i.e. whether they are “global” charities that aim to help people in different parts of the world (which will typically be the case of ACF) or “non-global” charities, which might focus more on local issues.

We adopt a simple characterization method: we take the stated purpose of each of the charitable organizations and categorize them as a “global charity” based on the presence of “global keywords.” Global keywords are selected from the (stemmed) list of all high-frequency words in the stated purpose of charities.<sup>23</sup> We manually choose the words that refer to foreign places<sup>24</sup> or those that contains a globalist thinking such as “global,” “European,” or “international.” The complete list of the global keyword dictionary can be found in the online Appendix Section C.1, where we also provide additional details on the classification method.

We categorize a charity as global if its stated purpose contains at least one global keyword. For example, a charity whose stated purpose is “distribution of school supplies in Morocco, Africa”<sup>25</sup> is categorized as global, while a charity whose stated purpose is “feed, heal and sterilize the stray cats of Saint-Médard”<sup>26</sup> is not categorized as global. Overall, about 18% of the charities are categorized as global, with a slightly higher concentration in larger cities.

To investigate whether the supply of global charities affects our findings, we estimate the following model:

$$\begin{aligned} Donors_{c(d),t} = & \pi_0 + \mathbf{Elections}'_{c(d)t} \pi_1 + \pi_2 \text{Number of global nonprofits}'_{c(d)t} \\ & + \mathbf{Elections}'_{c(d)t} \times \text{Number of global nonprofits}'_{c(d)t} \pi_3 \\ & + \pi_4 \text{Total number of nonprofits}_{c(d)t} + \mathbf{X}'_{c(d),t} \pi_5 + \gamma_d + \omega_t + \epsilon_{c(d)t} \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

where  $Donors_{c(d),t}$  is, as before, the (IHS transformation of the) share of households that have deducted a charitable donation in year  $t$  in city  $c$ , and  $\mathbf{Elections}'_{c(d)t}$  is a vector of the (IHS transformation of the) vote shares obtained by each of the candidates in the presidential elections.  $\text{Number of global nonprofits}'_{c(d)t}$  is the number of global nonprofit organizations per 1,000 inhabitants in city  $c$  and year  $t$ . We also control for the overall number of nonprofit organizations per 1,000 inhabitants in the city ( $\text{Total number of nonprofits}_{c(d)t}$ ) (we use the IHS transformation of both variables). The other control variables included in the vector  $\mathbf{X}'_{c(d),t}$  are the same as in Section 3.1.2.

<sup>23</sup>High-frequency words refers here to words that showed up more than 10 times in all stated purposes of charities; in total, there are about 5,000 words that are high-frequency, out of which we selected 434 global keywords. We used the stemming function in French from the nltk.corpus.

<sup>24</sup>Foreign places include all the foreign continents, countries, regions and city names in adjective or noun form in the high-frequency list.

<sup>25</sup>This is the case for example of the nonprofit organization “TEAM VW GOLF 2 BOSTON.”

<sup>26</sup>Saint-Médard is a small city in France. This charity is called “*L’Ile aux chats*” (Island for cats).

We are interested in the sign of  $\pi_3$ . Indeed, one might expect the likelihood of donating to a charity to vary with the supply of charities. In particular, while a citizen with communal morality might dislike donating to charity by default, she might be less reluctant to donate to charities that focus exclusively on local issues. Table 3 reports the results for the 2012 and 2017 presidential elections pulled together.<sup>27</sup> In Column (2), we introduce the number of charities and the number of global charities, where the latter is more predictive of the share of households that donate without affecting the estimated elasticities of the share of donors with respect to vote shares.

Column (3) shows that the negative relationship between far-right voting and the propensity to donate is stronger in places with more global charities. The effect is both statistically and economically significant: holding the total number of charities per 1,000 inhabitants constant, a 1% increase in the local number of global charities increases the size of the far-right donation gap by one fourth (from a baseline of -0.21 to -0.16 ). On the other hand, the interaction term is not statistically significant for the other parties, and positive for the Socialist party: left-wing voters donate more in cities with a higher number of global charities (although the magnitude of the effect is relatively small). This finding is consistent with our assumption that communal vs universalist moral values partly explain the far-right donation gap.

## 4.2 Salience and political donations

**Charities as a far-right policy issue** As early as 2014, Éric Zemmour – one of the far-right candidates in the 2022 presidential elections in France – wrote in his book *Le Suicide français*, in a chapter partly devoted to the charity sector (and in particular to “Les Restos du Coeur,” one of the main French nonprofit organizations): everything “*was copied from the Anglo-Saxon models: the charitable objective, but also the number of celebrities (...), the altruistic theme, the universalism without borders, even the images of the studio recording (...). But while this business of charity was a secular tradition in the Anglo-Saxon Protestant world, it was an innovation in a Catholic country like France where the State had ousted the Church in its role of providing social charity since the Revolution. In France, solidarity is guaranteed by taxes and redistribution organizations that avoid the humiliating clash between a donor and his recipient. But it was undoubtedly the historical vocation of this post-Second World War generation to end up in the arms of Anglo-Saxon liberal Protestantism, after it had ruthlessly destroyed the moral and then economic foundations of the French Catholic-social state.*” This criticism has become more salient in recent years, in particular with a number of far-right local politicians (in particular mayors) openly cutting subsidies to a number of nonprofit

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<sup>27</sup>In the online Appendix, we report the results for these two elections considered separately: see Table A.22 for the 2012 presidential elections and Table A.23 for the 2017 ones.

Table 3: The propensity to donate and the local supply of global charities

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	% HHs donating		% HHs donating		% HHs donating	
Mélenchon	-0.033***	(0.009)	-0.033***	(0.009)	-0.033***	(0.009)
PS	0.082***	(0.007)	0.082***	(0.007)	0.081***	(0.007)
LREM	0.074***	(0.008)	0.073***	(0.008)	0.074***	(0.008)
LR	0.136***	(0.013)	0.136***	(0.013)	0.137***	(0.013)
Le Pen	-0.152***	(0.014)	-0.151***	(0.014)	-0.148***	(0.014)
Total # of charities			0.003*	(0.001)	0.003*	(0.001)
glob. charities			0.026***	(0.006)	0.176	(0.214)
glob. charities × Mélenchon					0.001	(0.020)
glob. charities × PS					0.030***	(0.011)
glob. charities × LREM					-0.017	(0.020)
glob. charities × LR					-0.018	(0.027)
glob. charities × Le Pen					-0.052**	(0.024)
Department FEs	✓		✓		✓	
Election FEs	✓		✓		✓	
Controls	✓		✓		✓	
Observations	55,949		55,949		55,949	
Clusters (Departments)	101		101		101	
Mean DepVar	3.12		3.12		3.12	
Sd DepVar	0.36		0.36		0.36	

**Notes:** \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Models are estimated using an OLS (standard errors clustered at department level in parentheses). An observation is a city/election, and all the specifications include department and election fixed effects. Controls are city-level controls and include local demographics, income, share of foreigners, employment, education and taxes. The dependent variable is the (IHS transformation of) the total amount of charitable donations reported in municipality  $c$  in year  $t$ , normalized by the number of households in the municipality. “Globalist charities” are defined based on a set of keywords in the charities’ statement of purpose (see the text for details).

organizations. This, for example, was the case in 2015 of the far-right mayor of Mantes-la-Ville who ended public subsidies to the “*Ligue des droits de l’homme*” (the Human Rights League). In 2020, during the mayoral election campaigns, many far-right candidates vowed to end municipal subsidies to nonprofit organizations they presented as “communitarist” or to organizations “that promote mass immigration.”

Data from party manifestos confirms this trend and further suggests that other parties have adopted a more positive tone toward charities. For evidence on this, we turn to the Manifestos project (Lehmann et al., 2023), which details the share of party manifestos that make certain political statements. While it does not contain a measure directly linked to charities, it measures “Support for Civic-mindedness,” which codes all statements “favourable [to] civil society and volunteering; decrying anti-social attitudes in times of crisis; appeals for public spiritedness and support for the public interest.”

Online Appendix Figure B.4 plots the share of party manifestos supporting Civic-mindedness by political family in 2012 and 2017. To have sufficiently dense and comparable data in both elections, we aggregate parties by political families, with parties weighted by their vote shares. There is a clear increase in positive mentions of Civic-mindedness in party manifestos across the board, i.e. with the decline observed for the far right a notable exception. This indicates that the far right’s change of tone with regard to civic-mindedness is out of tune with the political competition.

**Political vs. charitable donations** With political parties increasing the salience of charities as globalist actors, communal voters might substitute away from charitable donations to political donations that give more direct support to their communal values through exclusionary policies. Thus, political donations present another margin of adjustment that can explain the differential donation behavior of far-right voters.

To test this hypothesis, we focus on the sub-sample of municipalities in our data for which information on the aggregate amount of political donations declared on the households’ tax forms is available.<sup>28</sup> This sub-sample is richer and more urban than the complete sample of municipalities (online Appendix Table A.24), a caveat that should be taken into account (even if we control for these observable characteristics). Moreover, more municipalities are included for the 2012 elections (5,632 observations) than for the 2017 ones (3,586 observations), which we thus consider separately. Reassuringly, the number of households donating to charities – our outcome of interest – is very similar in this sub-sample.

In Table 4, we estimate equation (2) but introduce as a control the share of households

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<sup>28</sup>This includes all the municipalities for which there is a high-enough number of households making a political donation so as to guarantee anonymity. The data is from Cagé and Guillot (2021) and was provided to them by the tax administration. Unfortunately, we do not observe the beneficiary of the political donation in this administrative tax data.



in the municipalities that declare a political donation, as well as this share interacted with the vote share obtained by the different political parties. Columns (1) to (3) report the results for the 2012 presidential elections, and Columns (4) to (6) for the 2017 ones. For the sake of comparison, Columns (1) and (4) report the results without political donations; the magnitude of the estimated effects is similar to the one reported in Table 2 (Column (1)).

In Columns (2) and (5), we show that introducing political donations as a control does not affect the estimated far-right donation gap; if anything, the estimated coefficients slightly increase. Interestingly, political donations are positively correlated with the propensity to make a charitable donation. In Columns (3) and (6), we interact the vote share obtained by each candidate with political donations. While the share of political donors is still positively correlated with the share of charitable donors, the far-right donation gap *per se* is no longer significant. Instead, the far-right vote share is negatively associated with the share of charitable donors only in places where the share of political donors is high enough. In terms of magnitude, a 10% increase in the vote share for Le Pen is not significantly associated with a decrease in the share of tax-deducting donors to charity, but it is significantly associated with a 5.6% to 7.5% decrease in the share of charitable donors if the share of political donors increases by 10% as well. This suggests that political donations seem to act as substitutes for far-right voters.

### 4.3 Underlying preferences or social pressure?

We now turn to the relationship between one’s preference to donate and the local social norms. Charitable giving is often perceived as a pro-social behavior: people donate not only to satisfy their own preferred level of altruism but also to send a signal to others.

