

# SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC INEQUALITIES AND POLITICAL CLEAVAGES:

AN INVESTIGATION OF RECENT  
ELECTIONS, NATIVIST MOVEMENTS,  
AND INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL VOTING SHIFTS

ANDREW LONSDALE

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# Sociodemographic Inequalities and Political Cleavages: An Investigation of Recent Elections, Nativist Movements, and Individual-Level Voting Shifts

Andrew Lonsdale\*

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# Abstract

Drawing principally on the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database (WPID), I carry out three distinct but highly-related analyses that help contribute to the debate on sociodemographic inequalities and political transformations in contemporary democratic societies. First, I update the WPID for 18 countries with newly available electoral surveys, documenting how political cleavages have progressed in recent years while discussing potential drivers of these findings. Next, I look specifically at the sociodemographic origins of nativist parties across a number of Latin American, Eastern European, and Western countries in recent decades, identifying patterns in support for these movements and considering plausible economic drivers of their emergence. Finally, I undertake a study of "vote switchers" both to nativist movements and to electoral abstention, investigating how levels of party polarization over redistributive policy issues may relate to the party origins of these phenomena. In the first analysis, I report evidence of a continued progression away from class-oriented political conflict in Western countries, with more context-dependent evolutions in non-Western settings. In the latter two segments, I present a number of findings consistent with the idea that economic drivers are of paramount importance for explaining common trends in the evolution of modern political competition.

# Introduction

## Context

Recent decades have given rise to profound economic and political transformations across contemporary democracies. Most regions of the world have experienced a sustained increase in levels of national income and wealth inequality over the past 40 years, with financial gains disproportionately concentrated among the top deciles of countries' income and wealth distributions (Chancel et al., 2022). At the same time, electoral conflicts in many settings have moved away from a traditional left-right division centred on class-based preferences to increasingly reflect novel areas of political organization (Gethin, Martínez-Toledano, and Piketty, 2021a, 2022; Hooghe and Kern, 2017; Norris and Inglehart, 2019). In particular, mainstream political parties have come to place growing emphasis on sociocultural issues (such as immigration and gender equality) relative to questions of redistributive policy, while socially conservative movements decrying progressive societal changes have enjoyed unprecedented electoral success in countries such as the United States, Brazil, and a handful of European states.

In light of these developments, a growing body of social science research has sought to illuminate the link between sociodemographic inequalities and electoral cleavages over the recent period. One prodigious effort put forth to better understand such changes has been the creation of the World Political Cleavages and Inequality Database (WPID), a consolidation of harmonized electoral surveys conducted in fifty countries from the mid-20th century to the current period.<sup>1</sup> This database allows for cross-country and time-consistent comparisons of electoral outcomes broken down by over a dozen socioeconomic characteristics, such as education, income, age, and gender. While I will discuss its contributions in greater detail below, a particularly insightful takeaway from this project is the ongoing trend in many countries towards a reversal of the traditional roles of education and income in predicting voting behaviour. In Western democracies in particular, low levels of education and income were once strongly associated with voting for left-wing parties, though the opposite is generally the case for education today (such that voters for the left are now disproportionately found among the most educated members of society) and a similar, albeit slower evolution appears to be underway for the income distribution (Gethin, Martínez-Toledano, and Piketty, 2021b, 2022). Such findings,

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<sup>1</sup>The WPID can be accessed at <https://wpid.world>.

as I will discuss, provide a particularly valuable reference point for understanding the evolution of modern political competition in these countries.

## **Overview of Analysis**

This paper builds on the release of the WPID to further study the relationship between sociodemographic inequalities, redistributive conflict, and electoral behaviour. In Part 1, I present the findings of work that I have undertaken to update the WPID following its initial launch in 2021, incorporating newly-available electoral survey data from 18 countries. In doing so, I discuss the extent to which cleavage dynamics previously documented by this database have progressed in recent years while simultaneously highlighting the emergence of any novel phenomena in the most recent surveys. In Part 2, I then exploit the richness of the WPID to investigate the sociodemographic origins of support for recent far-right and anti-immigrant movements (which I will refer to under the broader moniker of "nativist" movements, after adapting this term to the nuances of the political contexts under consideration) in a number of Latin American, Eastern European, and Western countries. As these parties have played a crucial role in fueling the aforementioned shift in the public discourse towards a heightened focus on sociocultural issues, a cross-country analysis of their supporters provides important insights into the drivers of these developments and their intricate links with re-distributive politics. Finally, in Part 3, I draw on the WPID to examine individual-level vote shifts towards nativist movements and electoral abstention, tying variations in the party origins of these developments to levels of party polarization over economic policy issues. This analysis provides additional insights into the important influence of redistributive conflict (or better put, a lack thereof) on prominent political and economic developments over the recent period.

## **Background Literature**

### **Multi-Dimensional Politics and Political Cleavages**

While redistributive preferences play a key role in shaping voting decisions, party competition over political issues is a multi-dimensional phenomenon (Albright, 2010; Rovny, 2012). The simple fact that rising levels of income and wealth inequality have not been met with a commensurate resurgence of class-oriented political conflict implies that the relative importance of other policy areas may weigh heavily in determining voter support. Still, social class served as the defining axis of political organization in democratic countries during the decades following the Second World War, with members of less-advantaged groups showing a strong affinity for left-wing parties and educational and financial elites both faithfully supporting

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right-wing groups (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). The heightened importance that sociocultural themes have come to hold in modern political conflict suggests that the multi-dimensional nature of issue competition plays a greater role in shaping electoral outcomes today than it has in the past. Unsurprisingly, both the growing political importance of non-economic policy issues and the electoral implications of this development are prevalent topics of research in the social science literature.

As early as the 1970s, Inglehart (1977) hypothesized a shift across the Western political landscape towards a focus on "post-materialist" themes and away from the class-driven debates that had governed political life in recent decades. According to this thesis, modern generations raised under relative prosperity had come to develop new political priorities beyond simple economic security, and these issues would work to supplant material concerns in the public debate. Years later, the growing prevalence of non-economic issues among the campaign platforms of Western political parties led Norris and Inglehart (2019) to affirm this prediction by concluding that modern political conflict indeed predominantly centres on socio-cultural concerns, which typically find support among well-educated middle-class populations. This finding relates to a broader field of initial research on the gradual decline in support among members of the working class for traditional left-wing parties, which have grown increasingly dependent on the middle class for electoral success (Gingrich and Häusermann, 2015; Kitschelt, 1994; Kriesi, 1998).

Drawing a more precise link between these evolving political trends and the dynamics of inequality, Roemer (1998) develops a model of multi-dimensional political competition and concludes that the supply of redistributive policies is inversely related to the salience of non-economic issues. Accordingly, one can expect a lower level of economic redistribution in equilibrium as sociocultural concerns garner growing importance in the mainstream political debate. In a similar vein, Alesina and Glaeser (2004) argue that the presence of demographic cleavages (such as linguistic or ethnic fractionalization) reduces demand for redistribution, consistent with the notion that multidimensional preferences hamper egalitarian outcomes. Such findings provide a potential explanation for the unfettered rise of inequality observed in recent decades, to the extent that transformations within the left-wing electorate have elevated disputes over non-economic policy issues to increasing political importance.

The above research provides a strong foundation to understand the underlying dynamics and electoral impacts of evolving political cleavages. Previously lacking from this literature, however, were efforts to empirically document these trends from a long-run comparative perspective, both across countries and over a range of sociodemographic dimensions. A prominent body of empirical research has since drawn on data from harmonized electoral surveys to advance this discussion. First investigating these trends in the United Kingdom, France, and the United States over recent decades, Piketty (2018) finds a particularly strong reversal of the education cleavage in all three countries and a continued, yet gradually weakening

support for right-wing parties among high-income and high-wealth voters.<sup>2</sup> Such developments, he argues, have given rise to "multiple-elite" party systems where financial and educational elites now differ in their prioritization of policy issues. The fact that the latter—who tend to attach strong importance to progressive cultural developments—have come to represent an increasing share of left-wing party supporters can help to explain the declining emphasis of these parties on redistributive policy issues. Gethin, Martínez-Toledano, and Piketty (2022) broaden the scope of this analysis by documenting the evolutions of more than a dozen political cleavages in 17 Western countries. They report a widespread prevalence of multiple-elite party systems across their sample, which provides a convincing cross-country explanation for the evolutions observed in the nature of political conflict among contemporary Western democracies. Gethin, Martínez-Toledano, and Piketty (2021a) then further expand their focus by compiling studies of political cleavage dynamics in 50 countries, using the collective data collection and harmonization efforts that form the basis of the WPID. This endeavour reveals far more varied patterns for the non-Western countries under consideration, whose political histories often differ vastly from their Western counterparts (in that they are often marked by recent and strong legacies of ideologies such as communism, authoritarianism, or colonialism). While some non-Western countries have moved in a decidedly class-based direction, issues surrounding regional, religious, or ethnic dimensions have remained particularly strong in others.

### **Nativist Movements**

An additional branch of literature that is tied to the evolution of political cleavages looks at the causes and electoral implications of far-right and anti-immigrant movements, which have grown increasingly prevalent across democratic countries in recent decades. As this strand of research is highly relevant to my analyses in Parts 2 and 3 below, I will now review common findings and theories concerning the emergence of these parties. While I will expand on this point at the beginning of Part 2, it is worth noting that I largely employ the term "nativist" to describe this category of political parties. The literature often focuses on "right-wing populism" or the "radical right", but some of the movements that I consider cannot be definitely placed on the right in light of their economic policy positions. At the same time, labels such as "populist" or "anti-system" capture a far broader set of parties than I wish to study. Given that a uniting feature of these movements is an overt opposition to immigration, nativist is a fitting descriptor, though its use must be nuanced in contexts such as Latin America (and I will address this point in Part 2) where immigration is not the defining characteristic of these movements.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>A shortened version of this analysis has since been published as Piketty (2021).

<sup>3</sup>It is also worth noting that the literature on the emergence of nativist politics predominantly focuses on Western settings. A relatively sparse number of studies also look at non-Western movements, though they are typically narrower in focus (aiming to provide in-depth case studies of a small number

A common objective of this literature involves characterizing supporters of nativist movements in relation to the broader electorate. Voters for these parties are often thought to be poorer, low-educated, male, and older (Norris and Inglehart, 2019; Oesch, 2013).<sup>4</sup> Some researchers have thus branded anti-immigrant movements as new parties of the working class (Arzheimer, 2013; Oesch, 2013), and efforts are frequently made to connect their emergence to the deterioration of social democracy (Bale et al., 2010; Benedetto, Hix, and Mastrorocco, 2020; Berman and Snegovaya, 2019). In this sense, the crumbling electoral performance of social democratic parties (particularly in Western Europe, following their dominant period in the post-war era) is seen, in part, as a consequence of emergent nativist parties appealing to this electorate of working-class voters. In general, two broad theories have been developed to explain why these voters may come to support nativist parties in Western contexts, one centred on economic drivers and another focused on sociocultural factors (Berman, 2021; Guriev and Papaioannou, 2022; Noury and Roland, 2020).

According to the *economic thesis*, an important source of support for nativist movements—the working class—has grown disillusioned with the mainstream left following its failure to provide the levels of economic protection and equality that it once promised these voters (Berman and Snegovaya, 2019; Piketty, 2018, 2020). As social democratic leaders embraced a greater role of market forces in organizing the economy and rejected their parties' expansive redistributive platforms from the post-war era, conventional supporters came to perceive fewer differences in the material benefits derived from traditional left-wing and nativist governments. This literature often makes reference to nativist voters as "losers of globalization", who have been insufficiently protected by left-wing parties from broad economic developments such as trade competition and rising inequality (Colantone and Stanig, 2018; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017; Rodrik, 2018). As such, many working-class voters turned to nativist movements that promised protection against perceived threats to their societal status (such as immigration).

Conversely, the *sociocultural thesis* is often attributed to Norris and Inglehart (2019) and argues that the success of nativist movements is driven by the aforementioned shift among Western electorates towards a growing prioritization of post-materialist values. As issues such as immigration, ethnic minority rights, and gender equality came to occupy growing space within mainstream political discourse, a conservative subset of voters (typically comprised of older, less-educated, native-born men) objected to this unfamiliar social climate by shifting their support to emergent parties that openly decried many of these developments. The particularly high salience of immigration policy is presented as evidence by proponents of this theory that concerns over identity have driven voters towards these parties, rather than

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of countries) and I will hold off on discussing this research until Part 2 of my project where I investigate these trends at the country level. In general, I will use the dominant notions underlying the rise of Western nativism as a starting point to analyze both the legitimacy of these explanations across Western countries and their potential applicability to non-Western contexts.

<sup>4</sup>Although additional research has confirmed more varied age patterns across countries (Gethin, Martínez-Toledano, and Piketty, 2022; Stockemer, Lentz, and Mayer, 2018).



economic grievances having pushed them away from the mainstream (Kaufmann, 2018).

I will discuss the relative merits of these two theories in Part 2 below. At this point, however, it bears mentioning that the emergence of nativist parties does not provide a convincing explanation for the broader dynamics of the education cleavage outlined by the WPID. First, as Gethin, Martínez-Toledano, and Piketty (2022) note, the long-run nature of the political evolutions documented by this database long predate the emergence of these movements in Western countries. The exodus of the working class from the mainstream left thus began well before voters had the option of turning to nativist groups. Second, the authors repeat their analysis while excluding nativist parties and report the same qualitative trends, finding that the emergence of this party family can only account for 14% of the reversal of the education cleavage in the WPID. Still, the particularly disruptive nature of nativist movements in the mainstream political arena makes this phenomenon a topical area of study, and better understanding its origins can help shine light on factors shaping the broader evolutions of political competition and voting behaviour in contemporary democracies.

# Data and Methodology

## Data Sources and Considerations

As noted above, the analyses that I carry out in this paper draw on harmonized surveys recording information on both individual voting behaviour and a range of sociodemographic characteristics, which collectively comprise the WPID. These surveys are, for the most part, led by academic researchers based in each country during the period immediately following a national election. When this data is either not available or of insufficient quality, I rely on either pre-electoral surveys (which are similar to post-electoral surveys but are carried out in the period leading up to an election, and therefore ask about intended voting behaviour), or large cross-country projects in place to track the links between political attitudes and sociodemographic variables over time (such as the European Social Survey or the Asian Barometer Survey).

Since the database's initial launch in 2021, surveys covering recently-held elections have been released for several WPID countries. The availability of new data naturally warrants a study of how the cleavage dynamics documented by this database have evolved in recent years. I will therefore provide updated analyses of these cleavages for 18 countries with accessible data at the time of this study: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Germany, Finland, Israel, Malaysia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Taiwan, Thailand, and the United Kingdom. A full description of the election years, sources used, and sample sizes of these surveys can be found in Table 1.

Another key data source that I draw on in Part 2 of my analysis is the Manifesto Project Database (MPD), an ongoing academic effort to code political parties' election manifestos and break down their policy preferences in a way that can be used for comparative analyses (Lehmann et al., 2023). This data captures the emphasis that parties place on a range of policy issues, and I will primarily rely on a specific indicator—the state-market economic index—as a measure of the extent to which a party manifesto in a given election make statements in support of pro-market versus pro-redistribution economic policies. I will also consider indicators covering parties' broad sociocultural positions and their attitudes towards multiculturalism in particular. The main benefit of this data source is that it allows me to analyze how the ideological slant of a given political party varies in relation to its domestic competitors and international counterparts over important issue areas. In this way, I am able to construct indicators of ideological polarization (e.g. on redistributive policy)

TABLE 1: Recent Elections Covered in the WPID Update

Country	Election Year	Survey Source	Sample Size
Australia	2022	Australian Election Study	2508
Austria	2019	Austrian National Election Study	3098
Belgium	2019	ESS Wave 10	1341
Canada	2021	Canadian Election Study	15026
Chile	2021	Encuesta Centro de Estudios Públicos	1355
Denmark	2019	Danish National Election Study	2422
Germany	2021	German Longitudinal Election Study	3179
Finland	2019	Finnish National Election Study	1598
Israel	2021	Israel National Election Study	1816
Malaysia	2018	Asian Barometer Survey Wave 5	1237
Netherlands	2021	Dutch Parliamentary Election Study	4805
New Zealand	2020	New Zealand Election Studies	3730
Poland	2019	ESS Wave 10	2065
Portugal	2022	Estudo Eleitoral Português	1010
Sweden	2018	CSES Module 5	3784
Taiwan	2020	CSES Module 5	1680
Thailand	2019	CSES Module 5	1536
United Kingdom	2019	British Election Study	3946

Note: CSES: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. ESS: European Social Survey.

between different parties or classes of parties in a given election and compare this measure across countries over time.

## WPID Methodology

The primary methodology that I employ in this paper—notably in Part 1—follows the approach developed to construct the WPID and implemented in prior analyses using this database, such as Gethin, Martínez-Toledano, and Piketty (2022) and the compilation of studies in Gethin, Martínez-Toledano, and Piketty (2021a). After harmonizing the new electoral surveys with the existing WPID, I estimate the following linear probability model on each individual survey while accounting for probability weights:

$$Y_{ijk} = \alpha + \beta X_{ijk} + \eta C_{ijk} + \epsilon_{ijk}$$

In this specification,  $Y_{ijk}$  is a dummy variable that captures whether individual  $i$  in country  $j$  voted for a left-wing party (in Western countries) or a pro-poor party (in non-Western countries)<sup>5</sup> in election  $k$ ,  $X_{ijk}$  is a dummy variable that captures whether individual  $i$  in country  $j$  belongs to a particular societal group when surveyed for election  $k$ , and  $C_{ijk}$  is a vector of sociodemographic control variables. The coefficient of interest,  $\beta$ , thus captures the difference in the propensity to vote for a left-wing

<sup>5</sup>I will explain this distinction in party framing at the start of Part 1.

party (or a pro-poor party, if in a non-Western country) between members and non-members of the group under consideration, holding all control variables equal.

To better align the election results reported in the survey with those observed in reality, I continue adhering to the WPID methodology by aggregating the survey election results and official election results separately by party type (i.e. into groups of either left-wing, right-wing, or other parties) and re-weighting the survey weights of voters in these categories in the following way:

$$w_{final} = w_{survey} \times \frac{share_{official}}{share_{survey}}$$

Here,  $w_{survey}$  corresponds to the original survey weight of an individual voting for a given party group,  $share_{official}$  corresponds to the share of votes received by that group according to official elections results, and  $share_{survey}$  corresponds to the share of votes received by that group in the survey under consideration.

A further methodological concern arises from the fact that many surveys report income and education variables in discrete categories (such as income brackets, or levels of education attained) that must be mapped to corresponding quantile groups within the population distribution. Again, the approach that I take follows the established methodology by allocating multiples of individuals to the range of potential quantiles into which they may fall, in proportion to the share of respondents in each category that must be found within a given quantile. Applying this allocation procedure should provide a conservative estimate of the relationships between education/income quantiles and voting behaviour, to the extent that the trends in vote shares within each bracket follow the same trends displayed across brackets.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup>A demonstration of this exact approach can be found in the Online Appendix of Gethin, Martínez-Toledano, and Piketty (2022).

# Part 1: WPID Update

## Analytical Considerations

Prior to presenting the results from the WPID update, it is important to clarify a number of decisions that have informed my analyses conducted in this section. Following Gethin, Martínez-Toledano, and Piketty (2022), I focus on voting for left-wing parties in Western countries and for "pro-poor" parties in non-Western countries, displaying these two groups in separate panels and discussing them in turn. Left-wing parties in the former case correspond to those rooted in social democratic, socialist, communist, or green party traditions, as well as liberal parties in certain countries (e.g. Canada). The decision to consider "pro-poor" parties in non-Western settings reflects the fact that the standard left-right axis of political organization often applied to Western contexts does not adequately extend to many of the non-Western countries covered in the WPID (Gethin, Martínez-Toledano, and Piketty, 2022). Instead, the "pro-poor" designation provides a more comparable framework to analyze the politicization of social inequalities in such cases, and is assigned to parties or coalitions that have typically found greatest electoral success among voters in the bottom half of the income distribution (relative to those in the top half). A description of the main left-wing/pro-poor parties and coalitions considered for each country can be seen in Table A1 of the Appendix.

I have also chosen to display all long-run series estimates after controlling for a number of available sociodemographic variables recorded in the data. For the sake of brevity, I will not repeat this fact each time I consider the dynamics of a given electoral cleavage, but all long-run series estimates and subsequent discussions of these findings should be interpreted with this in mind. Additionally, when a given cleavage is available for nearly all countries, I display the Western and non-Western group averages in a separate figure to consider how these estimates have evolved at the group level in the updated electoral surveys. In general, data availability is much more limited among the non-Western countries under consideration. As such, I sometimes display the corresponding analysis for the non-Western group in the Appendix when only a small number of countries are covered.

Finally, as outlined in previous research linked to the WPID, the relatively small sample sizes of these surveys present clear analytical limitations (Gethin, Martínez-Toledano, and Piketty, 2022), particularly when comparing election-on-election variations. Additionally, population voting patterns can be influenced by unique context-specific factors (such as economic crises, political scandals, etc.) and may be subject

to temporary deviations from long-term trends in any given election. With that in mind, I will compare the cleavage estimates from the new election under consideration with the decennial averages provided in the initial launch of the WPID. In cases where the new survey covers an election that took place in the 2010s, I preclude these results from the respective country's 2010s average and instead present them separately under the "Update" label of the relevant graphs. New elections that have occurred in the 2020s are similarly displayed in the "Update" category.<sup>7</sup> An increase from a country's 2010s value to its "Update" value therefore implies a positive evolution of the cleavage under consideration since the initial launch of the WPID.<sup>8</sup> Of course, comparing individual elections against decennial averages does not do away with the concerns presented above, but it still offers an improvement over considering pairs of unique elections by reducing volatility and improving the precision of the the last point in the pre-update series. It also appears as the most straightforward way to graphically show how the updated surveys impact the direction of the series under consideration.

## Updated Cleavages

### Education

As discussed previously, the most striking trend identified by the WPID is the long-run reversal of the education cleavage that begun to unfold in Western countries during the second half of the 20th century. Figure 1 presents the updated series for one measure of this cleavage, the difference in the probability of voting for left-wing parties (in Western countries) or for pro-poor countries (in non-Western countries) between voters in the top 10% and the bottom 90% of the education distribution. These estimates point to a deepening of the educational divide in the most recent elections for the majority of the Western countries under consideration.<sup>9</sup> Indeed, 9 out of 12 countries in the upper panel of Figure 1 experienced an increase of this indicator relative to the pre-update 2010s estimates.<sup>10</sup> Figure 2 then displays the simple average of the series for Western and non-Western countries, confirming a clear upward trend for the former group. Particularly large jumps occurred in Belgium (11.5 percentage points) and Sweden (6.7 percentage points), which, interestingly, saw


<sup>7</sup>None of the countries included in this analysis have other elections from the 2020s covered by the WPID. Thus, in all cases, the most recent point in the pre-update series for each cleavage is the 2010s category.