Specifically, we want to determine whether social pressure also drives the far-right donation gap. Perez-Truglia (2018) shows for example that individuals are more politically active in more like-minded social environments. Similar social pressure might also apply to donations: even if a far-right supporter would like to donate less, she might still be motivated to donate if she lives in an environment where everyone donates. In addition, social norms can change. An individual might dare to expose her real preference if there is evidence that this opinion is more mainstream than she imagined, as documented by Bursztyn et al. (2020).

To explore this possibility, we look at the size of the far-right donation gap for cities below and above the median far-right vote. We then estimate equation (2) (including all the city-level controls), but consider separately cities with relatively low and high support for the far right in the 2012 and 2017 presidential elections.

Figure 4 presents the results. First note that, for both the 2012 and the 2017 elections, the far-right donation gap is statistically significant both in municipalities with high and low electoral support for the far right. In the 2012 elections (sub-Figure 4a), we see that contrary to

Table 4: The impact of political donations on the propensity to make a charitable donation

	2012 Elections			2017 Elections		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
LFI (Rad. Left)	0.20 (0.14)	-0.11 (0.14)	0.14 (0.42)	0.17 (0.14)	0.01 (0.15)	0.40 (0.26)
PS (Left)	0.99*** (0.16)	0.83*** (0.15)	1.55*** (0.30)	2.09*** (0.27)	1.84*** (0.29)	2.94*** (0.54)
LREM (Center)	3.31*** (0.31)	3.44*** (0.33)	4.48*** (0.51)	1.33*** (0.16)	1.37*** (0.17)	1.67*** (0.27)
LR (Right)	0.72*** (0.15)	0.59*** (0.15)	0.91*** (0.25)	0.64*** (0.16)	0.55*** (0.16)	1.14*** (0.26)
DLF (Rad. Right)	1.13** (0.51)	1.05*** (0.40)	2.69* (1.43)	1.51*** (0.42)	1.55*** (0.43)	3.07*** (0.92)
FN (Rad. Right)	-0.27* (0.15)	-0.30** (0.15)	0.22 (0.32)	-0.60*** (0.13)	-0.66*** (0.13)	-0.23 (0.23)
% donating pol.		0.13*** (0.01)	0.62*** (0.17)		0.09*** (0.02)	0.75*** (0.19)
% donating pol. × LFI (Rad. Left)			-0.36 (0.37)			-0.78** (0.35)
% donating pol. × PS (Left)			-0.73*** (0.26)			-1.40*** (0.36)
% donating pol. × LREM (Center)			-1.03** (0.45)			-0.58 (0.35)
% donating pol. × LR (Right)			-0.41* (0.24)			-0.91*** (0.31)
% donating pol. × DLF (Rad. Right)			-1.56 (1.11)			-2.13** (0.85)
% donating pol. × FN (Rad. Right)			-0.56* (0.30)			-0.75** (0.29)
Department FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	5,632	5,632	5,632	3,586	3,586	3,586
Clusters (Departments)	99	99	99	95	95	95
Mean DepVar	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.0	3.0	3.0
Sd DepVar	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.38	0.38	0.38

**Notes:** \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Models are estimated using an OLS (standard errors clustered at department level between parentheses). An observation is a city and all the specifications include department fixed effects. Columns (1) to (3) report the results for the 2012 presidential elections Columns (4) to (6) for the 2017 presidential elections. Controls are city-level controls and include local demographics, income, share of foreigners, employment, education and taxes. The dependent variable is the (IHS transformation of) the total amount of charitable donations reported in municipality  $c$  in year  $t$ , normalized by the number of households in the municipality. The main independent variable is a vector of the (IHS transformations of the) vote shares obtained by the different candidates in the 2012 and 2017 presidential elections. The omitted category is abstention. In Columns (3) and (6) we interact these shares with the share of households making a political donation in the municipality.

the social norm hypothesis, the far-right voting gap is stronger in municipalities with relatively fewer Le Pen voters. In 2017 (sub-Figure 4a), there is no statistically significant difference in the magnitude of the estimated coefficients between the two kinds of municipalities. Overall, our results show that, if anything, far-right voters are actually less reluctant to donate in a municipality with many far-right voters where they would not suffer from the stigma of not donating. This result lends supports to the hypothesis that the far-right donation gap relates to individual preferences and is not simply related to concerns about violating social norm.

## 5 Discussion

Given the existence of the far-right donation gap, there is reason to worry that the recent rise in electoral support for the far right will threaten the future of the charitable sector, which may become even more concentrated. Thus, a key question is to what extent and in what way could the share of charitable donors decline further, should the vote share of the far-right continue to rise. We discuss this question in two steps: first, we consider whether “new converts” to the far-right ideology significantly reduce their donations right away; secondly, we examine an “intensification” effect of communal morality for those who already voted for the far right in the past.

### 5.1 The new far-right voters

Do voters that have recently started voting for the far right but have not done so in the past also contribute less to charities? To tackle this question, we first exploit the panel dimension of the administrative tax data by introducing municipality fixed effects ( $\gamma_c$ ) and estimate the following model:

$$Donations_{c,t} = \pi_0 + \mathbf{Elections}'_{c,t}\pi_1 + \mathbf{X}'_{c,t}\pi_2 + \gamma_c + \omega_t + \epsilon_{c,t} \quad (4)$$


Introducing municipality fixed effects allows us to investigate the impact of the change in far-right vote between 2012 and 2017 on the change in tax-declared charitable donations between these two dates. Standard errors are clustered at the city level and we use as before the IHS transformation of both the share of donors and the vote shares.

Figure 5 reports the results.<sup>29</sup> A 10% increase in the vote for Le Pen compared to abstention is associated with a 0.4% decrease in the share of households making a charitable donation, holding all other votes constant. The point estimate is statistically significant, but smaller in magnitude than the one we obtain with the cross-sectional estimations, where a 10% increase in the vote for Le Pen is associated with a decrease of about 2% in the share

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
<sup>29</sup>See online appendix Table A.20 for the associated regression table.

Figure 4: The far-right donation gap: Municipalities with high vs. low electoral support for the far-right



**Notes:** The figure reports with 95% confidence intervals the results of the estimation of equation (2), using an OLS model (standard errors are clustered at the level of the department). An observation is a city. The upper Figure 4a presents the results for the 2012 presidential elections, and the bottom Figure 4b for the 2017 presidential elections (the corresponding tables are the online Appendix Tables A.26 and A.27). All the estimations control for department fixed effects and the full set of city-level observables. Black bars with dots report the estimates for the municipalities whose vote share for Le Pen is below the median, and gray bars with squares for municipalities whose vote share for Le Pen is above the median. The independent variable is a vector of the (IHS transformation of the) vote shares obtained by candidates at the presidential elections (omitting abstention). The dependent variable is the (IHS transformation of) the share of households declaring a charitable donation in their tax returns.

Figure 5: The far-right donation gap, controlling for election and municipality fixed effects



**Notes:** The figure reports with 95% confidence intervals the results of the estimation of equation (4) (standard errors are clustered at the municipality level), using an OLS model. An observation is a city/election and the corresponding regression coefficients are reported in the online Appendix Table A.20. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. The omitted category is abstention and the estimation control for election and municipality fixed effects.

of households that donated. This is robust to adding the full set of controls and looking at the extensive margin only (see online Appendix Figure B.5) Thus, while people stop donating when they start voting for far-right candidates, it seems that some differences in donation patterns between the Le Pen voting cities and other cities are driven by unobservable traits that have intensified the far-right donation gap in recent years.

## 5.2 Intensification over time

We next turn to our survey data to decompose the 2022 far-right donation gap depending on the respondent’s reported vote in 2017. In Table 5, we divide the respondents who report a Le Pen vote in 2022 into “converters” and “faithfuls” depending on whether they already

voted for Le Pen in 2017.<sup>30</sup> It is the Le Pen “faithfuls”<sup>31</sup> who are significantly less likely to report a donation: they are on average 6.7 percentage points less likely to have reported a donation compared to those who abstained, while those who used to vote for other candidates – regardless of which ones – do not report that they donate significantly less than those who abstained (although the point estimate is much smaller than the one observed for other candidates). This hints at an intensifying far-right donation gap for voters with a longer history of voting for far-right movements.

To investigate this further, we next look at the unexplainable share of the drop in the share of households that donate to charities in the administrative tax data depending on the early far-right vote in 2012. We residualize the share of households that donates in the yearly municipality panel with the time-varying municipality-level characteristics and divide municipalities by tercile of their Le Pen vote in 2012. Next, we index the residuals within group by their 2012 level to make changes in residuals over time more comparable.

Figure 6 shows the temporal evolution of the indexed residuals by the 2012 Le Pen vote tercile. The overall downward trend already shown in Figure 1a in the share of households that declare charitable donations affects all municipalities. However, the drop is much more pronounced for municipalities that voted relatively more for the far right in 2012. As mentioned, this “intensification” cannot be explained by changes in local socio-economic characteristics that are residualized here. Instead, the far-right vote from the early wave of its success (in France) is becoming increasingly important for explaining the decline of the propensity to donate. As many countries have experienced a rise in far-right voting in recent years, this suggests that a similar “intensification” of the far-right electorate’s negative attitudes poses a threat to the donor base on which the charitable sector depends.

## 6 Conclusion

Can the observed drop in the share of charitable donors be linked to the electoral rise of the far right? In this paper, we take advantage of the French presidential elections to conduct a large-scale survey in order to better understand the drivers of charitable giving. We document a lower propensity of far-right supporters to contribute to charities, which we confirm by combining administrative tax data on donations with electoral results at the local level. According to our findings, the rise of the far right leads not only to a change in reported donations but also changes the actual behavior of far-right supporters who donate less to charities. Using a number of different empirical strategies, we provide suggestive evidence

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<sup>30</sup>Summary statistics are reported in the online Appendix Table A.25: about 60% of Le Pen supporters in 2022 already voted for her in 2017, 4% voted from other far-right candidates, while the others come from a wide range of other positions in the political spectrum (about 7% from the Left, 5% from Macron, 11% from the right, while 7% abstained in 2007).


<sup>31</sup>Here defined as those who voted for Le Pen or another far-right candidate (Dupont-Aignan) in 2017.

Table 5: The 2022 far-right donation gap depending on the reported vote in 2017

	(1)	(2)
	Donated	Donated
Other Left	0.126*** (0.023)	0.126*** (0.023)
Mélenchon	0.035 (0.023)	0.035 (0.023)
Macron	0.034 (0.022)	0.034 (0.022)
Other Right	0.042 (0.024)	0.042 (0.024)
Le Pen Converters	0.002 (0.025)	
Le Pen Faithfuls	-0.076*** (0.023)	-0.076*** (0.023)
Zemmour	-0.026 (0.025)	-0.026 (0.025)
Le Pen Converter - Left		-0.003 (0.045)
Le Pen Converter - Macron		-0.054 (0.052)
Le Pen Converter - Right		0.020 (0.032)
Le Pen Converters - Abst		-0.000 (0.037)
Controls	Yes	Yes
N	10,755	10,755
Dep. mean	0.44	0.44
Dep. SD	0.50	0.50

**Notes:** \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Models are estimated using an OLS (robust standard errors in parentheses). An observation is an individual. Our sample of analysis include all the surveyed individuals who are part of the part of the 2022 French Electoral Survey and that reported their vote in 2017 ( $N = 10,755$ ). The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent reports that she has made a charitable donation in the past 12 months, and to zero otherwise. The main explanatory variable is a vector of indicator variables that represent the candidate that the respondent intends to vote for in the 2022 presidential elections. Voters of Le Pen are further split into new Le Pen voters and voters report to have voted for Le Pen in the first round of the 2017 election already. The omitted category is abstention. More details are provided in the text.

Figure 6: Trends in the residualised share of households donating (in the administrative tax data) depending on the 2012 vote for Le Pen



**Notes:** The residuals are obtained from regressing the share of households donating in a municipality on the full set of controls described in online Appendix Table A.4. The residuals average to zero over by construction and are indexed to the 2013 average.



that this far-right donation gap is most probably linked to a higher demand for communal morality.

Our findings imply a potential (unanticipated) drop in charities' resources in the years to come. Further, not only might the rise in support for far-right politicians pose a threat to the total revenue of the charitable sector through a change in social norms, but also a shrinking base of supporters for charities may trigger a debate about the democratic legitimacy of the large tax breaks that support them in many countries and thus jeopardize the charitable sector as a whole.

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# Online Appendix to the Paper The Far-Right Donation Gap

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## A Additional Tables

Table A.1: Summary statistics: Socio-demographic characteristics of the surveyed individuals

	Mean	St.Dev
<b>Demographics</b>		
=1 if woman	0.52	0.50
Age	50	18
=1 if married/civ. union	0.50	0.50
=1 if College graduate	0.54	0.50
<b>Profession</b>		
=1 if Senior executive	0.10	0.31
=1 if Intermediate profession	0.16	0.36
=1 if Employee	0.17	0.38
=1 if Worker	0.12	0.33
=1 if Retired	0.29	0.45
<b>Location</b>		
=1 if lives in rural area	0.23	0.42
=1 if lives in urban area	0.40	0.49
=1 if lives in the Paris region	0.17	0.38
<b>Religion</b>		
=1 if No religion	0.42	0.49
=1 if Catholic	0.51	0.50
=1 if Muslim	0.03	0.16
<b>Income</b>		
Below €1,250	0.10	0.30
€11,250-€9,999	0.20	0.40
€9,000-€2,499	0.14	0.34
€2,500-€3,499	0.22	0.41
€3,500-€4,999	0.18	0.39
Above €5,000	0.08	0.27
Observations	12,600	

**Notes:** The table reports summary statistics for the surveyed individuals as part of the *Enquête Electorale Française* (see the text for more details). An observation is an individual.

Table A.2: Summary statistics: Political preferences of the surveyed individuals

	Mean	St.Dev
<b>2022 elections</b>		
=1 if intended vote E. Macron 2022, 1st round	0.23	0.42
=1 if intended vote M. Le Pen 2022, 1st round	0.20	0.40
=1 if intended vote JL. Melenchon 2022, 1st round	0.15	0.36
=1 if intended vote E. Zemmour 2022, 1st round	0.09	0.28
<b>2017 elections</b>		
=1 voted E. Macron 2017, 1st round	0.20	0.40
=1 if voted M. Le Pen 2017, 1st round	0.18	0.38
=1 voted JL. Melenchon 2017, 1st round	0.16	0.37
<b>Preferences</b>		
Self-reported political preference (0 (left) to 10 (right))	5.63	2.51
Observations	12,600	

**Notes:** The table reports summary statistics for the surveyed individuals as part of the *Enquête Electorale Française* (see the text for more details). An observation is an individual.

Table A.3: Summary statistics: Subjective Well-being and Trust of the surveyed individuals

	Mean	Median	SD	Min	Max	N
<i>Life Satisfaction</i>						
Overall life satisfaction	5.91	6	2	0	10	12,600
<i>Political Trust</i>						
Trust in: the President	2.62	2	1	1	4	10,785
Trust in: Deputies	2.82	3	1	1	4	10,782
Trust in: the Mayor of my city	2.32	2	1	1	4	10,784
Trust in: Media	2.91	3	1	1	4	10,783
Trust in: Political Parties	3.13	3	1	1	4	10,782
<i>Social Trust</i>						
Trust in: Family Members	1.34	1	1	1	4	10,785
Trust in: People I personally know	1.57	2	1	1	4	10,785
Trust in: People I meet for the first time	2.77	3	1	1	4	10,779
Trust in: People of different nationalities	2.25	2	1	1	4	10,775
Trust in: People of different religions	2.21	2	1	1	4	10,772

**Notes:** The table reports summary statistics for the surveyed individuals as part of the *Enquête Electorale Française* (see the text for more details). An observation is an individual.

Table A.4: Summary statistics: municipality level data

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
<b>Tax-deducted donations</b>					
Share of fiscal HHs declaring a charitable donation	12.12	4.85	0.69	53.79	189,491
Amount of charitable donations declared	41.61	56.85	1.55	13133.34	189,491
<b>Demographics</b>					
Population > 14 year-old	2,157	19,102	2	3,755,778	251,367
Share of women	0.50	0.03	0.17	0.76	251,357
Share of population above 25 years old	0.11	0.03	0.01	0.50	250,112
<b>Income</b>					
median annual income	20638.70	3,414.17	14076.00	41460.00	224,298
GINI	0.32	0.17	0.21	9.52	36,513
Share of population below 60 % of median income	19.39	9.33	5.00	71.00	34,657
<b>Foreigners</b>					
Share of the population that is foreigner	0.05	0.05	0.00	0.92	256,732
Share of foreigners that are unemployed	0.08	0.12	0.00	1.00	238,967
<b>Employment</b>					
Unemployment rate	0.11	0.05	0.01	0.67	248,485
Share of the active pop working in agriculture	0.07	0.11	0.00	1.00	251,048
Share of the active pop working in public administration	0.02	0.05	0.00	0.99	251,280
Share of white-collar workers	0.07	0.10	0.00	1.00	240,659
Share of blue-collar workers	0.24	0.20	0.00	1.00	240,659
<b>Education</b>					
Share of the adult population with a bachelor	0.30	0.15	0.00	1.00	249,912
Share of the adult population with a Master degree	0.14	0.12	0.00	1.00	249,912
<b>Other admin tax data information</b>					
Reference tax income of tax households	23215.78	73136.43	404.51	1,598,188.52	246,704
Total net tax	1,397.81	5,596.12	5.42	128,336.21	246,704
# of retirees	322	923	11	18,934	246,201
Total pensions	7,399.65	21778.37	204.04	467,093.34	244,193
<b>Charities</b>					
Stock Charities Per 1,000 Inhabitants	0.49	1.69	0.00	142.86	209,640
New Charities Per 1,000 Inhabitants	0.03	0.34	0.00	40.00	209,640
Global Charities per 1,000 inhabitants	0.08	0.56	0.00	32.26	209,640
Percentage Global, Stock	0.17	0.31	0.00	1.00	57,978

**Notes:** The table reports summary statistics for the city-level observable (see the text for more details). An observation is a city/year. Data on tax-deducted donations are from Cagé and Guillot (2021); election results in the 2012 and 2017 presidential elections are from the *Ministère de l'Intérieur*; data on the supply of charities were built from the National Directory of Associations (“*Répertoire National des Associations*”) provided by the *Ministère de l'Intérieur*; other control variables such as demographics, income, foreigners, employment and education come from census data provided by the *Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques*.



Table A.5: Summary statistics: Donations received by Action Contre la Faim, Oxfam and SOS Méditerranée

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
<b>2012</b>					
Total amount donated to ACF (€/hh)	0.69	1.86	0.00	219.03	177,186
Total amount donated to Oxfam (€/hh)	0.03	0.20	0.00	18.10	177,186
Total amount donated to SOSM (€/hh)	.	.	.	.	0
<b>2017</b>					
Total amount donated to ACF (€/hh)	0.69	1.71	0.00	236.08	177,341
Total amount donated to Oxfam (€/hh)	0.03	0.29	0.00	29.17	177,341
Total amount donated to SOSM (€/hh)	0.05	0.84	0.00	194.44	177,341
<b>2022</b>					
Total amount donated to ACF (€/hh)	0.65	1.72	0.00	202.49	104,636
Total amount donated to Oxfam (€/hh)	0.06	0.37	0.00	29.17	104,636
Total amount donated to SOSM (€/hh)	0.08	1.06	0.00	194.44	104,636
<b>Total</b>					
Total amount donated to ACF (€/hh)	0.68	1.78	0.00	236.08	459,163
Total amount donated to Oxfam (€/hh)	0.04	0.28	0.00	29.17	459,163
Total amount donated to SOSM (€/hh)	0.06	0.93	0.00	194.44	281,977

**Notes:** The table reports summary statistics for the donations received by the three charities – Action Contre la Faim, Oxfam and SOS Méditerranée – for which we have donation-level information (see the text for more details). Each observation is a city/year. The summary statistics are aggregated around the closest Presidential elections: the 2012 Presidential elections for the 2010-2014 donations, the 2017 elections for the 2015-2019 donations, and the 2022 elections for the 2020-2022 donations. Data on donations were provided to us directly by the charities.

Table A.6: The far-right donation gap: Evidence from self-reported donations (2022 electoral survey)

	Donated to charity							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Mélenchon	0.09*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Other Left	0.21*** (0.02)	0.19*** (0.02)	0.18*** (0.02)	0.19*** (0.02)	0.18*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.02)
Macron	0.20*** (0.02)	0.15*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Other Right	0.18*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)
Dupont-Aignan	0.03 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)
Le Pen	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.05*** (0.02)	-0.05*** (0.02)	-0.06*** (0.02)	-0.06*** (0.02)	-0.06*** (0.02)	-0.04** (0.02)	-0.04** (0.02)
Zemmour	0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Demographics		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Income			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Religion				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Life satisfaction					✓	✓	✓	✓
Trust on Pol.						✓	✓	✓
Trust on Society							✓	✓
City Controls								✓
Observations	12,600	12,600	12,600	12,600	12,600	10,778	10,755	10,755
Mean DepVar	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.44	0.44	0.44
Sd DepVar	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.50	0.50	0.50

**Notes:** \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Models are estimated using an OLS (robust standard errors in parentheses). An observation is an individual. Our sample of analysis include all the surveyed individuals who are part of the part of the 2022 French Electoral Survey ( $N = 12,600$ ; the lower number of observations in Columns (6) to (8) comes from the fact that some individuals did not answer the questions on trust). The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent reports that she has made a charitable donation in the past 12 months, and to zero otherwise. The main explanatory variable is a vector of indicator variables that represent the candidate that the respondent intends to vote for in the 2022 presidential elections. The omitted category is abstention. The “other left” candidates include the candidate from the French communist party (Fabien Roussel, 2.28%) of the votes, the candidate of the *Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste* (Philippe Poutou, 0.77%), the candidate of the Socialist party (Anne Hidalgo, 1.75%), and the candidate of *Lutte Ouvrière* (Nathalie Arthaud, 0.56%). The “other right” candidates include the candidate of *Les Républicains* (Valérie Pécresse, 4.78%). More details are provided in the text.