<sup>8</sup>More detailed regression results showing the cleavage estimates for the 2010s elections, the "Update" elections, and the difference between the two can be found in Table A2 of the Appendix. I largely reserve my comments for statistically significant cleavage developments. Still, I will occasionally mention non-significant point estimates that align strongly with concurrent political developments yet suffer from issues of small sample size. It will also be instructive to highlight the patterns observed across all point estimates for a country group, regardless of whether each individual estimate is statistically significant itself.

<sup>9</sup>Similar patterns can be observed when comparing voters in the top 50% of the education distribution to those in the bottom half, as shown in Figure A1 of the Appendix.

<sup>10</sup>There was nevertheless large variation in the extent of this increase. Some countries would be best described as having maintained their existing levels of the education cleavage.


FIGURE 1: Updated Education Cleavages (Top 10% vs. Bottom 90%)



Data source: WPID.

Note: This figure displays the difference between the share of voters in the top 10% and the share of voters in the bottom 90% of the education distribution voting for left-wing parties in Western countries (top panel) and for pro-poor parties in non-Western countries (bottom panel). The estimates control for income, age, gender, religion, worship frequency, rural/urban location, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status, in country-years where available. "Update" refers to the most recent election with available survey data in each country, while "2010s" corresponds to the last point in this series in the original version of the WPID. AD: Approve Dignity; FA: Broad Front; PRO: Progressive Party; BN: Barisan Nasional; PiS: Law and Justice; DPP: Democratic Progressive Party; PTP: Pheu Thai Party; FFP: Future Forward Party.

FIGURE 2: Updated Education Cleavages (Top 10% vs. Bottom 90%),  
Country Group Means



*Data source:* WPID.

*Note:* This figure displays the (unbalanced) average difference between the share of voters in the top 10% and the share of voters in the bottom 90% of the education distribution voting for left-wing parties in Western countries and for pro-poor parties in non-Western countries. The countries included are shown in Figure 1. Estimates control for income, age, gender, religion, worship frequency, rural/urban location, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status, in country-years where available. "Update" refers to the most recent election with available survey data in each country, while "2010s" corresponds to the last point in this series in the original version of the WPID.

significant electoral gains made by nativist parties during the elections added in this update. A notable rise can also be seen in the United Kingdom (5.4 percentage points), following a 2019 general election dominated by the issue of Brexit. While one must exercise caution in interpreting these results due to the small survey samples and potential volatility of single elections, the overall trends outlined in these figures provide suggestive evidence that the reversal of the education cleavage has generally intensified in the Western countries under consideration over recent years.

Turning to non-Western countries, voters in the top education decile are estimated to vote less often for pro-poor parties than those in the bottom 90% of the distribution in all cases (Figure 1), with little evolution for this group on average (Figure 2). A clear decline in this indicator is seen in Israel (6.8 percentage points), where the drop in educational elites' relative support for conservative movements seems to parallel the trends observed in Western countries.<sup>11</sup> While there has not been much change in Poland, the sizeable negative divide of 10.4 percentage points reflects the continued aversion of educational elites to the nativist PiS. In Taiwan, the educational divide remains particularly small in light of the highly salient and

<sup>11</sup>The obvious difference being that conservative movements in Israel are considered to be pro-poor, and so declining support from high-education voters drives the cleavage in the opposite direction.



class-cutting nature of Taiwanese ethnic cleavages, which I will discuss below. Chile also presents an interesting example following the historic victory of progressive Approve Dignity (AD) candidate Gabriel Boric in the 2021 presidential election. The fact that first round voting did not, however, see a substantial mobilization of low-education voters behind pro-poor coalitions raises the question of whether Chile may progress to the form multiple-elite party organization observed in many Western countries. All in all, the rich contextual diversity of the non-Western countries under consideration reveals clear differences from their Western counterparts in the nature of the education cleavage over the recent period.

## Income

Unlike the stark reversal of the education cleavage over past decades, the progressive attenuation of the effects of income on voting behaviour in Western countries has been much more subdued. Figure 3 presents the updated series comparing the difference in the propensity to vote for left-wing parties (in Western countries) or for pro-poor parties (in non-Western countries) between voters in the top 90% and the bottom 10% of the income distribution. The most recent elections do not reveal an obvious shift towards a reversal of the income cleavage in most Western countries, with little change observed in aggregate for this group (Figure 4).<sup>12</sup> Still, there are some important jumps at the country level. The large increases observed in Austria (12.0 percentage points) and Finland (8.3 percentage points) point to the potential for a sustained realignment of the income cleavages in these countries, which would join the United States and Italy as the only other Western countries to have undergone this transformation to such an extent (Gethin, Martínez-Toledano, and Piketty, 2022).<sup>13</sup> Sweden, on the other hand, displays a deepening of the income divide over this time frame by 5.9 percentage points, while most observations show little change overall. Given the clear lack of any recent pattern across countries in these figures, it is reasonable to conclude that the income cleavage has not followed any systematic trend in the Western countries under consideration since the initial launch of the WPID.


Looking at recent data among non-Western countries shows an upward evolution of the negative income cleavage in nearly all countries (Figure 3), leading to an aggregate attenuation for this group (Figure 4). In general, there is less polarization along the income dimension for these countries than observed among their Western counterparts. The largest transformation occurred in Taiwan, which experienced a reversal along this dimension in the updated survey following an 10.7 percentage point increase in the relative support of high-income voters for the Democratic

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<sup>12</sup>Similar patterns can be observed when comparing voters in the top 50% of the income distribution to those in the bottom half, as shown in Figure A2 of the Appendix.

<sup>13</sup>As we will see in Part 2, the largest right-wing party in the 2019 Finnish general election—the nativist True Finns—are relatively strong advocates of redistributive social policies (albeit in welfare chauvinist fashion). This could help explain the reversal of the income cleavage, to the extent that the True Finns have resonated more among low-income voters than their high-income counterparts.


FIGURE 3: Updated Income Cleavages (Top 10% vs. Bottom 90%)



Data source: WPID.

Note: This figure displays the difference between the share of voters in the top 10% and the share of voters in the bottom 90% of the income distribution voting for left-wing parties in Western countries (top panel) and for pro-poor parties in non-Western countries (bottom panel). The estimates control for education, age, gender, religion, worship frequency, rural/urban location, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status, in country-years where available. "Update" refers to the most recent election with available survey data in each country, while "2010s" corresponds to the last point in this series in the original version of the WPID. AD: Approve Dignity; FA: Broad Front; PRO: Progressive Party; BN: Barisan Nasional; PiS: Law and Justice; DPP: Democratic Progressive Party; PTP: Pheu Thai Party; FFP: Future Forward Party.

FIGURE 4: Updated Income Cleavages (Top 10% vs. Bottom 90%),  
Country Group Means



*Data source:* WPID.

*Note:* This figure displays the (unbalanced) average difference between the share of voters in the top 10% and the share of voters in the bottom 90% of the income distribution voting for left-wing parties in Western countries and for pro-poor parties in non-Western countries. The countries included are shown in Figure 3. The estimates control for education, age, gender, religion, worship frequency, rural/urban location, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status, in country-years where available. "Update" refers to the most recent election with available survey data in each country, while "2010s" corresponds to the last point in this series in the original version of the WPID.

Progressive Party (DPP). Given that Taiwanese independence serves as the dominant electoral cleavage in the domestic political sphere (Achen and Wang, 2017), and that the two-party nature of Taiwanese electoral contests pits the pro-autonomy DPP against the anti-independence Kuomintang, it could be that financial elites felt particularly drawn to the latter in response to growing political tensions with Beijing. Beyond this example, however, the evolution of the income cleavage in other non-Western contexts has been much more subdued. Again, Chile presents an interesting case given the weakness of the income cleavage in light of the victory by the economically-progressive AD in the recent presidential election (in addition to, as I will discuss in Part 2 below, the unambiguously pro-rich economic policy platform of their principal opponent Jose Antonio Kast). So does Poland, where income is not largely politicized despite the expansive social spending program implemented by PiS following its electoral victory in 2015. The fact that high education is more negatively associated with pro-poor voting than high income in Poland points to a particular importance of nativist political conflict in this country, which I will return to in Part 2.

## Age

Younger voters in Western democracies tend to be significantly more likely to support left-wing parties than their older counterparts (Gethin, Martínez-Toledano, and Piketty, 2022). The upper panel of Figure 5 shows that this trend persists for most countries in the updated election surveys when comparing voters aged 25 and under to those aged 60 and above.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, the generational cleavage has deepened in 8 out of 11 countries under consideration since the release of the WPID, with sizeable increases in countries such as the United Kingdom (12.5 percentage points) and Austria (11.9 percentage points).<sup>15</sup> Two exceptions to this trend with notable decreases—Finland (13.0 percentage points) and Germany (8.2 percentage points)—are cases where younger generations have actually been more likely to vote for emergent right-wing nativist movements than their older counterparts, and show that unidirectional polarization over generational lines is far from inevitable.<sup>16</sup> Still, Figure 6 confirms that generational cleavages have intensified sharply among the Western countries in this sample on average. What might help to explain the recent rise in age-based voting over this short period? One plausible driver of this trend is the growing salience of environmental issues and their electoral importance to younger voters. Indeed, between the 2010s surveys in the initial version of the WPID and the most recent elections covered by this update, green parties appear to have had their largest increase in vote shares among the youngest voters (i.e. voters aged 25 or below) while net changes in support for the traditional left-wing parties at these ages have been much weaker (see Figure A4 in the Appendix). Moving forward, generational cleavages in many Western countries may thus continue to deepen as salient political topics such as environmental issues find differential support along generational lines.

The non-Western countries included in the update display highly varied trends in the recent dynamics of the generational cleavage (Figure 5).<sup>17</sup> Relative support for pro-poor parties among younger voters has reached particularly high levels in Taiwan, following a 10.8 percentage point increase in the last presidential election. In this case, the greater prevalence of nationalist sentiments among younger voters can explain their greater affinity for the DPP in light of rising political tensions with mainland China (Wang, 2019). The Chilean example also stands out given the country's period of wide-sweeping civil unrest starting in 2019 that was triggered by youth discontent over public transit fare hikes, before quickly transforming into a broader societal movement against social inequality. Here, "millennial"


<sup>14</sup>I also display the updated cleavage when comparing voters in the bottom 50% of the age distribution to those in the top half in Figure A3 of the Appendix, which reveals similar patterns.

<sup>15</sup>While a country-by-country analysis of these trends is beyond the scope of this discussion, it is worth drawing a link between the generational divide over Brexit in the United Kingdom and the particularly deep generational cleavage observed during the 2019 British general election.

<sup>16</sup>I will return to the diversity in generational support for nativist movements in Part 2.

<sup>17</sup>While there is a clear increase in this trend on average (Figure 6), it is not a very meaningful generalization for this reason.


FIGURE 5: Updated Generational Cleavages (Ages 25 and under vs. 26+)



Data source: WPID.

Note: This figure displays the difference between the share of voters aged 25 and under and the share of voters older than 25 voting for left-wing parties in Western countries (top panel) and for pro-poor parties in non-Western countries (bottom panel). The estimates control for education, income, gender, religion, worship frequency, rural/urban location, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status, in country-years where available. "Update" refers to the most recent election with available survey data in each country, while "2010s" corresponds to the last point in this series in the original version of the WPID. AD: Approve Dignity; FA: Broad Front; PRO: Progressive Party; PiS: Law and Justice; DPP: Democratic Progressive Party; PTP: Pheu Thai Party; FFP: Future Forward Party.

FIGURE 6: Updated Generational Cleavages (Ages 25 and under vs. 26+), Country Group Means



Data source: WPID.

Note: This figure displays the mean difference between the share of voters aged 25 and under and the share of voters older than 25 voting for left-wing parties in Western countries and for pro-poor parties in non-Western countries. The countries included are shown in Figure 5. The estimates control for education, income, gender, religion, worship frequency, rural/urban location, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status, in country-years where available. "Update" refers to the most recent election with available survey data in each country, while "2010s" corresponds to the last point in this series in the original version of the WPID.