Table A.7: Far-right Donation Gap: Self-reported donations, On Self-Reported Left-Right Scale

	Donated to charity							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
0 - Very to the Left	0.02 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.07* (0.04)	0.07* (0.04)	0.08** (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.06 (0.05)
1	0.08** (0.04)	0.08** (0.04)	0.08** (0.04)	0.09** (0.04)	0.09** (0.04)	0.10*** (0.04)	0.09** (0.04)	0.08* (0.04)
2	0.08*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.03)	0.07*** (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
3	0.09*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)
4	0.14*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)
6	0.10*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)
7	0.09*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)
8	0.05*** (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)
9	0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.00 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)
10 - Very to the Right	-0.10*** (0.02)	-0.09*** (0.02)	-0.09*** (0.02)	-0.09*** (0.02)	-0.09*** (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
99 - No Response	-0.14*** (0.02)	-0.12*** (0.02)	-0.12*** (0.02)	-0.11*** (0.02)	-0.11*** (0.02)	-0.08*** (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.06** (0.03)
Demographics		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Income			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Religion				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Life satisfaction					✓	✓	✓	✓
Trust on Pol.						✓	✓	✓
Trust on Society							✓	✓
City Controls								✓
Observations	12,600	12,600	12,600	12,600	12,600	10,778	10,755	8,138
Mean DepVar	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.44	0.44	0.45
Sd DepVar	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.50	0.50	0.50

**Notes:** \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Models are estimated using an OLS (robust standard errors in parentheses). An observation is an individual. Our sample of analysis include all the surveyed individuals who are part of the part of the 2022 French Electoral Survey ( $N = 12,600$ ; the lower number of observations in Columns (6) to (8) comes from the fact that some individuals did not answer the questions on trust). The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent reports that she has made a charitable donation in the past 12 months, and to zero otherwise. The main explanatory variable is a vector of indicator variables that represent the respondent's self-reported position on the political spectrum from 0 (very on the left) to 10 (very on the right). The omitted category is 5. 6.9% of the respondents choose to not respond to the question. We are unable to observe what they would have chosen, but we can observe the intended vote for this group. Among those who choose not to answer, 28.9% intended to vote Le Pen, 25.4% will choose abstention, 16.5% intended to vote Macron, 9.1% other right-wing candidates, 9.0% other left-wing candidates and 5.2% Zemmour.

Table A.8: Far-right Donation Gap, Robustness Checks: Logit Regression, Self-reported donations, French Election Panel, 2022

	Donated to charity							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Donated								
Other Left	2.37*** (0.22)	2.28*** (0.21)	2.23*** (0.21)	2.25*** (0.21)	2.22*** (0.21)	1.80*** (0.19)	1.76*** (0.18)	1.73*** (0.22)
Mélenchon	1.49*** (0.14)	1.55*** (0.14)	1.53*** (0.14)	1.51*** (0.14)	1.50*** (0.14)	1.26** (0.13)	1.18 (0.13)	1.12 (0.14)
Macron	2.26*** (0.19)	1.90*** (0.16)	1.75*** (0.15)	1.70*** (0.14)	1.60*** (0.14)	1.13 (0.11)	1.14 (0.12)	1.11 (0.13)
Other Right	2.13*** (0.21)	1.60*** (0.16)	1.49*** (0.15)	1.43*** (0.15)	1.40*** (0.14)	1.18 (0.13)	1.20 (0.13)	1.11 (0.15)
Le Pen	0.85* (0.08)	0.79*** (0.07)	0.78*** (0.07)	0.76*** (0.07)	0.76*** (0.07)	0.76*** (0.08)	0.81** (0.08)	0.75** (0.09)
Zemmour	1.08 (0.11)	0.91 (0.10)	0.86 (0.09)	0.82* (0.09)	0.82* (0.09)	0.84 (0.10)	0.89 (0.11)	0.80 (0.11)
Demographics		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Income			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Religion				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Life satisfaction					✓	✓	✓	✓
Trust on Pol.						✓	✓	✓
Trust on Society							✓	✓
City Controls								✓
Observations	12,600	12,600	12,600	12,600	12,600	10,778	10,755	8,135
Mean DepVar	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.44	0.44	0.45
Sd DepVar	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.50	0.50	0.50

Exponentiated coefficients

**Notes:** \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Models are estimated using a logit regression and we report odd ratios (robust standard errors in parentheses). An observation is an individual. Our sample of analysis include all the surveyed individuals who are part of the part of the 2022 French Electoral Survey ( $N = 12,600$ ; the lower number of observations in Columns (6) to (8) comes from the fact that some individuals did not answer the questions on trust). The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent reports that she has made a charitable donation in the past 12 months, and to zero otherwise. The main explanatory variable is a vector of indicator variables that represent the candidate that the respondent intends to vote for in the 2022 presidential elections. The omitted category is abstention. The “other left” candidates include the candidate from the French communist party (Fabien Roussel, 2.28%) of the votes, the candidate of the *Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste* (Philippe Poutou, 0.77%), the candidate of the Socialist party (Anne Hidalgo, 1.75%), and the candidate of *Lutte Ouvrière* (Nathalie Arthaud, 0.56%). The “other right” candidates include the candidate of *Les Républicains* (Valérie Pécresse, 4.78%). More details are provided in the text.

Table A.9: Far-right Donation Gap, Robustness Checks: Probit Regression, Self-reported donations, French Election Panel, 2022

	Donated to charity							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Donated to charity								
Mélenchon	1.28*** (0.07)	1.31*** (0.08)	1.31*** (0.08)	1.30*** (0.08)	1.29*** (0.07)	1.16** (0.07)	1.11 (0.07)	1.11 (0.07)
Other Left	1.71*** (0.10)	1.67*** (0.10)	1.65*** (0.10)	1.66*** (0.10)	1.64*** (0.10)	1.44*** (0.09)	1.42*** (0.09)	1.42*** (0.09)
Macron	1.66*** (0.08)	1.49*** (0.08)	1.42*** (0.07)	1.39*** (0.07)	1.34*** (0.07)	1.09 (0.07)	1.09 (0.07)	1.09 (0.07)
Other Right	1.60*** (0.10)	1.34*** (0.08)	1.29*** (0.08)	1.26*** (0.08)	1.24*** (0.08)	1.12 (0.08)	1.12* (0.08)	1.12* (0.08)
Dupont-Aignan	1.09 (0.12)	1.04 (0.11)	1.02 (0.11)	1.00 (0.11)	1.01 (0.11)	0.99 (0.11)	1.02 (0.12)	1.02 (0.12)
Le Pen	0.90* (0.05)	0.87** (0.05)	0.86*** (0.05)	0.85*** (0.05)	0.85*** (0.05)	0.85*** (0.05)	0.89* (0.06)	0.89* (0.06)
Zemmour	1.05 (0.07)	0.95 (0.06)	0.92 (0.06)	0.89* (0.06)	0.89* (0.06)	0.90 (0.07)	0.93 (0.07)	0.93 (0.07)
Demographics		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Income			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Religion				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Life satisfaction					✓	✓	✓	✓
Trust on Pol.						✓	✓	✓
Trust on Society							✓	✓
City Controls								✓
Observations	12,600	12,600	12,600	12,600	12,600	10,778	10,755	10,755
Mean DepVar	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.44	0.44	0.44
Sd DepVar	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.50	0.50	0.50

Exponentiated coefficients

**Notes:** \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Models are estimated using a probit regression and we report odd ratios (robust standard errors in parentheses). An observation is an individual. Our sample of analysis include all the surveyed individuals who are part of the part of the 2022 French Electoral Survey ( $N = 12,600$ ; the lower number of observations in Columns (6) to (8) comes from the fact that some individuals did not answer the questions on trust). The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent reports that she has made a charitable donation in the past 12 months, and to zero otherwise. The main explanatory variable is a vector of indicator variables that represent the candidate that the respondent intends to vote for in the 2022 presidential elections. The omitted category is abstention. The “other left” candidates include the candidate from the French communist party (Fabien Roussel, 2.28%) of the votes, the candidate of the *Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste* (Philippe Poutou, 0.77%), the candidate of the Socialist party (Anne Hidalgo, 1.75%), and the candidate of *Lutte Ouvrière* (Nathalie Arthaud, 0.56%). The “other right” candidates include the candidate of *Les Républicains* (Valérie Pécresse, 4.78%). More details are provided in the text.

Table A.10: Far-right Donation Gap, Robustness Checks: Intended donations Next Year, French Election Panel, 2022

	Donated to charity							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Mélenchon	0.11*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)
Other Left	0.23*** (0.02)	0.22*** (0.02)	0.21*** (0.02)	0.21*** (0.02)	0.21*** (0.02)	0.17*** (0.02)	0.16*** (0.02)	0.16*** (0.02)
Macron	0.20*** (0.02)	0.16*** (0.02)	0.14*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)
Other Right	0.16*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)
Dupont-Aignan								
Le Pen	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.06*** (0.02)	-0.06*** (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)
Zemmour	0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)
Demographics		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Income			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Religion				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Life satisfaction					✓	✓	✓	✓
Trust on Pol.						✓	✓	✓
Trust on Society							✓	✓
City Controls								✓
Observations	12,600	12,600	12,600	12,600	12,600	10,778	10,755	10,755
Mean DepVar	0.41	0.41	0.41	0.41	0.41	0.43	0.43	0.43
Sd DepVar	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49

**Notes:** \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Models are estimated using an OLS (robust standard errors in parentheses). An observation is an individual. Our sample of analysis include all the surveyed individuals who are part of the part of the 2022 French Electoral Survey ( $N = 12,600$ ; the lower number of observations in Columns (6) to (8) comes from the fact that some individuals did not answer the questions on trust). The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent reports that she will make a charitable donation in the next 12 months, and to zero otherwise. The main explanatory variable is a vector of indicator variables that represent the candidate that the respondent intends to vote for in the 2022 presidential elections. The omitted category is abstention. The “other left” candidates include the candidate from the French communist party (Fabien Roussel, 2.28%) of the votes, the candidate of the *Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste* (Philippe Poutou, 0.77%), the candidate of the Socialist party (Anne Hidalgo, 1.75%), and the candidate of *Lutte Ouvrière* (Nathalie Arthaud, 0.56%). The “other right” candidates include the candidate of *Les Républicains* (Valérie Pécresse, 4.78%). More details are provided in the text.

Table A.11: External Validity: Results from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP)

	Donated		
	(1) Donation	(2) Donated Blood	(3) Donated for Refugees
LINKE	0.12*** (0.01)	0.02*** (0.01)	0.10*** (0.01)
SPD	0.10*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.00)	0.08*** (0.01)
Grüne	0.25*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.19*** (0.01)
FDP	0.14*** (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)
CDU/CSU	0.15*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.00)	0.05*** (0.01)
AfD	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)
Controls	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓
State FE	✓	✓	✓
Observations	93,705	51,250	75,716
Mean DepVar	0.44	0.11	0.23
Sd DepVar	0.50	0.32	0.42

*Notes:* \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . SE clustered at individual level (panel data). The dependent variable is a dummy for having reported a donation in the survey and the independent variable is the individual's reported party preference. The omitted category is abstention. Controls include year and state FE, demographics (gender, marital status), log of income, trust for society in general, religion and employment status.

Table A.12: Far-right Donation Gap: Tax-declared donations, 2012 Election and 2013-2016 Donation, Elasticity

	Share of donors						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Mélenchon (Rad. Left, ihs)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.02*** (0.01)
Hollande (Left, ihs)	0.18*** (0.03)	0.18*** (0.03)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)
Bayrou (Centre, ihs)	0.22*** (0.01)	0.21*** (0.01)	0.13*** (0.01)	0.12*** (0.01)	0.12*** (0.01)	0.11*** (0.01)	0.11*** (0.01)
Sarkozy (Right, ihs)	0.33*** (0.03)	0.32*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.02)	0.14*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)
Dupont-Aignan (Rad. Right, ihs)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01* (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Le Pen (Rad. Right, ihs)	-0.20*** (0.02)	-0.20*** (0.02)	-0.17*** (0.02)	-0.20*** (0.02)	-0.19*** (0.02)	-0.17*** (0.02)	-0.14*** (0.01)
Demographics		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Income			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Foreigners				✓	✓	✓	✓
Employment					✓	✓	✓
Education						✓	✓
Local Taxes							✓
Observations	29,989	29,989	29,989	29,989	29,989	29,989	29,989
Mean DepVar	3.18	3.18	3.18	3.18	3.18	3.18	3.18
Sd DepVar	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35

Notes: \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . SE clustered at department level. Each column reports a multivariate regression of (the IHS transformation of) votes obtained by presidential candidates in the 2012 and 2017 election as share of the total electorate (omitting abstention). The dependent variable is the IHS transformation of share of households deducting a charitable donation in tax returns. Demographics: Population, share of women, under 24-year old. Income: Log median income, share of population in poverty, GINI. Foreigners: Share of foreign-born, foreigners unemployment rate. Employment: Unemployment rate, share of white and blue collar workers, share employed in public sector and agriculture. Education: Share with master degree, share with bachelor's degree. Taxes: Log total tax revenue, number of fiscal households, total pensions.



Table A.13: Far-right Donation Gap: Tax-declared donations, 2017 Election and 2017-2019 Donation, Elasticity

	Share of donors						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Mélenchon (Rad. Left, ihs)	0.03*	0.03	-0.00	-0.01	0.01	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Hammon (Left, ihs)	0.07***	0.07***	0.05***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Macron (Centre, ihs)	0.34***	0.34***	0.15***	0.15***	0.15***	0.14***	0.12***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Fillon (Right, ihs)	0.35***	0.34***	0.20***	0.19***	0.18***	0.17***	0.13***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Dupont-Aignan (Rad. Right, ihs)	0.07***	0.06***	0.02**	0.01*	0.01*	0.01*	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Le Pen (Rad. Right, ihs)	-0.16***	-0.17***	-0.19***	-0.23***	-0.22***	-0.20***	-0.16***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Demographics		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Income			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Foreigners				✓	✓	✓	✓
Employment					✓	✓	✓
Education						✓	✓
Local Taxes							✓
Observations	27,561	27,561	27,561	27,561	27,561	27,561	27,561
Mean DepVar	3.05	3.05	3.05	3.05	3.05	3.05	3.05
Sd DepVar	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36

Notes: \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . SE clustered at department level. Each column reports a multivariate regression of (the IHS transformation of) votes obtained by presidential candidates in the 2017 election as share of the total electorate (omitting abstention). The dependent variable is the IHS transformation of share of households deducting a charitable donation in tax returns. Demographics: Population, share of women, under 24-year old. Income: Log median income, share of population in poverty, GINI. Foreigners: Share of foreign-born, foreigners unemployment rate. Employment: Unemployment rate, share of white and blue collar workers, share employed in public sector and agriculture. Education: Share with master degree, share with bachelor's degree. Taxes: Log total tax revenue, number of fiscal households, total pensions.

Table A.14: Far-right Donation Gap: Tax-declared donations, 2012 Election and 2013-2016 Donation, Shares

	Share of donors						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Mélenchon (Rad. Left)	0.17*** (0.01)	0.16*** (0.01)	0.10*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
Hollande (Left)	0.26*** (0.02)	0.26*** (0.02)	0.16*** (0.01)	0.15*** (0.01)	0.15*** (0.01)	0.14*** (0.01)	0.10*** (0.01)
Bayrou (Centre)	0.48*** (0.02)	0.48*** (0.02)	0.33*** (0.02)	0.31*** (0.02)	0.30*** (0.01)	0.28*** (0.01)	0.26*** (0.01)
Sarkozy (Right)	0.33*** (0.01)	0.32*** (0.01)	0.20*** (0.01)	0.18*** (0.01)	0.18*** (0.01)	0.17*** (0.01)	0.12*** (0.01)
Dupont-Aignan (Rad. Right)	0.19*** (0.04)	0.18*** (0.03)	0.08*** (0.03)	0.06** (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)	0.06** (0.03)	0.05** (0.03)
Le Pen (Rad. Right)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)
Demographics		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Income			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Foreigners				✓	✓	✓	✓
Employment					✓	✓	✓
Education						✓	✓
Local Taxes							✓
Observations	29,989	29,989	29,989	29,989	29,989	29,989	29,989
Mean DepVar	12.75	12.75	12.75	12.75	12.75	12.75	12.75
Sd DepVar	4.78	4.78	4.78	4.78	4.78	4.78	4.78

*Notes:* \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01. SE clustered at department level. Each column reports a multivariate regression of votes obtained by presidential candidates in the 2012 election as share of the total electorate (omitting abstention). The dependent variable is the share of households deducting a charitable donation in tax returns standardized to have zero mean and standard deviation one. Demographics: Population, share of women, under 24-year old. Income: Log median income, share of population in poverty, GINI. Foreigners: Share of foreign-born, foreigners unemployment rate. Employment: Unemployment rate, share of white and blue collar workers, share employed in public sector and agriculture. Education: Share with master degree, share with bachelor's degree. Taxes: Log total tax revenue, number of fiscal households, total pensions.

Table A.15: Far-right Donation Gap: Tax-declared donations, 2017 Election and 2017-2019 Donation, Shares

	Share of donors						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Mélenchon (Rad. Left)	0.15*** (0.01)	0.14*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
Hammon (Left)	0.36*** (0.02)	0.35*** (0.02)	0.27*** (0.02)	0.24*** (0.02)	0.24*** (0.02)	0.22*** (0.02)	0.17*** (0.01)
Macron (Centre)	0.34*** (0.01)	0.34*** (0.01)	0.20*** (0.02)	0.18*** (0.01)	0.19*** (0.01)	0.18*** (0.01)	0.14*** (0.01)
Fillon (Right)	0.36*** (0.02)	0.34*** (0.02)	0.23*** (0.02)	0.22*** (0.01)	0.20*** (0.01)	0.20*** (0.01)	0.15*** (0.01)
Dupont-Aignan (Rad. Right)	0.28*** (0.03)	0.27*** (0.03)	0.17*** (0.03)	0.14*** (0.03)	0.14*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.02)
Le Pen (Rad. Right)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)
Demographics		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Income			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Foreigners				✓	✓	✓	✓
Employment					✓	✓	✓
Education						✓	✓
Local Taxes							✓
Observations	27,561	27,561	27,561	27,561	27,561	27,561	27,561
Mean DepVar	11.27	11.27	11.27	11.27	11.27	11.27	11.27
Sd DepVar	4.44	4.44	4.44	4.44	4.44	4.44	4.44

*Notes:* \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01. SE clustered at department level. Each column reports a multivariate regression of votes obtained by presidential candidates in the 2017 election as share of the total electorate (omitting abstention). The dependent variable is the share of households deducting a charitable donation in tax returns standardized to have zero mean and standard deviation one. Demographics: Population, share of women, under 24-year old. Income: Log median income, share of population in poverty, GINI. Foreigners: Share of foreign-born, foreigners unemployment rate. Employment: Unemployment rate, share of white and blue collar workers, share employed in public sector and agriculture. Education: Share with master degree, share with bachelor's degree. Taxes: Log total tax revenue, number of fiscal households, total pensions.

Table A.16: Far-right Donation Gap: Tax-declared donations, 2012 Election and Sum of Donation 2013-2016

	Share of donors						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Mélenchon (Rad. Left, ihs)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.03)	0.04** (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Hollande (Left, ihs)	0.52*** (0.06)	0.49*** (0.06)	0.27*** (0.04)	0.26*** (0.04)	0.24*** (0.04)	0.22*** (0.04)	0.08** (0.04)
Bayrou (Centre, ihs)	0.32*** (0.02)	0.34*** (0.02)	0.19*** (0.02)	0.19*** (0.02)	0.20*** (0.02)	0.18*** (0.02)	0.17*** (0.02)
Sarkozy (Right, ihs)	0.55*** (0.05)	0.56*** (0.06)	0.24*** (0.04)	0.24*** (0.04)	0.25*** (0.04)	0.23*** (0.04)	0.14*** (0.04)
Dupont-Aignan (Rad. Right, ihs)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Le Pen (Rad. Right, ihs)	-0.29*** (0.05)	-0.26*** (0.05)	-0.20*** (0.04)	-0.22*** (0.04)	-0.22*** (0.04)	-0.18*** (0.04)	-0.18*** (0.03)
Demographics		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Income			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Foreigners				✓	✓	✓	✓
Employment					✓	✓	✓
Education						✓	✓
Local Taxes							✓
Observations	29,989	29,989	29,989	29,989	29,989	29,989	29,989
Mean DepVar	4.11	4.11	4.11	4.11	4.11	4.11	4.11
Sd DepVar	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68

Notes: \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01. SE clustered at department level. Each column reports a multivariate regression of votes obtained by presidential candidates in the 2012 election as share of the total electorate (omitting abstention). The dependent variable is the share of households deducting a charitable donation in tax returns standardized to have zero mean and standard deviation one. Demographics: Population, share of women, under 24-year old. Income: Log median income, share of population in poverty, GINI. Foreigners: Share of foreign-born, foreigners unemployment rate. Employment: Unemployment rate, share of white and blue collar workers, share employed in public sector and agriculture. Education: Share with master degree, share with bachelor's degree. Taxes: Log total tax revenue, number of fiscal households, total pensions.