AD candidate and former student protest leader Gabriel Boric appears to have resonated strongly with younger voters in the 2021 presidential election, evidenced by a 9.6 percentage point increase in relative support for pro-poor parties among voters 25 and under. Looking at Thailand, on the other hand, the generational cleavage remained constant in the 2019 general election despite large age-based changes in party affiliation, as younger voters flocked to the novel Future Forward Party (FFP) after favouring the Pheu Thai Party (PTP) in past elections. Finally, in Poland, younger voters have remained less likely to vote for PiS and the generational cleavage deepened considerably (by 8.6 percentage points) in the most recent survey. This development is consistent with a conflict between the more socially liberal attitudes found among younger generations and the strong conservative stances adopted by this party in issue areas such as LGBT rights and gender equality (Dochow-Sondershaus, Teney, and Borbáth, 2023), which have been elevated to a high degree of importance across the Polish electoral landscape.<sup>18</sup> A surge in the relative support of younger generations for pro-poor parties is thus not guaranteed and can depend

<sup>18</sup>The lack of support for PiS among younger voters comes in spite of the introduction of certain economic policies explicitly targeted to this demographic, such as sizeable income tax exemptions for those aged 26 and under.

on the positions of these parties across a range of salient issue areas, reflecting the multidimensional nature of political competition.

## Gender


Gender-based voting patterns have also undergone important transformations in recent decades. While women in Western countries have historically provided disproportionate support for conservative parties, these patterns have typically reversed over recent decades such that women are more likely than men to vote for left-wing parties today (Gethin, Martínez-Toledano, and Piketty, 2022; Inglehart and Norris, 2000). The updated gender cleavage series shown in the upper panel of Figure 7 reveal that 10 out of 12 Western countries under consideration have experienced a deepening of this transformation since the initial release of the WPID, leading to a particularly pronounced jump on average (Figure 8). While much of the reversal of gender voting patterns in Western countries can be attributed to higher rates of secularization among women (Inglehart and Norris, 2000), these estimates explicitly control for both religion and worship frequency, suggesting that gender itself has indeed become more politicized in recent years. As I will discuss in Part 2 below, nativist movements typically find greater success among male voters than their female counterparts, and the electoral gains made by these parties in some countries provide one plausible driver of the growing gender cleavage documented in this section. There may also be candidate effects at play in cases such as Finland—the country with the greatest jump along this dimension (11.7 percentage points)—where the three largest left-wing parties in the 2019 general election were all led by women.<sup>19</sup> Candidate effects and nativist success nevertheless only hold relevance for a handful of cases, and the trends shown below suggest that gender continues to re-emerge as a relevant political cleavage across Western societies irrespective of these factors.

Unlike in Western countries, women and men in non-Western countries have not shown systematic tendencies to vote for different party groups in past elections (Gethin, Martínez-Toledano, and Piketty, 2022). The updated series displayed in the lower panel of Figure 7 confirm that significant variation persists in the size and direction of the gender cleavage among the non-Western countries under consideration, with little divide at the aggregate level (Figure 8). Malaysia remains the country with the highest gender gap in this sample (12.5 percentage points), though without any major trend observed in the most recent survey. In Taiwan and Chile, women voters have become more likely to support pro-poor parties than men in the updated election, following sizeable increases of 7.9 percentage points and 7.5 percentage points, respectively.<sup>20</sup> At the same time, the relatively greater support of women for

<sup>19</sup>Another example where candidate effects may have had an important influence is Germany, given the large increase (5.4 percentage points) in relative support for left-wing parties among women voters once Angela Merkel stepped down as the leader of the Christian Democratic Union.

<sup>20</sup>The results in Chile are consistent with my findings in Part 2 below where I show that men have had a much higher tendency to vote for the far-right candidate Jose Antonio Kast, mirroring the gendered patterns of nativist voting observed in Western countries.

FIGURE 7: Updated Gender Cleavages




Data source: WPID.

Note: This figure displays the difference between the share of women voters and the share of men voters voting for left-wing parties in Western countries (top panel) and for pro-poor parties in non-Western countries (bottom panel). The estimates control for education, income, age, religion, worship frequency, rural/urban location, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status, in country-years where available. "Update" refers to the most recent election with available survey data in each country, while "2010s" corresponds to the last point in this series in the original version of the WPID. AD: Approve Dignity; FA: Broad Front; PRO: Progressive Party; BN: Barisan Nasional; PiS: Law and Justice; DPP: Democratic Progressive Party; PTP: Pheu Thai Party; FFP: Future Forward Party.



FIGURE 8: Updated Gender Cleavages, Country Group Means



Data source: WPID.

Note: This figure displays the mean difference between the share of women voters and the share of men voters voting for left-wing parties in Western countries and for pro-poor parties in non-Western countries. The countries included are shown in Figure 7. The estimates control for education, income, age, religion, worship frequency, rural/urban location, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status, in country-years where available. "Update" refers to the most recent election with available survey data in each country, while "2010s" corresponds to the last point in this series in the original version of the WPID.

opposing (i.e. non pro-poor) parties intensified in other contexts during this period, such as Thailand (by 6.5 percentage points) and Poland (by 3.6 percentage points).<sup>21</sup> In general, the relevance and implications of gender for voting behaviour in these settings remain highly country-specific, and there is no indication of a trend towards the sort of quasi-universal reversal observed in Western countries.

## Religion

Religion is another sociodemographic variable that tends to be associated with political orientation in democratic societies. To investigate these patterns in the most recent electoral surveys, I consider differences in party choice between voters belonging to a country's dominant religious group and those who are either irreligious or belong to a religious minority.<sup>22</sup> Historically, members of the dominant religion have generally voted more conservatively than the remainder of the voting population in Western countries, and the upper panel of Figure 9 shows that this pattern has

<sup>21</sup>The trend in Poland could reflect the conservative crackdown on women's reproductive issues advanced by PiS following its initial electoral victory. This evolution would further illustrate the aforementioned dynamic of gendered nativist voting from the opposite angle, given that PiS is both pro-poor and unambiguously nativist.

<sup>22</sup>Depending on the country, the dominant religious group is defined as either Christianity, Islam, or Buddhism, with the precise designation for each case provided in the note of Figure 9.

persisted for most countries under consideration in the recent election. These results are consistent with a tendency to hold more progressive attitudes among secular individuals, as well as the fact that religious minorities may be subject to marginalization in society that is less prevalent among left-wing movements. There are sizeable evolutions in some countries, such as an 10.4 percentage drop in Sweden that likely reflects a significant increase in the relative number of religious minority voters in the country's newest electoral survey following increased levels of immigration over the recent period.<sup>23</sup> Still, there does not seem to be a meaningful deepening of this cleavage on average since the initial launch of the WPID (Figure 10).


Returning to the point on marginalization faced by religious minorities, it is worth looking specifically at the strong tendency for Muslim voters in Western countries to support left-wing parties, in light of the Islamophobic sentiments present in nativist political discourse that is generally found on the right (Gethin, Martínez-Toledano, and Piketty, 2021b, 2022; Piketty, 2020). Figure 11 reveals that, among the countries with available data, the popularity of left-wing parties remains particularly elevated among Muslim voters relative to non-Muslim voters. While a sizeable gap has persisted in all countries, the direction of this cleavage has nevertheless followed varied trends across countries from the pre-update 2010s levels. Still, these results suggest that Muslim voters continue to turn to left-wing movements in the face of hostility emerging from the anti-immigrant right.

Looking at non-Western countries reveals far more varied outcomes across the religious dimension and yields several observations of note (Figure 9). In Malaysia, the sizeable deepening of this cleavage—which rose by 23.0 percentage points in the newest survey—reflects the abandonment of the pro-poor Barisan Nasional (BN) by the ethnically Chinese Buddhist minority in recent years, increasing the concentration of support for this party among the country's Muslim majority. Chile saw a comparable drop (25.7 percentage points) in the opposite direction that stems from a coalescence of non-religious voters around AD candidate Gabriel Boric and a strong affinity of Catholic and Protestant voters for his principal opponent Jose Antonio Kast. The religious cleavage is much less prominent in the remaining non-Western settings, though it is worth also pointing out that Polish voters belonging to the country's Catholic majority are more likely to support the pro-poor PiS than other voters, in line with the party's strong socially conservative stance in issues such as abortion and LGBT rights.

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<sup>23</sup>There is also a substantial 15.4 percentage point jump in Finland. While an immediate explanation for this development is not as clear as in the Swedish case, it could also be linked to compositional changes within the electorate given high rates of secularization coupled with only a small number of religious minorities, which may have mechanically rendered the population of non-religious voters more conservative.


FIGURE 9: Updated Religious Cleavages



Data source: WPID.

Note: This figure displays the mean difference between the share of voters belonging to a country's dominant religious group and the share of all other voters voting for left-wing parties in Western countries and for pro-poor parties in non-Western countries. The estimates control for education, income, age, gender, worship frequency, rural/urban location, region, employment status, and marital status, in country-years where available. "Update" refers to the most recent election with available survey data in each country, while "2010s" corresponds to the last point in this series in the original version of the WPID. AD: Approve Dignity; FA: Broad Front; PRO: Progressive Party; BN: Barisan Nasional; PiS: Law and Justice; DPP: Democratic Progressive Party; PTP: Pheu Thai Party; FFP: Future Forward Party. The dominant religious group refers to Christians (Catholics and other denominations combined) in all Western countries, Chile, and Poland, Buddhists in Taiwan and Thailand, and Muslims in Malaysia.


FIGURE 10: Updated Religious Cleavages, Country Group Means



Data source: WPID.

Note: This figure displays the difference between the share of voters belonging to a country's dominant religious group and the share of all other voters voting for left-wing parties in Western countries (top panel) and for pro-poor parties in non-Western countries (bottom panel). The countries included are shown in Figure 9, with the religious groups considered listed in the note of that figure. The estimates control for education, income, age, gender, worship frequency, rural/urban location, region, employment status, and marital status, in country-years where available. "Update" refers to the most recent election with available survey data in each country, while "2010s" corresponds to the last point in this series in the original version of the WPID.

FIGURE 11: Updated Muslim/Non-Muslim Cleavages



Data sources: WPID and ESS.


Note: This figure displays the levels of support for left-wing parties among Muslim and non-Muslim voters in several Western countries. "Update" refers to the most recent election with available survey data in each country, while "2010s" corresponds to average of the elections in this decade covered by the original version of the WPID. The data for Belgium, Germany, and Sweden come from the European Social Survey.

## National Origin and Race/Ethnicity

Given the persistent influence of religion on voting behaviour among the countries under consideration, it is no surprise that race and ethnicity also continue to be relevant predictors of party support in a number of settings. While data on national origin is only available for a handful of cases (all of which are Western countries), immigrants from non-Western countries were more likely to support left-wing parties than native-born voters in all of the new electoral surveys (Figure 12), albeit by a particularly small margin in some cases. The trends in this cleavage do not seem to have followed a clear pattern across countries since the initial release of the WPID, however. In parallel with the patterns observed among Muslim voters above, high levels of support for left-wing parties among this group are to be expected given the prevalence of right-wing nativist political discourse in many Western countries over recent years. The observation that the immigrant cleavage is particularly large in countries with prominent nativist political discourse (e.g. Austria, Belgium, the United Kingdom, etc.), as noted by Gethin, Martínez-Toledano, and Piketty (2021b, 2022), still holds true in the updated sample, suggesting that non-Western immigrant voters continue to turn to left-wing parties in the face of right-wing antagonism.