Table A.17: Far-right Donation Gap: Tax-declared donations, 2017 Election and Sum of Donation 2017-2019

	Share of donors						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Mélenchon (Rad. Left, ihs)	0.15*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.03)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)
Hammon (Left, ihs)	0.17*** (0.02)	0.17*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.01)	0.13*** (0.01)	0.13*** (0.01)	0.12*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)
Macron (Centre, ihs)	0.63*** (0.03)	0.63*** (0.03)	0.29*** (0.03)	0.29*** (0.03)	0.28*** (0.03)	0.26*** (0.03)	0.12*** (0.03)
Fillon (Right, ihs)	0.48*** (0.03)	0.50*** (0.03)	0.29*** (0.03)	0.28*** (0.03)	0.29*** (0.03)	0.28*** (0.03)	0.19*** (0.03)
Dupont-Aignan (Rad. Right, ihs)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.03* (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
Le Pen (Rad. Right, ihs)	-0.24*** (0.04)	-0.21*** (0.04)	-0.18*** (0.03)	-0.21*** (0.03)	-0.21*** (0.03)	-0.19*** (0.03)	-0.19*** (0.03)
Demographics		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Income			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Foreigners				✓	✓	✓	✓
Employment					✓	✓	✓
Education						✓	✓
Local Taxes							✓
Observations	27,561	27,561	27,561	27,561	27,561	27,561	27,561
Mean DepVar	4.19	4.19	4.19	4.19	4.19	4.19	4.19
Sd DepVar	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68

Notes: \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01. SE clustered at department level. Each column reports a multivariate regression of votes obtained by presidential candidates in the 2017 election as share of the total electorate (omitting abstention). The dependent variable is the share of households deducting a charitable donation in tax returns standardized to have zero mean and standard deviation one. Demographics: Population, share of women, under 24-year old. Income: Log median income, share of population in poverty, GINI. Foreigners: Share of foreign-born, foreigners unemployment rate. Employment: Unemployment rate, share of white and blue collar workers, share employed in public sector and agriculture. Education: Share with master degree, share with bachelor's degree. Taxes: Log total tax revenue, number of fiscal households, total pensions.

Table A.18: Far-right Donation Gap: Tax-declared donations, yearly breakdown

	Share of donors						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Mélenchon (Rad. Left, ihs)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
PS (Left, ihs)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
LREM (Center, ihs)	0.11*** (0.01)	0.11*** (0.01)	0.11*** (0.01)	0.10*** (0.01)	0.12*** (0.01)	0.11*** (0.01)	0.12*** (0.01)
LR (Right, ihs)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.12*** (0.01)	0.13*** (0.01)	0.12*** (0.01)
Dupont-Aignan (Rad. Right, ihs)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.03*** (0.01)
Le Pen (Rad. Right, ihs)	-0.15*** (0.01)	-0.14*** (0.01)	-0.14*** (0.01)	-0.14*** (0.01)	-0.16*** (0.01)	-0.17*** (0.01)	-0.16*** (0.02)
Election year	2012	2012	2012	2012	2017	2017	2017
Year of tax declarations	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Demographics	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Income	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Foreigners	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Employment	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Education	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Local Taxes	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	31,134	31,041	31,258	30,047	29,757	29,248	28,399
Mean DepVar	3.55	3.54	3.55	3.50	3.47	3.42	3.35
Sd DepVar	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.36	0.36	0.37	0.38

*Notes:* \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . SE clustered at department level. Each column reports a multivariate regression of votes obtained by presidential candidates in the 2017 election as share of the total electorate (omitting abstention). The dependent variable is the share of households deducting a charitable donation in tax returns standardized to have zero mean and standard deviation one. Demographics: Population, share of women, under 24-year old. Income: Log median income, share of population in poverty, GINI. Foreigners: Share of foreign-born, foreigners unemployment rate. Employment: Unemployment rate, share of white and blue collar workers, share employed in public sector and agriculture. Education: Share with master degree, share with bachelor's degree. Taxes: Log total tax revenue, number of fiscal households, total pensions.

Table A.19: Far-right Donation Gap: Tax-declared donations, 2017 Election and 2017-2019 Donation, Removing Cities with Far-right Representatives

	Share of donors						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Mélenchon (Rad. Left, ihs)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Hammon (Left, ihs)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
Macron (Centre, ihs)	0.33*** (0.02)	0.34*** (0.02)	0.15*** (0.02)	0.14*** (0.02)	0.15*** (0.02)	0.14*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.01)
Fillon (Right, ihs)	0.35*** (0.03)	0.33*** (0.02)	0.20*** (0.02)	0.18*** (0.02)	0.17*** (0.02)	0.17*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.01)
Dupont-Aignan (Rad. Right, ihs)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.01* (0.01)	0.01* (0.01)	0.01* (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)
Le Pen (Rad. Right, ihs)	-0.16*** (0.02)	-0.18*** (0.02)	-0.19*** (0.02)	-0.23*** (0.02)	-0.22*** (0.02)	-0.20*** (0.02)	-0.16*** (0.02)
Demographics		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Income			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Foreigners				✓	✓	✓	✓
Employment					✓	✓	✓
Education						✓	✓
Local Taxes							✓
Observations	27,394	27,394	27,394	27,394	27,394	27,394	27,394
Mean DepVar	3.05	3.05	3.05	3.05	3.05	3.05	3.05
Sd DepVar	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36

Notes: \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01. SE clustered at department level. Each column reports a multivariate regression of votes obtained by presidential candidates in the 2017 election as share of the total electorate (omitting abstention), removing cities in the 8 electoral districts that elected a far-right representative in the 2017 parliamentary elections. The dependent variable is the share of households deducting a charitable donation in tax returns standardized to have zero mean and standard deviation one. Demographics: Population, share of women, under 24-year old. Income: Log median income, share of population in poverty, GINI. Foreigners: Share of foreign-born, foreigners unemployment rate. Employment: Unemployment rate, share of white and blue collar workers, share employed in public sector and agriculture. Education: Share with master degree, share with bachelor's degree. Taxes: Log total tax revenue, number of fiscal households, total pensions.

Table A.20: Far-right vote and Donations (ihs), Panel with municipality Fixed Effects

	Share of donors	
	(1)	(2)
LFI (Rad. Left, ihs)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
PS (Left, ihs)	0.01* (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
LREM (Center, ihs)	0.02*** (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)
LR (Right, ihs)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.05** (0.02)
FN (Rad. Right, ihs)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.03)
Commune Fixed effects	✓	✓
Full Controls		✓
Observations	188,197	188,197
Mean DepVar	4.22	4.22
Sd DepVar	0.61	0.61

*Notes:* \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Yearly municipality panel from 2013-2019. Including municipality fixed effect and SE clustered at the municipality level. Each coefficient can be interpreted as an elasticity. The dependent variable is the IHS transformation of the declared donations per tax household. The plotted coefficients are the the IHS transformation of the party vote shares of candidates in the Presidential elections in the 2012 and 2017 as share of the total electorate (omitting abstention). The full set of controls includes demographics (population, share of women, under 24-year old), income (log median income, share of population in poverty, GINI), foreigners (share of foreign-born, foreigners unemployment rate), employment (unemployment rate, share of white and blue collar workers, share employed in public sector and agriculture), education (share with master degree, share with bachelor's degree), taxes (log total tax revenue, number of fiscal households, total pensions).



Table A.21: Far-right ideology and the overall amount of donations (standardized coefficients)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Tax data	ACF	Oxfam	SOSM
LFI (Rad. Left)	-0.017 (0.013)	0.038*** (0.010)	0.050*** (0.011)	0.071*** (0.016)
PS (Left)	0.109*** (0.018)	0.112*** (0.017)	0.101*** (0.019)	0.288*** (0.058)
LREM (Center)	0.087*** (0.012)	0.070*** (0.013)	0.042*** (0.011)	0.036** (0.016)
LR (Right)	0.126*** (0.015)	0.057*** (0.012)	0.006 (0.010)	0.025 (0.016)
DLF (Rad. Right)	-0.019** (0.009)	-0.016** (0.008)	-0.016** (0.008)	-0.023** (0.010)
FN (Rad. Right)	-0.098*** (0.015)	-0.111*** (0.013)	-0.045*** (0.011)	-0.051*** (0.015)
Department FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Election FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	57,349	57,349	57,349	27,561
Clusters (Departments)	101	101	101	95
Mean DepVar	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00
Sd DepVar	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00

**Notes:** \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01. SE clustered at department level. Each column reports a multivariate regression of the standardised vote shares obtained by presidential candidates in the 2012 and 2017 election as share of the total electorate (omitting abstention). Column (1) regresses on the tax-deducted donations per fiscal household, column (2) on standardised donations to *Action contre la Faim*, column (3) for *Oxfam* and column (4) for *SOS Méditerranée*. All outcomes and regressors are standardised and winsorised at the 99th percentile to account large outliers in small municipalities in the Oxfam and SOSM data. Controls include department FE, election FE, local demographics, income, share of foreigners, employment, education and taxes.

Table A.22: The propensity to donate and local supply of global charities, 2012

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	% HHs donating		% HHs donating		% HHs donating	
Mélenchon	-0.020***	(0.007)	-0.020***	(0.007)	-0.019**	(0.007)
Hollande	0.046**	(0.019)	0.046**	(0.019)	0.044**	(0.019)
Bayrou	0.118***	(0.008)	0.118***	(0.008)	0.118***	(0.008)
Sarkozy	0.091***	(0.016)	0.092***	(0.016)	0.093***	(0.017)
Le Pen	-0.136***	(0.014)	-0.134***	(0.014)	-0.132***	(0.014)
Total # of charities			0.005***	(0.001)	0.004***	(0.001)
glob. charities			0.025***	(0.007)	0.200	(0.373)
glob. charities × Mélenchon					-0.027	(0.023)
glob. charities × Hollande					0.061	(0.041)
glob. charities × Bayrou					-0.021	(0.029)
glob. charities × Sarkozy					-0.036	(0.043)
glob. charities × Le Pen					-0.046	(0.028)
Controls	✓		✓		✓	
Observations	28,686		28,686		28,686	
Mean DepVar	3.18		3.18		3.18	
Sd DepVar	0.34		0.34		0.34	

Table A.23: The propensity to donate and local supply of global charities, 2017

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	% HHs donating		% HHs donating		% HHs donating	
Mélenchon	-0.012	(0.014)	-0.013	(0.014)	-0.013	(0.014)
Hamon	0.034***	(0.007)	0.034***	(0.007)	0.032***	(0.007)
Macron	0.112***	(0.015)	0.112***	(0.015)	0.113***	(0.015)
Fillon	0.129***	(0.014)	0.129***	(0.014)	0.129***	(0.015)
Le Pen	-0.165***	(0.016)	-0.163***	(0.016)	-0.160***	(0.015)
Total # of charities			0.003*	(0.001)	0.003*	(0.001)
glob. charities			0.022***	(0.006)	0.025	(0.311)
glob. charities × Mélenchon					0.017	(0.030)
glob. charities × Hamon					0.048***	(0.016)
glob. charities × Macron					-0.022	(0.031)
glob. charities × Fillon					0.008	(0.027)
glob. charities × Le Pen					-0.051*	(0.031)
Controls	✓		✓		✓	
Observations	27,263		27,263		27,263	
Mean DepVar	3.05		3.05		3.05	
Sd DepVar	0.36		0.36		0.36	

**Notes:** \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Models are estimated using an OLS (standard errors clustered at department level in parentheses). The independent variable is the (IHS transformation of) the share of households declaring charitable donations. The dependent variables are the (IHS transformation of) vote shares in 2012 and 2017. An observation is a city/year. All the specifications include department fixed effects. Controls are city-level variables and include local demographics, income, share of foreigners, employment, education and taxes. The dependent variable is the (IHS transformation of) the total amount of charitable donations reported in municipality  $c$  in year  $t$ , normalized by the number of households in the municipality. “Globalist charities” are defined based on a set of keywords in the charities’ statement of purpose (see the text for details).

Table A.24: Communes with and without data on political donations due to statistical secrecy

	No pol. data			Pol. data			Diff
	n	mean	sd	n	mean	sd	
% donating to politics	64047	-99.00	0.00	9311	0.99	0.50	99.987***
Political donations (€/hh)	64047	-99.00	0.00	9311	2.47	2.34	101.473***
Election (2012, 2017)	64047	2014.58	2.50	9311	2013.93	2.43	-0.601***
Charitable donations (€/hh)	48371	40.34	43.33	9311	48.10	33.45	7.725***
% donating to charity	48371	12.00	4.73	9311	12.14	4.51	0.138
LFI (Rad. Left)	62600	11.28	5.53	9224	11.46	4.46	0.183
PS (Left)	62600	12.93	10.34	9224	16.59	10.34	3.663***
LREM (Center)	62600	12.20	5.97	9224	11.88	6.50	-0.323
LR (Right)	62600	19.54	7.62	9224	19.39	6.85	-0.149
DLF (Rad. Right)	62600	3.29	2.39	9224	2.41	1.38	-0.879***
FN (Rad. Right)	62600	19.94	7.00	9224	16.15	5.43	-3.792***
Population > 14 year-old	62286	786.96	2092.62	9292	12255.10	54228.82	10,543.695***
Share of women	62283	0.50	0.03	9292	0.52	0.02	0.023***
Share above 25 years old	61931	0.11	0.03	9292	0.13	0.03	0.023***
median annual income	54854	20514.35	3243.27	9080	21812.78	4182.65	1,296.694***
Share below 60 % of median	2300	18.36	8.75	7609	19.69	9.47	1.972***
GINI	2525	0.29	0.05	7920	0.33	0.19	0.033***
Share that is foreigner	64043	0.04	0.04	9309	0.08	0.07	0.035***
Share foreigners unemployed	58788	0.08	0.13	9292	0.11	0.05	0.026***
Unemployment rate	61480	0.10	0.05	9292	0.12	0.05	0.022***
Share in agriculture	62206	0.07	0.11	9291	0.02	0.04	-0.053***
Share in public sector	62265	0.02	0.04	9290	0.05	0.06	0.035***
Share white-collar jobs	59222	0.06	0.10	9218	0.12	0.07	0.067***
Share blue-collar jobs	59222	0.24	0.21	9218	0.23	0.10	-0.011**
Share with a bachelor	61927	0.30	0.16	9219	0.35	0.13	0.059***
Share with a Master degree	61927	0.14	0.12	9219	0.19	0.11	0.051***
Reference tax income	61956	8143.96	9384.63	9241	120448.47	168162.86	111,993.360***
Total net tax	62226	392.08	557.36	9246	7751.82	13469.66	7,359.742***
Total pensions	61269	2656.36	3023.45	9243	37575.21	49226.64	34,918.853***
Global Charities p. 1,000	60636	0.07	0.58	9244	0.10	0.17	0.029***
Percentage Global, Stock	12670	0.16	0.34	7575	0.17	0.25	0.003

**Notes:** \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01. The table compares the observable characteristics of the municipalities for which tax data on political donations are available with the characteristics of the municipalities for which they are not.

Table A.25: Decomposition of 2017 Votes for 2022 Le Pen voters

	Converters Breakdown	
	Frequency	Observations
N. Arthaud	0.00	2
P. Poutou	0.00	8
JL Mélenchon	0.06	102
B. Hamon	0.01	47
E. Macron	0.05	144
J. Lassalle	0.01	17
F. Fillon	0.11	210
N. Dupont-Aignan	0.04	101
M. Le Pen	0.61	1328
J. Cheminade	0.00	2
F. Asselineau	0.00	9
Abst.	0.07	208
B&N	0.02	63
Total	1.00	2241

*Notes:* The table reports the reported votes in the 2017 presidential election of survey respondents who have reported to vote Le Pen in 2022. “Observations” reported the raw number of respondents who said they voted for this candidate in 2017 and “Frequency” refers to the (weighted) frequency among 2022 Le Pen voters. Respondents who voted Le Pen or Dupont-Aignant in 2017 are categorized as “faithfuls”, while the others are categorized as “converters”.

Table A.26: Far-right Donation Gap By Median Le Pen Votes, Tax-declared Donations, 2012 Elections and 2013-2016 Donations

	Share of donors	
	(1) Below Median Le Pen Vote	(2) Above Median Le Pen Vote
Mélenchon (Rad. Left, ihs)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Hollande (Left, ihs)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)
Bayrou (Centre, ihs)	0.11*** (0.01)	0.12*** (0.01)
Sarkozy (Right, ihs)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.16*** (0.02)
Dupont-Aignan (Rad. Right, ihs)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Le Pen (Rad. Right, ihs)	-0.15*** (0.02)	-0.09*** (0.02)
Demographics	✓	✓
Income	✓	✓
Foreigners	✓	✓
Employment	✓	✓
Education	✓	✓
Local Taxes	✓	✓
Observations	15,102	14,887
Mean DepVar	3.24	3.12
Sd DepVar	0.32	0.35

Notes: \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . SE clustered at department level. Each column reports a multivariate regression for half of the sample whose vote for the far-right candidate in the 2012 election was above/below the median. The independent variable is (IHS transformation of) votes obtained by presidential candidates in the 2017 election as share of the total electorate (omitting abstention). The dependent variable is the (IHS transformation of) share of households deducting a charitable donation in tax returns. Demographics: Population, share of women, under 24-year old. Income: Log median income, share of population in poverty, GINI. Foreigners: Share of foreign-born, foreigners unemployment rate. Employment: Unemployment rate, share of white and blue collar workers, share employed in public sector and agriculture. Education: Share with master degree, share with bachelor's degree. Taxes: Log total tax revenue, number of fiscal households, total pensions.

Table A.27: Far-right Donation Gap By Median Le Pen Votes, Tax-declared Donations, 2017 Elections and 2017-2019 Donation

	Share of donors	
	(1) Below Median Le Pen Vote	(2) Above Median Le Pen Vote
Mélenchon (Rad. Left, ihs)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)
Hammon (Left, ihs)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.02*** (0.01)
Macron (Centre, ihs)	0.14*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.01)
Fillon (Right, ihs)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.17*** (0.01)
Dupont-Aignan (Rad. Right, ihs)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)
Le Pen (Rad. Right, ihs)	-0.16*** (0.02)	-0.19*** (0.03)
Demographics	✓	✓
Income	✓	✓
Foreigners	✓	✓
Employment	✓	✓
Education	✓	✓
Local Taxes	✓	✓
Observations	14,143	13,418
Mean DepVar	3.13	2.97
Sd DepVar	0.34	0.36

*Notes:* \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . SE clustered at department level. Each column reports a multivariate regression for half of the sample whose vote for the far-right candidate in the 2017 election was above/below the median. The independent variable is (IHS transformation of) votes obtained by presidential candidates in the 2017 election as share of the total electorate (omitting abstention). The dependent variable is the (IHS transformation of) share of households deducting a charitable donation in tax returns. The dependent variable is the share of households deducting a charitable donation in tax returns standardized to have zero mean and standard deviation one. Demographics: Population, share of women, under 24-year old. Income: Log median income, share of population in poverty, GINI. Foreigners: Share of foreign-born, foreigners unemployment rate. Employment: Unemployment rate, share of white and blue collar workers, share employed in public sector and agriculture. Education: Share with master degree, share with bachelor's degree. Taxes: Log total tax revenue, number of fiscal households, total pensions.


## B Additional Figures

Figure B.1: Action contre la faim's interventions in the world



**Notes:** The Figure reports a screen shot of a map provided on the Action contre la faim's website illustrating the interventions of the non-profit organization in the world.


Figure B.2: Action contre la faim, SOS Méditerranée and Oxfam: Annual amount of donations received



**Notes:** The Figure plots the annual amount of donations received from donors located in France for three non-profit organizations: “Action Contre la Faim” (ACF, blue lines with dots), “SOS Méditerranée” (SOSM, dashed red line with squares), and Oxfam (green line with triangles).




Figure B.3: External Validity: Results from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP, 2010-2020)



German Socioeconomic Panel. Baseline: Non-aligned. Parties from left to right, with AfD as only far-right party. Donations: dummy if donated past year (charities, refugees) or past five years (blood) SE clustered at the individual level and control for state & year FEs, gender, age, employment, income, marital status, religion, trust and subjective well-being.


Notes: \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01. SE clustered at individual level (panel data). The dependent variable is a dummy for having reported a donation in the survey and the independent variable is the individual's reported party preference. The omitted category is abstention. Controls include year and state FE, demographics (gender, marital status), log of income, trust for society in general, religion and employment status.

Figure B.4: Party support Civic Mindedness, by political family



**Notes:** The Figure plots the importance of civic mindfulness in party manifestos by political family for the 2012 and 2017 presidential election from the Manifestos project Lehmann et al. (2023). It gives the share of sentences that express support for civic mindfulness as a fraction of the overall number of coded sentences per manifesto. A sentence is counted as supportive if it contains *"appeals for national solidarity and the need for society to see itself as united [or calls] for solidarity with and help for fellow people, familiar and unfamiliar. This may include favourable mention of the civil society, decrying anti-social attitudes in times of crisis, appeal for public spiritedness and support for the public interest."* For example, a value of 2% indicates that two percent of coded sentences in a manifesto express positive attitude towards civic mindedness. Parties are aggregated into political families by their vote share on the presidential election. The parties are classified in accordance with Lehmann et al. (2023): LFI, FDG, PCF, PRG as "Far Left"; EELV, Les Verts and PS as "Green/Left"; LREM, PR and UDI as "Liberal"; AC, MoDem, NC, LR and UMP as "Right"; and FN (Le Pen's party) as "Far right".

Figure B.5: Far-right vote and Share of Donors (IHS), Panel with municipality fixed effects



**Notes:** This figure reports with 95% confidence intervals the regression coefficients from Table ??, which uses the yearly municipality panel from 2013-2019. The specification includes municipality fixed effect and SE are clustered at the municipality level. Each coefficient can be interpreted as an elasticity. The dependent variable is the IHS transformation of the share of donors. The plotted coefficients are the the IHS transformation of the party vote shares of candidates in the Presidential elections in the 2012 and 2017 as share of the total electorate (omitting abstention). The full set of controls includes demographics (population, share of women, under 24-year old), income (log median income, share of population in poverty, GINI), foreigners (share of foreign-born, foreigners unemployment rate), employment (unemployment rate, share of white and blue collar workers, share employed in public sector and agriculture), education (share with master degree, share with bachelor's degree), taxes (log total tax revenue, number of fiscal households, total pensions).

## C Other additional information

### C.1 RNA and Global keywords

**Definition of a “charity”** The RNA contains about 2 million observations of associations, including active, dissolved and inactive ones. In this paper, we analysis only a subset of non-profit organizations: those categorized as “charities” by the RNA.

We follow the WALDEC nomenclature of associations built in the RNA provided by the *Ministère de l’Intérieur et des Outre-Mer*. The codebook could be found on Data.gouv.fr.

The nomenclature is a 5-digit code that separate the charities into 27 small categories (on a 2-digit level) and more than 300 small categories. See below for a table that compares the original French description of the 2-digit categories and a short English translation used for the breakdown of associations as listed in ??.