Similar conclusions can be made for racial and ethnic minorities in the Western countries with available data. These voters are generally more likely to support left-wing parties, but there has not been a systematic evolution of this cleavage as of late (Figure 13). There is, however, a large decline in this cleavage in New Zealand in the most recent survey (by 9.8 percentage points), following a surge in support for


FIGURE 12: Updated Native/Non-Western Immigrant Cleavages



*Data sources:* WPID and ESS.

*Note:* This figure displays the levels of support for left-wing parties among native-born and non-western immigrant voters in several Western countries. "Update" refers to the most recent election with available survey data in each country, while "2010s" corresponds to the last point in this series in the original version of the WPID. The data for Austria, Belgium, Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom come from the European Social Survey.

FIGURE 13: Updated Race/Ethnicity Cleavages



Data source: WPID.

Note: This figure displays the difference between the share of racial/ethnic minority voters and the share of all other voters voting for left-wing parties. The estimates control for education, income, age, gender, worship frequency, rural/urban location, region, employment status, and marital status, in country-years where available. "Update" refers to the most recent election with available survey data in each country, while "2010s" corresponds to the last point in this series in the original version of the WPID. BN: Barisan Nasional; DPP: Democratic Progressive Party.

the Labour Party among white voters in the 2020 general election. Still, the continued affinity for left-wing parties among racial and ethnic minorities gives further credence to the notion that both the polarization of political discourse along socio-cultural lines and the nativist stances often originating from the right have created a threatening political environment for these groups.


Turning to the two non-Western cases with available data paints a very different picture (Figure 13). In Taiwan, those with recent mainland Chinese origins (who I classify as minorities, distinct from the long-established Chinese majority with a more distant immigrant background) often have historical ties to the Kuomintang Party and thus tend not to vote for the DPP, which explains the substantial and persistent negative cleavage into the recent period. This critical importance of this class-cutting divide can account for why, as noted above, education in Taiwan is weakly politicized. In Malaysia, the negative racial cleavage intensified by 23.7 percentage points during the 2018 general election when, as mentioned previously, the country's sizeable (an economically prosperous) Chinese minority largely withdrew their support from BN to back its principal opponent, the Pakatan Harapan party. The Taiwanese and Malaysian contexts differ starkly from their Western counterparts in that both countries are home to a prominent minority population that is not socio-economically marginalized relative to the dominant group, yielding an electoral importance of foreign policy in the former and a synergy of class- and ethnicity-based issues in the latter that diminish minority support for pro-poor parties (Sota and Gethin, 2021; Gethin and Jenmana, 2021). While racial and ethnic cleavages have therefore continued to hold relevance in both the Western and non-Western countries under consideration, the precise drivers of these patterns differ starkly across these categories.

## Geography

Looking now at geographic cleavages, rural voters are less likely than their urban counterparts to support left-wing parties in all Western countries where this information is recorded (Figure 14). This cleavage has grown sharply more negative in New Zealand (by 10.7 percentage points), which saw a surge in urban support for the Labour Party in the 2020 general election. More generally, the rural-urban cleavage has either intensified or remained relatively constant in practically all of the cases under consideration.

Turning to the two non-Western countries with available data, Malaysia and Thailand present interesting differences in voting patterns along rural-urban lines (Figure 14). In Thailand, the negative cleavage dropped to 15.3 percentage points as the FFP resonated particularly strongly with urban voters in the 2019 general election. In Malaysia, on the other hand, the disproportionate support for BN in rural areas is now much less apparent, in spite of the party's historical popularity in these settings given factors such as strong reductions in rural poverty under BN leadership (Gethin and Jenmana, 2021).

FIGURE 14: Updated Rural-Urban Cleavages




Data source: WPID.

Note: This figure displays the difference between the share of voters living in rural areas and the share of voters living in urban areas voting for left-wing parties in Western countries (top panel) and for pro-poor parties in non-Western countries (bottom panel). The estimates control for education, income, age, gender, religion, worship frequency, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status, in country-years where available. "Update" refers to the most recent election with available survey data in each country, while "2010s" corresponds to the last point in this series in the original version of the WPID. BN: Barisan Nasional; PTP: Pheu Thai Party; FFP: Future Forward Party.



FIGURE 15: Updated Centre-Periphery Cleavages



*Data source:* WPID.


*Note:* This figure displays the mean difference between the share of voters living in a country's political centre (i.e. its capital) and the share of voters living elsewhere voting for left-wing parties in Western countries. The estimates control for education, income, age, gender, religion, worship frequency, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status, in country-years where available. "Update" refers to the most recent election with available survey data in each country, while "2010s" corresponds to the last point in this series in the original version of the WPID.

Likewise, living in a country's urban political centre continues to be clearly associated with voting for left-wing parties in the Western countries with available data (Figure 15). There does not seem to be an apparent pattern in the direction of this cleavage over recent years, however. The only non-Western country for which this data is recorded is Thailand and I have displayed the corresponding analysis in Figure A5 of the Appendix. It reveals a significant reversal of this cleavage in the 2019 general election as support for the Democrat Party crumbled in Bangkok—the party's historic stronghold—while the new (and much more progressive) FFP made considerable gains among voters in the city.

## Employment

Concerning political cleavages linked to employment, voters working in the public sector continue to show stronger support for left-wing parties than their private sector counterparts among the Western countries with available data (Figure 16). The extent of this divide is particularly high in Denmark (25 percentage points), and remains prominent (albeit at smaller levels) in several other cases. Still, there does not seem to be a clear trend in dynamics across this sample in the most recent surveys. I have included the analysis for the two non-Western settings with available data (Poland and Taiwan) in Figure A6 of the Appendix. These cases do not show much

FIGURE 16: Updated Public/Private Sector Cleavages




Data source: WPID.

Note: This figure displays the difference between the share of voters working in the public sector and the share of voters working in the private sector voting for left-wing parties in Western countries. The estimates control for education, income, age, gender, religion, worship frequency, rural/urban location, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status, in country-years where available. "Update" refers to the most recent election with available survey data in each country, while "2010s" corresponds to the last point in this series in the original version of the WPID.

evolution of note in the recent election surveys, though Taiwan continues to present a negative sectoral cleavage as the DPP found relatively lower support among public sector workers in the 2020 presidential election.

Looking at unionized voters reveals that they remain stronger sources of support for left-wing parties than non-unionized voters in the Western settings under consideration (Figure 17). Germany and Austria each saw sizeable declines in the strength of this cleavage (by 11.8 percentage points and 11.2 percentage points, respectively), while it remained relatively constant in most other countries. Again, Poland and Taiwan were the only two non-Western cases with sufficient data and I have displayed these analyses in Figure A7 of the appendix. In the most recent survey, Taiwan saw a sizeable deepening (9.8 percentage points) of its already-negative union cleavage while Poland saw little change along this dimension.

FIGURE 17: Updated Union Member/Non-Union Member Cleavages




Data source: WPID.

Note: This figure displays the difference between the share of unionized voters and the share of non-union member voters voting for left-wing parties in Western countries. The estimates control for education, income, age, gender, religion, worship frequency, rural/urban location, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status, in country-years where available. "Update" refers to the most recent election with available survey data in each country, while "2010s" corresponds to the last point in this series in the original version of the WPID.

### Subjective Class

Finally, it is worth making a comment on changes in the relationship between party support and perceived social class in countries for which this indicator is available. As discussed in Gethin, Martínez-Toledano, and Piketty (2021b), voters in the west who self-identify as belonging to the working class have become gradually less likely to support left-wing parties, in line with the long-run transformations of the education and income cleavages in these countries. Figure 18 shows that this trend has continued to unfold in most countries with available data since the release of the WPID, with the largest decline in the United Kingdom (6.6 percentage points) in recent years. This general development complements the continued reversal of the educational divide among the updated electoral surveys, suggesting that broad working class profiles (measured in different ways) are increasingly at odds with left-wing political parties.

FIGURE 18: Updated Subjective Class Cleavages



Data source: WPID.

Note: This figure displays the mean difference between the share of voters that view themselves as belonging to the working class and the share of all other voters voting for left-wing parties in Western countries. The estimates control for education, income, age, gender, religion, worship frequency, rural/urban location, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status, in country-years where available. "Update" refers to the most recent election with available survey data in each country, while "2010s" corresponds to the last point in this series in the original version of the WPID.


## Discussion: General Insights from the Recent Surveys

The preceding analysis has highlighted a number of noteworthy developments in the most recent electoral surveys for the 18 WPID countries under consideration. Despite the inherent limitations of this type of survey data, the trends documented above provide valuable insights into the evolving nature of political competition in Western and non-Western settings. Several key takeaways emerge from this investigation, concerning both the continuation of specific long-term cleavage dynamics as well as evidence of other more recent developments that have divided electorates along sociodemographic lines.

### Western Countries

As we have seen, the relative support of educational elites for left-wing parties has continued to rise in most of the Western countries under consideration, while the dynamics of the income cleavage have followed much less of a consistent pattern across this group. This combination of trends would suggest that the multiple-elite form of political conflict has intensified in some of the countries under consideration. Looking at both measures simultaneously indeed reveals several cases (e.g.

FIGURE 19: Changes in the Education and Income Cleavages, Top 10% vs Bottom 90%, Western Countries



Data source: WPID.

Note: This figure displays the change in the education cleavage and the change in the income cleavage between the top 10% and the bottom 90% income/education groups in Western countries, from the last points in these series in the original version of the WPID (i.e. the 2010s average) to the electoral survey added as part of the update.

Belgium, Sweden, etc.) that have experienced a deepening of the educational reversal coupled with either a stagnation of or a drop in the negative income cleavage since the launch of the WPID (Figure 19). Recalling the discussion of redistributive conflict and its relation to electoral divides, this realignment of voter coalitions would expectedly work to diminish the importance of redistributive economic policy in the mainstream political debate. Austria and Finland have also seen large positive changes along the income dimension with little evolution in the education dimension, pointing to the potential for a sustained realignment along both variables (notably in Austria, where the education cleavage is already strongly positive) that reflects the type of "globalist" versus "nativist" form of political conflict hypothesized in Piketty (2018). In any case, nearly all countries show a continued evolution away from the traditional organization of Western political conflict.

The preceding analyses have also revealed a clear deepening of the age and gender cleavages across this group of countries. The sizeable intensification of the generational divide in most Western settings implies a rising salience of specific issues that polarize young and older voters. While these developments are presumably too complex to pin on a single policy area, the growing importance of environmental issues for younger populations, as I have suggested, may play a role in shaping these

outcomes,<sup>24</sup> foreboding a rise in inter-generational political conflict if climate issues continue to gain electoral relevance. As mentioned, country-specific factors (e.g. the growing success of nativist parties, or higher levels of women's representation among left-wing politicians) may help to explain a portion of the growing gender reversal. Still, the quasi-universality of this development coupled with the fact that it is a continuation of long-term trends observed since the post-war era points to a likely role of more historically-rooted explanations in underlying such changes, though an in-depth consideration of the drivers of the gender cleavage is beyond the scope of this paper.

Among the remaining political cleavages considered above, I find evidence of a continued importance of sociocultural and religious divides, evidenced by the sustained affinity of religious and racial/ethnic minorities as well as non-Western immigrants for left-wing parties. These results, as mentioned, are unsurprising given that the left has typically been more charitable to the causes of sociocultural minorities at a time when identitarian issues have remained prominent in Western political debates. Clear regional and employment divides have also persisted in the recent survey data (albeit with a pervasive weakening of the union cleavage), while the correlation between left-wing voting and perceived social class has decreased. All in all, my findings above are consistent with a broad evolution towards a continued decline of class-based politics in Western countries, as sociocultural issues linked to identity increasingly feature at the forefront of the public debate.

### **Non-Western Countries**


The collection of non-Western countries with recently available survey data captures a greater diversity of political and historical contexts than observed among the Western settings above. While this limits the usefulness of generalizing across the entire non-Western sample, the updated analyses still lead to insightful takeaways from these settings. For instance, each of the five countries with available data experienced larger estimated changes in the income cleavage than in the education cleavage over the period under consideration (Figure 20). This development stands in contrast to the Western country group, where changes in the educational divide have often shown high importance in the most recent surveys. We have also seen that both income and education tend to serve as less important axes of electoral polarization in the non-Western countries under consideration than in their Western counterparts, pointing to the existence of more salient sociodemographic dimensions along which politics is organized in these contexts.

The importance of additional political cleavages and their recent evolutions in non-Western settings is highly country-specific. Age is shown to be strongly (and increasingly) politicized in most cases, although the sign of this divide can only be

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<sup>24</sup>Another issue area that could serve as an important source of generational division is housing policy, in settings where younger populations are increasingly unable to access property ownership while the housing values of older populations continue to appreciate.

FIGURE 20: Changes in the Education and Income Cleavages, Top 10% vs Bottom 90%, Non-Western Countries



*Data source:* WPID.

*Note:* This figure displays the change in the education cleavage and the change in the income cleavage between the top 10% and the bottom 90% income/education groups in non-Western countries, from the last points in these series in the original version of the WPID (i.e. the 2010s average) to the electoral survey added as part of the update.

understood by taking a holistic look at how the multi-issue stances of pro-poor parties intersect with generational preferences. The gender cleavage has also displayed no consistent cross-country trend, with a sustained and sizeable positive divide in Malaysia yet far less politicization along this dimension in other countries. Various ethnic and religious identities are also found to serve as critical axes of political organization in specific cases, while the presence and nature of geographic and employment divides are highly context-dependent. The scope of available data for the non-Western countries under consideration is far more narrow than in the Western countries studied above. Still, the evidence that I have presented points to a persistent role of diverse sociodemographic variables in uniquely shaping political conflict across these non-Western settings, with the precise nature of these cleavages dependent on country-specific historical, economic, and political factors.

# Part 2: The Sociodemographic Origins of Nativist Voting In Comparative Perspective

## Theory and Background

Perhaps no political phenomenon has garnered as much public attention over the past two decades as the rise of far-right and anti-immigrant electoral movements in democratic societies. Several Western European countries have seen a substantial increase in support for parties that espouse overtly xenophobic rhetoric and often hold socially-conservative views in other issue areas. These parties have managed to achieve outright victories (as in the 2022 Italian general election), enter into ruling coalitions with traditional conservative groups (as in the 2017 Austrian general election), and otherwise exert a tremendous influence on government policy by helping shape the public agenda.<sup>25</sup> The growing success of this style of politics nevertheless extends beyond Western European borders. Both Hungary and Poland are governed by anti-immigrant socially conservative parties that took sharp right-ward turns during the 2010s, in a blatant shift away from Eastern Europe's transition to liberal democracy. Across the Atlantic, the victory of Donald Trump in the 2016 United States presidential election presents the most publicized example of this electoral trend, while far-right parties have enjoyed unprecedented support in Latin American countries such as Brazil and Chile over recent years. The rise of these electoral movements thus looks to be a decidedly global phenomenon, raising the question of whether potential similarities and differences can be found in both their sociodemographic sources of support and the underlying drivers of their emergence.

As mentioned previously, I will predominately refer to this family of parties as "nativist". Employing the term "far-right" overlooks the fact that these movements, as we will see, show sizeable ideological diversity in their economic policy positions.<sup>26</sup> The common label of "populist" also captures a much broader class of parties than I wish to consider. As a uniting theme among these movements is their vocal opposition to immigration, "nativist" seems like the most appropriate descriptor. Still, immigration tends to hold less salience in Latin America compared to in

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<sup>25</sup>Perhaps the clearest example of this type of impact can be seen in the United Kingdom Independence Party and its role as a catalyst for the United Kingdom's exit from the European Union.

<sup>26</sup>Gethin, Martínez-Toledano, and Piketty (2022) note, for instance, that New Zealand's main nativist party—New Zealand First—is often considered to be centrist.



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Europe, and the parties that I will include in this analysis for Brazil and Chile (led by Jair Bolsonaro in the former and Jose Antonio Kast in the latter) are not principally defined by their anti-immigrant stances in the same way as their Western counterparts. Still, the political construction of the *us versus them* is widely apparent within these parties' discourses, which are often critical of ethnic minority groups and hostile to the notion of multiculturalism. As such, my use of "nativist" should be understood to capture these broader demographic tensions in the Brazilian and Chilean contexts.

At this point, it is worth recalling the two prominent theories often evoked to explain the emergence of nativist movements in Western settings. According to the economic thesis, social democratic parties pushed away a share of their traditional electorates by refusing to assure the levels of economic protection and equality they had once promised. Some of these voters subsequently turned to emergent nativist movements, attracted by promises of security from alleged threats to their social status. The sociocultural thesis, on the other hand, contends that voters were attracted to these parties due to sentiments of alienation experienced in light of progressive societal changes, and not because they felt disillusioned with the declining emphasis of left-wing parties on redistributive policy issues. I will evaluate the evidence in support of these competing theories in my analysis below. Aiming to take a global perspective on this development, however, one should also ask the question of whether nativist voting merits similar potential explanations beyond the Western contexts in which it is usually studied. Indeed, the other instances of these movements identified above have emerged in national contexts with profound economic and political differences from their Western counterparts, both historically and into the present day.

A number of existing studies can provide preliminary insights into whether explanations for the rise of Western nativism may have a more general applicability in non-Western contexts. Looking to Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro's victory in the 2018 presidential election drew sizeable support both from middle-class voters and from the country's business and educational elites (Gethin and Morgan, 2021), showing a clear deviation from the Western European trend. In Chile, research has found that parties on the right—and not the left—have gravitated towards the centre on economic policy issues in past decades (Madariaga and Kaltwasser, 2020), casting doubt on the ability of economic abandonment arguments to sufficiently explain the recent electoral waves made by Jose Antonio Kast. Meanwhile, Santana, Zagórski, and Rama (2020) identify dissatisfaction with the European Union (EU) as the most important driver of voting for nativist parties in Hungary and Poland. While this is not necessarily inconsistent with many Western European settings, the obvious difference is that these two countries have seen a resounding success of nativist politics over the past decade. The existing literature therefore points to sizeable diversity in the contextual backgrounds of nativist parties across the globe, and calls for a careful

study of their sociodemographic origins to assess the relevance of potential explanations for their success. Fortunately, the harmonized nature of the WPID will allow me to do just that, providing a detailed look at the similarities and differences in the growth of nativist voting across this wide range of national contexts.

## Sample Considerations

I will begin this analysis by drawing on the updated WPID to study the sociodemographic origins of nativist support in a handful of Latin American, Eastern European, and Western countries. In doing so, I consider four dimensions that are often argued to correlate with voting for nativist parties and are widely available across electoral surveys: education, income, age, and gender. To limit my focus to the recent period where these movements have been most prevalent, I only look at elections from the year 2000 onwards. Of course, in some countries covered by the WPID (e.g. Ireland and Iceland), nativist movements have had minimal electoral impact during this period. Furthermore, the small sample sizes of post-electoral surveys raise even greater concerns for this analysis than in Part 1 above, since characterizing voters for nativist parties will often draw on fewer observations than when dealing with aggregations of all left-wing or pro-poor parties and coalitions. I thus limit my focus to "substantial" nativist movements while also easing sample size concerns by only considering country-years where at least one nativist party gained more than 5% of the vote in a national election, and only including parties above this threshold in my analysis. Restricting the sample in this way yields 18 countries with nativist movements that I will study using the WPID: two countries in Latin America (Brazil and Chile), two countries in Eastern Europe (Hungary and Poland), and 14 Western countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom).<sup>27</sup> A full listing of each election and the corresponding nativist parties included in this analysis is provided in Table A4 of the Appendix.<sup>28</sup>

## Sociodemographic Breakdown of Nativist Voting


### Education

As mentioned above, it is often noted that nativist movements—at least in Western contexts—enjoy particularly strong support among lower-educated segments of the

<sup>27</sup>While one could certainly argue that former United States President Donald Trump embodies a similar style of nativist politics to the other parties considered in my analysis, I do not include his Republican Party given the de facto two-party nature of the country's electoral system, which limits the comparability between his supporters and those of nativist movements in other Western countries.

<sup>28</sup>For France and Poland, I also omit elections from the very start of the 2000s where nativist parties surged before subsequently declining in popularity, to restrict the focus to "continuous" movements with high relevance for recent electoral developments. I also do not classify Fidesz in Hungary or PiS in Poland as nativist until the mid-2010s, in line with their sizeable socially conservative shifts over this period.

FIGURE 21: Voters for Nativist Parties by Education Group




Data source: WPID.

Note: This figure provides a breakdown of the nativist party electorate by education group, averaged over elections since 2000 where a nativist party received more than 5% of the vote. Only parties above this 5% threshold are included. The mean is weighted by the nativist vote share in each election.

electorate. Using the updated version of the WPID, Figure 21 displays the average share of voters for these parties originating from the bottom 50%, the next 40%, and the top 10% of the education distribution across the elections under consideration, for each country mentioned previously. This graph makes clear that important cross-country variation exists in the extent to which nativist parties derive support from different education groups. In most cases, the majority of these voters come from the bottom half of the distribution, reaching roughly two-thirds in the Netherlands (71.2%), Sweden (66.3%), and France (66.2%). On the other hand, this share is just 39.7% in Chile. Likewise, voters for nativist parties were disproportionately found among the top education decile in Chile (12.7%), Brazil (11.9%), and Hungary (10.3%), while gaining very little support from this group in the Netherlands (3.0%) and the United Kingdom (3.2%). Chile is also the only country where these parties find their largest shares of support in the middle education group, at 47.5%. The findings displayed in Figure 21 immediately hint at regional patterns along this dimension that I will discuss below.

The composition of the nativist electorate will ultimately reflect the party choices of voters in combination with any differential trends in electoral turnout across the education distribution. To the extent that lower-educated individuals may be less likely to vote, Figure 21 will not provide direct insights into the relative propensities for voters in each group to support these movements. Investigating this question by

FIGURE 22: Relative Likelihood of Voting for Nativist Parties, Bottom 50% vs. Top 10% Educated Voters



Data source: WPID.

Note: This figure shows the relative likelihood of voting for nativist parties between voters in the bottom 50% and the top 10% of the education distribution, averaged over elections since 2000 where a nativist party received more than 5% of the vote. Only parties above this 5% threshold are included.

looking at the vote share for nativist parties among voters in the top 10% of the education distribution relative to that among voters in the bottom 50% of the education distribution reveals that nativist support is higher among the latter group in nearly all countries (Figure 22), and by particularly large factors in the Netherlands (5.1), the United Kingdom (4.5), and Sweden (4.2).<sup>29</sup> In Brazil, however, nativist voting has been less common among voters in the bottom half of the distribution than those in the top decile, with a corresponding factor of 0.83. Additionally, in Spain, the popularity of these parties reaches its highest extent among the middle-education group (i.e. voters ranging from 50% to 90% in the education distribution) rather than low- or high-education voters (see Figure A8 of the Appendix). It is also worth noting that the patterns observed across countries in Figure 22 are similar whether one looks at education quantiles (as I have done) or at the level of education obtained by comparing tertiary-educated voters with their primary- and secondary-educated counterparts (see Figures A9 and A10 in the Appendix). Discrepancies in rates of educational attainment across countries therefore do not seem to play a major role in driving these results.