In this project, we define “charity” as the associations that fits in the category “20 - *associations caritatives, humanitaires, aide au développement, développement du bénévolat*”. We choose this board definition to follow the categorization by RNA itself; while it is true that some sub-categories of other categories have a charitable flavor (such as “02005-*associations philanthropiques*”, which is included in the boarder cateogry of “02-clubs, reflection”), we would like to refrain from subjectively cherry-picking smaller categories. There are roughly 73k “active” associations in this category as of end of 2022.<sup>1</sup>

**Procedure to Generate the Global Key Words List** We use the following procedures to generate the global key word list.

1. We take first all the active charitable associations in the RNA (about 73k, less than 5% of total active associations). Active here is defined as created before the end of 2022 without having been annulled.
2. Then we take all words in the statements of purpose, remove the stopwords, de-root them and list by frequency. The de-rooting and removing stopwords are based in the original French using the natural language processing package *nltk.corpus*.
3. We then take the top 5,000 words in frequency (covers all words that shows up more than 10 times in the description of all charities) and manually mark the words that satisfy the following characteristics
  - Name of a foreign country or location and their adjective forms, such as “Mali”, “Moroccan”, “Indonesia”, “Asia”

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<sup>1</sup>Active here is defined as non-dissolved. As we mentioned in the paper, the RNA data has a major caveat that it doesn’t accurately report the dissolutions: many associations do not report their inactivity or dissolution. So the stock of associations should be considered a proxy - a cumulated flow rather than an accurate estimation of active charities.

- Synonyms of “global”, “European” and “international”
- Word that is unlikely to be linked with the situation in France or developed countries, such as “war” “famine” “refugees”
- Word that indicates a form of exchange, such as “cultures” or “peoples”

4. We save this list as the global dictionary.

See the next page for the complete list of global keywords by frequency and the distribution of frequency for top 30 words.

Table C.1: 2-digit level categories (“large categories” in the RNA and rough English translations)

Code Objet Social	Objective - French	Short English name
1000	activités politiques	political activities
2000	clubs, cercles de réflexion	clubs, reflection
3000	défense de droits fondamentaux, activités civiques	defending rights, civil activism
4000	justice	justice
5000	information communication	information communication
6000	culture, pratiques d'activités artistiques, culturelles	art
7000	clubs de loisirs, relations	leisure
9000	action socio-culturelle	social-cultural action, youth or old age
10000	préservation du patrimoine	patrimony preservation
11000	Sports, activités de plein air	sports
13000	chasse pêche	hunting
14000	amicales, groupements affinitaires, groupements d'entraide (hors défense de droits fondamentaux)	affinity/solidarity groups
15000	éducation formation	education and formation
16000	recherche	research
17000	santé	health
18000	services et établissements médico-sociaux	social-medical service
19000	interventions sociales	social-intervention
20000	associations caritatives, humanitaires, aide au développement, développement du bénévolat	charity
21000	services familiaux, services aux personnes âgées	domestic assistance
22000	conduite d'activités économiques	economic activities
23000	représentation, promotion et défense d'intérêts économiques	representation and economic interest
24000	Environnement, cadre de vie	environment
30000	aide à l'emploi, développement local, promotion de solidarités économiques, vie locale	helps to job, local development and economic solidarity
32000	logement	housing
34000	Tourisme	tourism
36000	sécurité, protection civile	security
38000	armée (dont préparation militaire, médailles)	army
40000	activités religieuses, spirituelles ou philosophiques	religion
50000	domaines divers, domaines de nomenclature SITADELE à reclasser	others

Table C.2: Global Key Word Dictionary: Full List By Frenquency

Afrique	sénégalais	vietnamien	qu'international	Sahara	Lomé	Tambacounda	Bénin;	Antilles
international	centrafricain	Afrique.	amazon	Maroc;	Tamil	dogon	Togolais	pointe-noir
mond	cameroun	Pays	haït	Madagascar.	européen	Dogon	Unesco	marocain;
marocain	congo	Brésil	Rwanda	arménien	Bolivie	international;	Haitiens	kivu
Maroc	malien	indigent	Colombie	rwand	Martinique	Koudougou	Belgique	MONDE.
entraïd	haïtien	bénoïis	roumanie	Ouagadougou	Benin	Nadu	caribéen	Bali
divers	burkina	maritim	Ukrainiens	péruvien	bilatéral	sud-sud	nord/sud	indonésien
africain	congol	Kinshasa	Kenya	Congo-Brazzaville	gabon	moyen-orient	dominicain	Ouganda
Europe	tiers-mond	togolais	Internationale	Tibet	Pologne	bolivien	d'emmaus	Balkans
étrang	univers	île	islam	berber	Russie	soudan	nianing	franco-marocain
peupl	mondial	philippin	pays;	Antananarivo	Européens	marocain.	Europe.	Kolda
Sénégal	Vietnam	camerounais	indigen	afric	populations.	Subsaharienne	Anjouan	Occident
Sud	congolais	marrakech	franco	Mongolie	d'afriqu	bamako	Moldavie	Bulgarie
Madagascar	senegal	Africains	oriental	Orient	Guatemala	côte-ivoir	kinshas	moldav
Congo	palestinien	cambodgien	Thaïlande	Sénégalais	Faso.	gabonais	rajasthan	espagne
Cameroun	Mauritanie	emmaus	Africaine	d'afriqu	Mbour	libyen	burkinabe	congo.
Burkina	burkina-faso	bénin	étranger;	himalayen	Japon	japon	angolais	etranger.
République	Algérie	tunisien	Mexique	ukraine	Mali.	Grèce	international	boundou
ivoir	guinéen	guadeloup	Sénégal.	khmer	guinée-bissau	lao	juif	hémispher
alphabétis	éloign	Européenne	libanais	mongol	colomb	Somalie	Arabe	Cambodgiens
afrique	racism	Ile	afrique.	equateur	haitien	faso;	multicultural	Saint-Martin
Mali	refug	monde;	Burundi	tropical	franco-africain	bobo-dioulasso	Bosnie	Haiti.
étranger	burkinab	Sri	Angola	Djibouti	alger	Madagascar;	internationales;	touarègu
echang	musulman	Ghana	internationale.	brésilien	colombien	Congo;	ghanéen	Unis
fain	ivoirien	occidental	Indonésie	nouvelle-calédon	sahélien	katmandou	Congo.	romain
ong	comorien	Centrale	euros	Bangladesh	algérie	réunionnais	senegal.	Chiapas
continent	togo	asiat	mauritanien	Maurice	sahraou	Dominicaine	créol	Beyrouth
Togo	nord-sud	expédi	asie	Soudan	tchernobyl	mexicain	Saint-Louis	M'Bour
européen	océan	liban	Chine	palestin	latino-américain	dom-tom	tamil	Irak
ouest	monde.	argentin	népalais	saharien	peuples.	Togo;	algerien	Antalaha
interculturel	Tunisie	Argentine	sud-marocain	international.	emmaüs-international	centrafr	guadeloupéen	maroc.
malgach	brazzavill	anglais	chinois	telethon	laotien	judáism	martin	Albanie
Bénin	syrien	Laos	sri	mauritan	Nigéria	Camerounais	emmaüs-fr	antananarivo
Haïti	Pérou	afriqu	multiculturel	tchadien	Nord/Sud	Népalais	bresil	Togo.
francophon	subsaharien	Maroc.	benin	oultre-m	Caraïbes	maghreb	Ladakh	emmaï
sénégal	RDC	Dakar	Indien	toiareg	États	franco-malgach	égyptien	africain.
Népal	Centrafrique	unicef	etranger	laos	Chili	beninois	chilien	Serbie
global	etrang	burkin	sub-saharien	méditerranéen	vivre-ensembl	perou	Guyane	bilingu
Asie	expédit	l'étrang	Israël	alphabétis	Yaoundé	amérindien	Etats-Unis	ivoire
ukrainien	Liban	Andes	carai	américain	tribal	amazigh	Nicaragua	Penh
jumelag	Centrafrique	cambodg	himalai	nigérien	madagascar.	espagnol	djiboutien	Salvador
indien	Maghreb	Ethiopie	afghanistan	Martin	burund	Cameroun.	tamatav	mauricien
Cambodge	Espagne	sénégazel	Haiti	éthiopien	internationale	d'emmaï	soudanais	maghrébin
madagascar	tibétain	vietnam	Lille	l'afriqu	tibétain	métissag	africains.	sénégal.
ethniq	Syrie	Bretagne	Bamako	pakistan	tchad	cultures.	Géorgie	Kosovo
Amérique	Tchad	Afrique;	Arménie	Douala	marocains.	cultures;	euro	
Ukraine	Gabon	algérien	étranger.	kurd	méditerranée	bafou	thailand	
emmaï	Réunion	Unies	Cuba	Sénégal;	royaum	Europe;	senegalais	

**Categorization Criteria and Example of Global and Local Charity** We categorize charities as global if they have at least one global key word in the description.

This categorization of global charity should be considered as a lower bound: while the charities who have the key words are explicitly global, charities that do not contain a key word are not necessarily all focused on local issues.

- "Generalized" charities with very few words on their specific activities are categorized as local
- So are some charities who are global in nature but do not contain a key word because they focus on specific issues or places that are too rare to show up on the list, or because of spelling or grammar mistakes in the description.

For example, the charities with the following description are categorized as global:

- *"humanitarian action: distribution of school supplies morocco africa"*
- *"aid for the development of disadvantaged populations in laos"*
- *"aid for the social, cultural and educational development of togo's children "*
- *"providing one-off and/or permanent material, physical and moral assistance to disadvantaged children living in togo in the form of international solidarity initiatives: educational support, cultural, artistic and sporting activities. This includes support for children who are destitute, orphans and vulnerable to hiv, placed in foster care or from single-parent families, and who have sometimes dropped out of the school system; development of educational initiatives to promote citizenship, development and international solidarity among the general public at local, departmental and regional level (young people, adults, schoolchildren, students, etc.); support, advice and support for children who have lost their parents. Intercultural exchange, discovery of Togo and dissemination of Togolese culture (graphic arts, plastic arts, design, traditions, literature, music, gastronomy, tourism, etc.)."*

While the followings are not:

- *"feed, heal and sterilize the stray cats of saint-médard"*
- *"promote, organize and manage leisure and any form of reception, primarily aimed at young children, children and adolescents pedagogical concerning children's free time"*
- *"charity and general interest"*
- *"carry out a humanitarian foot race"*



Table C.3: Global Key Word Dictionary: Frequency of top 30 words by frequency

Word	Frequency
<b>Afrique</b>	3869
<b>international</b>	3731
<b>mond</b>	3701
<b>marocain</b>	3355
<b>Maroc</b>	2910
<b>entraïd</b>	2448
<b>divers</b>	2187
<b>africain</b>	1986
<b>Europe</b>	1807
<b>étrang</b>	1605
<b>peupl</b>	1540
<b>Sénégal</b>	1513
<b>Sud</b>	1153
<b>Madagascar</b>	1114
<b>Congo</b>	844
<b>Cameroun</b>	757
<b>Burkina</b>	747
<b>République</b>	672
<b>ivoir</b>	616
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