<sup>29</sup>I have chosen to specifically focus on the top 10% and bottom 50% of the distribution for the education and income analyses to illustrate the relative support for nativist parties among the working class and educational/financial elites, as this dichotomy has particular relevance to the cross-country comparisons carried out below. Still, I will mention cases where the relative support among the middle 40% of the distribution is noteworthy.

## Income

I will now repeat the same analysis with income to see whether there is similar variation in the degree to which nativist parties in these countries derive support across income groups. Figure 23 reveals that at least half of voters for these movements are found amongst the bottom half of the income distribution in most countries, reaching particularly elevated levels in France (62.6%) and Sweden (61.0%). On the contrary, the low-income category is vastly underrepresented among the nativist electorate in Chile, where it comprises just 34.6% of this vote share. Individuals in the top income decile account for less than 5% of the nativist vote in France (4.1%), while comprising over 10% of support for these parties in Chile (15.7%), Spain (13.2%), Italy (13.1%), Brazil (12.9%), and Hungary (10.8%). Nativist movements also find a plurality of supporters within the middle-income group in Chile (49.7%), Brazil (48.5%), Spain (46.3%) and Hungary (45.7%). In general, support for these parties appears slightly less slanted to lower-income voters than to lower-education voters at the country level, but substantial cross-country differences can still be observed along the income dimension.

As before, restricting the analysis to those who participate in elections paints a clearer image of the relative propensities for voters in different groups to opt for nativist movements over other parties. Doing so reveals that voters belonging to the top income decile are far more likely than those in the bottom half of the income


FIGURE 23: Voters for Nativist Parties by Income Group



Data source: WPID.

Note: This figure provides a breakdown of the nativist electorate by income group, averaged over elections since 2000 where a nativist party received more than 5% of the vote. Only parties above this 5% threshold are included. The mean is weighted by the nativist vote share in each election.

FIGURE 24: Relative Likelihood of Voting for Nativist Parties, Bottom 50% vs. Top 10% Income Voters



*Data source:* WPID.


*Note:* This figure shows the relative likelihood of voting for nativist parties between voters in the bottom 50% and the top 10% of the income distribution, averaged over elections since 2000 where a nativist party received more than 5% of the vote. Only parties above this 5% threshold are included.

distribution to support these parties in countries such as France (by a factor of 3.8), Germany (2.8), and the United Kingdom (2.8), with elevated levels in many other Western countries (Figure 24). On the other hand, the relative support of bottom 50% educated voters is below one in Italy (0.65), Brazil (0.68), Spain (0.74), and Chile (0.75). Additionally, in Chile, support for nativist parties is most common among the middle income group while still being relatively high among voters in the top 10% of the distribution (see Figure A11 of the Appendix).

### A Closer Look at Nativist Support Along Educational and Income Lines

As both education and income are important determinants of social class, it is worth taking a combined perspective to see how these two dimensions jointly relate to nativist voting at the country level. First, Figure 25 reveals striking similarities within countries in the extent to which nativist movements draw support from the bottom 50% of each distribution (though slightly slanted to low-education in general). The same general patterns also emerge whether one considers the next 40% of the income and education distributions, or the top deciles (see Figures A12 and A13 of the Appendix). In Western Europe, these movements appear to largely find roots

FIGURE 25: Composition of Nativist Electorates, Bottom 50% Education vs. Bottom 50% Income Shares



Data source: WPID.

Note: This figure shows the share of voters for nativist parties that have come from the bottom 50% of the education distribution and the share that have come from the bottom 50% of the income distribution in each country, averaged over elections since 2000 where a nativist party received more than 5% of the vote. Only parties above this 5% threshold are included. The mean is weighted by the nativist vote share in each election.


in the working class, corroborating the results found in the existing literature.<sup>30</sup> A different picture emerges for Brazil and Chile, where the middle and upper classes (in both educational and financial terms) form the majority of the nativist voter base. Turning to the Eastern European countries under consideration, Hungary is situated in the middle of the two groups along both dimensions, although it shows a closer resemblance to the Latin American settings. Poland, on the other hand, does not display any clear difference from the typical Western trend from an income perspective, although it reveals a low bottom 50% education share relative to this group. All in all, these findings suggest that nativist movements in non-Western countries tend to draw less heavily in relative terms on lower-educated and (with the exception of Poland) lower-income segments of the population than their Western counterparts.

Still, the patterns presented in Figure 25 above do not imply that income and education are equally important correlates of nativist voting once controlling for one another.<sup>31</sup> Indeed, Gethin, Martínez-Toledano, and Piketty (2022) find no clear pattern in support across the income dimension once controlling for education (alongside a range of other sociodemographic variables) but a consistent trend of lower

<sup>30</sup>There are some exceptions to these trends. For example, the nativist party in Spain, Vox, finds particularly strong support outside of the working class. I will return to the sizeable variation observed across Western countries below.

<sup>31</sup>Note that Figure 25 also captures differential abstention along the two distributions.

FIGURE 26: Education and Income Cleavages in Nativist Voting, Top 10% vs Bottom 50%, With Controls



Data source: WPID.

Note: This figure displays the differences between the share of voters in the top 10% and the share of voters in the bottom 90% of the education and income distributions voting for nativist parties, averaged over elections since 2000 where a nativist party received more than 5% of the vote. Only parties above this 5% threshold are included. The estimates control for education/income, age, gender, religion, worship frequency, rural/urban location, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status, in country-years where available. The dashed lines help to demarcate whether the income or education cleavage is larger for a given country.

support among high-educated voters after accounting for income and the additional controls. Keeping with my focus on the top 10% and the bottom 50% of these two distributions, Figure 26 displays the difference in the share of voters in each group voting for nativist parties along both dimensions after applying the aforementioned controls, averaged over all elections considered in the preceding analysis.<sup>32</sup> The education cleavage is estimated to be negative in all countries but Brazil and Chile, consistent with the idea that low education typically has a strong effect on voting for these movements. While belonging to the bottom half of the income distribution is also associated with greater nativist support than belonging to the top decile in most cases, 13 of the 14 countries in the bottom left quadrant of Figure 26 lie below the dashed red line, suggesting a higher importance of low education in accounting for

<sup>32</sup>I have chosen to display the difference in support between the two income/education groups rather than showing relative likelihoods (as I had done in Figures 22 and 24) for graph readability purposes. The obvious difference in this approach is that it does not implicitly account for differences in the vote shares of nativist parties, and hence countries with large absolute differences between groups might still have relatively small differences in the corresponding relative likelihoods. This should be kept in mind when considering the results of countries such as Brazil, Hungary, and Poland, where nativist voting is highly prevalent in absolute terms across education and income groups.




nativist voting than low income. On the other hand, the four countries with a positive income cleavage—Brazil, Chile, Italy, and Spain—are each estimated to have larger income divides than their respective education cleavages (although these two measures are practically equal in magnitude in Spain and Italy). A clear pattern has emerged: In nearly all Western countries as well as Poland and Hungary, low-education voters are most strongly attracted to these movements when controlling for relevant sociodemographic factors, and low income hence plays a lesser role. In Brazil, Chile, Italy, and Spain, however, high income is instead a clear predictor of nativist support, while the role of education is either minor or has a negative effect of comparable magnitude.

## Age

As noted above, age is another demographic variable often thought to hold importance for nativist voting, and taking a global perspective of this relationship reveals tremendous variation in the generational origins of support for these movements (Figure 27). In the United Kingdom, Sweden, Switzerland, New Zealand, and Poland, a plurality of voters for nativist parties are aged 60 or above, totaling 43.1%, 41.5%, 41.1%, 40.2%, and 38.5%, respectively. On the other hand, voters under 40 make up the largest share of these parties' electorates in Hungary (40.1%) and France (40.0%). In all other countries under consideration, 40- to 59-year-olds constitute the


FIGURE 27: Voters for Nativist Parties by Age Group



Data source: WPID.

Note: This figure provides a breakdown of the nativist electorate by age group, averaged over elections since 2000 where a nativist party received more than 5% of the vote. Only parties above this 5% threshold are included. The mean is weighted by the nativist vote share in each election.

FIGURE 28: Relative Likelihood of Voting for Nativist Parties, 60+ vs Under 40 Year-Old Voters



Data source: WPID.

Note: This figure shows the relative likelihood of voting for nativist parties between voters aged 60+ and those under the age of 40, averaged over elections since 2000 where a nativist party received more than 5% of the vote. Only parties above this 5% threshold are included.

greatest source of nativist support. It is also worth noting that in Western European countries such as Germany, Italy, and Spain, the share of these voters coming from the 40- to 59-year-old category is roughly twice as high as that coming from the 60+ age group, pointing to considerable diversity within this region.

Of course, an important element shaping the results in Figure 27 is the relative size of each age group within the electorate, reflecting a complex assortment of factors such as historic birth rates, life expectancies, and net migration rates. It is not unexpected that the young populations of Latin America would thus yield small nativist vote shares from the 60+ category while, conversely, many ageing Western democracies report relatively low levels for the under 40 group. Potential differences in turnout across generations would further impact these trends. A clearer picture of the relative popularity of nativist movements between younger (under 40) and older (60+) voters is provided in Figure 28. From this view, Brazil and Chile are now more spread out across the sample, likely due to the population age effects mentioned above. More interesting, however, is the fact that voters under 40 are more likely to support nativist movements than voters 60 and above in seven of the countries under consideration, six of which are located in Western Europe.<sup>33</sup> These findings show that—contrary to conventional wisdom—nativist support is


<sup>33</sup>Finland and Germany also report highest rates of nativist voting among those aged 40-59 (see Figure A14 of the Appendix.)

alive and well among younger sections of the electorate in several countries where these movements have gained prominence since the start of the current century.

## Gender

The final dimension that I will consider in my analysis of the nativist electorate is gender. As mentioned above, the fact that nativist parties tend to attract higher support from men than women is well-attested to in the existing literature on Western countries. Still, it is interesting to note the clear cross-country variation along this dimension shown in Figure 29, with men comprising 64.9% of the nativist electorate in both Germany and Sweden while accounting for just 43.8% of these voters in France. In general, the discrepancy between genders is more moderate in the Latin American and Eastern European countries under consideration, suggesting that the narrative of male-dominated nativist movements holds less relevance (while still applying) outside of Western contexts. It is also interesting to note that countries such as Germany, France, and Norway—where nativist movements have been largely led by women over the period under consideration—report highly varied levels of gender-based support, leaving little room for candidate effects to explain these patterns.<sup>34</sup>

FIGURE 29: Voters for Nativist Parties by Gender



Data source: WPID.

Note: This figure provides a breakdown of the nativist electorate by gender, averaged over elections since 2000 where a nativist party received more than 5% of the vote. Only parties above this 5% threshold are included. The mean is weighted by the nativist vote share in each election.

<sup>34</sup>As there is minimal discrepancy in turnout across genders, I omit the analysis of relative likelihoods.

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## Discussion: Key Patterns and Differences Across Nativist Electorates

One important takeaway that emerges from the preceding analysis concerns the striking geographic patterns in the popularity of these parties along education and income lines. My results are broadly consistent with the notion that individuals with traditional working-class profiles have been particularly drawn to nativist movements in Western countries. Although there are clear outliers that I will address below, these parties have disproportionately attracted lower-educated and lower-income voters in most Western contexts (and typically men, with large cross-country variation in generational patterns). Moreover, low education appears to be the key factor in explaining this phenomenon in nearly all Western settings once sociodemographic controls are accounted for. In Latin America, on the other hand, far more support for nativist movements has originated from the upper half of the income and education distributions, with high income appearing to play an important role in driving nativist voting after controls. Finally, in the two Eastern European countries under consideration, support for nativist parties is slanted towards lower-class voters along both dimensions (more so in Poland than in Hungary, and more towards low education after controls), though simply focusing on the direction of this cleavage ignores that nativist politics have attracted large swaths of the electorate in these settings and hence have still resonated strongly with voters in the upper and middle classes.<sup>35</sup>

The second key message to draw from these findings is that there is a surprising degree of diversity in the sociodemographic origins of nativist support within Western countries in particular. While these movements might often be treated similarly in the public debate, their voters in countries such as Italy and Spain differ starkly from those in places like the Netherlands, Sweden, or the United Kingdom, and such differences merit further elaboration.

I will now take a closer look within each geographic group to offer more precise insights into the sources of nativist voting in these countries, paying particular attention to the capacity for common theories of nativist support to adequately account for my results. Where these movements have found considerable electoral success, I will also discuss potential reasons for their broad support across social groups, though still tying these observations to the cleavage patterns noted above. As we will see, my findings are largely consistent with the notion that economic considerations are of paramount importance whether for explaining the attractiveness of these movements to working-class voters or, less commonly, to account for why it is the rich that tend to disproportionately support nativist movements in some cases.

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<sup>35</sup>Likewise, the apparently elite-driven nativist movements in Latin America have still found considerable appeal among lower-class voters in absolute terms, and it will be worth discussing potential reasons why the movements in non-Western settings have appealed to larger portions of the electorate than what standard theories of nativist support in Western contexts would predict.

## Latin America

While prominent left-wing political movements have been an important feature of Latin American politics in the 21st century (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011), their presence has not managed to curtail the rise of prominent nativist candidates in either Brazil or Chile. In the former case, the success of Jair Bolsonaro in the 2018 presidential election came after a series of past electoral victories by the country's Workers' Party (PT), who championed significant societal advancements in areas such as poverty reduction. In the 2021 Chilean presidential election, Jose Antonio Kast led first-round voting before losing to progressive candidate Gabriel Boric in the second-round run-off, where he nevertheless gained 45% of the vote. How, then, might one explain the popularity of nativist candidates in these contexts?

One argument advanced by Piketty (2020) for the case of Brazil, which appears equally suitable for Chile, contends that societal elites felt a need to assert control against the perceived risks of left-wing leadership. While elite hostility to the left had significant legal repercussions in Brazil,<sup>36</sup> it was further apparent in both countries by the fact that voters from the top income decile were clearly more likely to support Bolsonaro and Kast than those in the bottom half of the income distribution. Additionally, in Figure A15 of the Appendix, I compare the economic policy stances of nativist parties to those of their mainstream right-wing counterparts and find that both Bolsonaro and Kast's campaign manifestos have typically placed higher emphases on free-market economic policies than found amongst competitors on the right. I will return to the ideological diversity of economic policy proposals among nativist movements in the following section, but it is worth noting now that financial elites in both Brazil and Chile seem to have had a particularly strong economic incentive to vote for these candidates over other right-wing options (in addition to candidates on the left), which aligns with the patterns in income-based support presented above.

That being said, both movements managed to attract a substantial share of non-rich voters despite their unconcealed support for market-oriented economic policies, and particularly so within the middle class, meriting scrutiny of contextual factors and other issue areas that might help explain these developments. In the case of Brazil, Gethin and Morgan (2021) and Piketty (2020) highlight the fact that the fiscal burden of the inequality-reducing policies introduced by preceding PT governments largely fell on the middle class, which would explain the weak attachment of these voters to the economic policies of the Brazilian left (and, consequently, may have increased the potential for electoral gains to be made in non-economic issue areas, or simply led some to view Bolsonaro's economic platform as a welcome change). Furthermore, policies linked to law and order tend to hold strong importance for

<sup>36</sup>As Piketty (2020) notes, these desires culminated in the 2016 impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff. In 2018, then-former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was sentenced to over 9 years in jail on corruption charges that were later annulled after the Supreme Court ruled his imprisonment unlawful.

Latin American voters given the relatively high levels of personal insecurity in the region (Kestler, 2022; Madariaga and Kaltwasser, 2020), and these two candidates notably took vocal hard-line stances on urban crime and related topics that likely found appeal across social classes.<sup>37</sup> Interestingly, Brazil also shows very little difference in nativist support between young and old voters despite the strong anti-progressive rhetoric adopted by Bolsonaro, casting doubt on the idea that his success was principally rooted in a revolt against progressive cultural changes.<sup>38</sup> The nativist approaches of Bolsonaro and Kast thus appear to have resonated reasonably well across a range of social groups by tapping into a salient mixture of economic and personal security concerns. Still, the cases of Brazil and Chile differ starkly from most of their Western counterparts in that support for these movements has been strongest amongst financial elites, owing to economic policy platforms unambiguously catered to the benefit of the rich and attesting to the importance of economic drivers in explaining the cleavages noted above within these two settings.

### Eastern Europe

Hungary and Poland are the two countries in this study where nativist parties have found the greatest sustained electoral success over the past decade, with both ruling parties, as noted above, taking strong socially conservative turns in the mid-2010s. Support for these movements is slanted to lower-class voters in both income and education terms (and particularly so in Poland), with low education appearing to be the more important determinant of nativist voting. At the same time, nativist parties in each case have managed to find broad appeal in absolute terms across the electorate, meriting explanations for both these patterns of support as well as their overall levels.

The fact that nativist parties in both countries are most popular among lower-class voters raises the question of whether the aforementioned economic abandonment argument may be applicable in such settings. Indeed, a promising explanation for the appeal of nativist politics in these contexts—where it assumes a relatively eurosceptic dimension—is pervasive voter disgruntlement vis-à-vis the countries' relationships with the EU, which proliferated in line with the post-communism embrace of market-oriented economic policies by left-wing parties (Lindner et al., 2021; Piketty, 2020). Piketty (2020) notes that common citizens in this region often perceive their countries' position within the EU as one of economic subordination, consistent with the fact that annual EU transfer payment inflows pale in comparison to outflows of profits and other capital income to member states. Of course, other policy

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<sup>37</sup>It is also worth noting that corruption issues came to hold elevated salience in Brazil at the time in light of repeated corruption scandals within PT (Piketty, 2020), which would have presumably fostered further disillusionment with this party across societal groups.

<sup>38</sup>The relative lack of young voter's support for Kast in Chile reflects the fact that the youthful imagine projected by Boric seems to have found particular success within this demographic.

factors, such as expansions of family-oriented redistributive benefits in both countries, may also help to explain the appeal of nativist politics to working class voters. In general, however, disenchantment with the failures of the post-communist left to present a meaningful left-wing economic alternative, and the association of such developments with the economic framework of the EU, provides a convincing explanation for the particularly high levels of working class support for nativist movements in these settings.

Importantly, the discussion of EU-related drivers of nativist support is still consistent with relatively high nativist vote shares across the income and education distributions of these countries to the extent that critical attitudes towards the EU are prevalent beyond the bottom 50% groups. Recent research has found less of an educational divide in both Hungary and Poland compared to in France and Sweden over attitudes towards immigration (Dochow-Sondershaus, Teney, and Borbáth, 2023), which can be seen as a crude proxy for sentiments towards the EU given PiS and Fidesz's efforts to elevate EU refugee policy to the forefront of national political debates. Opposition to further European integration has also been found to be the most prominent determinant of voting for nativist parties in these countries—more so than nativist attitudes, anti-elite sentiment, or economic deprivation—which supports the idea that dissatisfaction with the EU is indeed what drives a significant portion of upper- and middle-class voters towards these parties (Santana, Zagórski, and Rama, 2020).<sup>39</sup> All in all, the nativist formula developed in the Hungarian and Polish contexts appears to have found particular success by capitalizing on broad voter disenchantment with pro-EU politics. In doing so, it has still found disproportionate support among working-class voters who, presumably, have felt left behind by the economic reality of their countries' liberal turns in the post-communist period.

### Western Countries

As we have seen, support for the Western nativist movements under consideration is often highly concentrated among working-class male voters. Of course, this observation alone does not imply that economic factors can explain the prevalence of nativist voting within this demographic. Moreover, there are still clear cross-country variations in these patterns along some of the dimensions studied above. Elaborating on these differences will help to better illuminate the drivers of electoral gains made by these parties in Western settings.

First, the preceding analyses have shown that nativist movements in Italy and Spain find strongest support among high earners. In general, there is little reason to believe that high-income voters in these cases would feel particularly opposed to progressive cultural change and hence disproportionately turn to nativist parties, as

<sup>39</sup>It is also worth noting that, like in Brazil, there has been relatively little difference in support for nativist parties between older and younger voters in either country. This holds true despite the blatantly anti-progressive nature of these movements and socially liberal attitudes found among younger generations, lending weight to the importance of economic factors over a generationally-driven cultural backlash in explaining these trends.

the sociocultural thesis would imply. In the case of Spain, the patterns in income-based voting are in line with the fact that Vox, the nativist party under consideration, has campaigned as a vocal advocate of economically liberal policies, proposing to cut taxation and reduce "wasteful" government spending. Indeed, Vox—similar to the nativist movements observed in Latin America—has placed a higher emphasis on free market economic policies than typically found amongst right-wing competitors (see Figure A15 in the Appendix). Vox seems to have thus provided a strong incentive for financial elites to support this party while offering limited economic appeal to traditional working-class voters,<sup>40</sup> underscoring the importance of economic policy stances in driving nativist support in this setting.<sup>41</sup> In the Italian case, the fact that the main nativist party during the period under consideration—Lega Nord—is a regionalist movement whose underlying political motivation opposes fiscal ties between the economically prominent North and the less prosperous South provides a potential explanation for these trends. Even though this party places more emphasis on economic redistribution relative to right-wing competitors (see Figure A15 in the Appendix), its policies are intended to find concentrated appeal among voters in richer areas of the country, which could mechanically account for their support among high earners at the national level while explaining their weaker gains among poorer voters.<sup>42</sup> Despite differing from the standard economic abandonment thesis, the Italian and Spanish cases are thus consistent with the underlying notion that economic drivers play a major role in support for nativist parties.

Another dimension with clear cross-country variation in nativist support is age. The fact that nativist parties are more popular among voters under 40 than those over 60 in a number of Western countries casts considerable doubt on the applicability of the sociocultural thesis to help explain the rise of these movements.<sup>43</sup> Clearly, it is difficult to reconcile such findings with the idea that nativist support is rooted in feelings of alienation among older voters faced with prominent social justice movements and increased immigration. These results are, however, still consistent with the economic thesis discussed above, wherein nativist parties have resonated strongly among voters who feel abandoned by the modern left's ideological rejection of its post-war redistributive focus. While an investigation of the country-specific factors that might explain large variations in age-based support for nativist movements is beyond the scope of this paper, it would not be surprising if younger

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<sup>40</sup>I will reserve an in-depth discussion of economic incentives provided by left-wing parties for the related analysis in Part 3. Still, it is worth noting that I later find particularly large polarization over economic issues between Vox and left-wing parties in Spain.

<sup>41</sup>Existing research has found that nationalist attitudes are particularly strong among Vox supporters (Turnbull-Dugarte, Rama, and Santana, 2020), as the emergence of this party has been largely intertwined with vocal opposition to the Catalan separatist movement. Still, the multi-dimensional nature of political competition suggests that traditional class-based voting on economic policy issues may well be an important explanation for these results.

<sup>42</sup>In terms of economic incentives offered by left-wing parties, my analysis in Part 3 does not find substantial polarization between Lega and left-wing parties in Italy. However, this picture is complicated by the presence of the anti-establishment Five Star Movement in the left-wing group, which entered a coalition government with Lega following the 2018 Italian general election.

<sup>43</sup>This point was similarly made by Gethin, Martínez-Toledano, and Piketty (2022).



voters in certain European countries—whose formative political years have coincided with the "crisis" of social democracy and who may have more malleable political identities—felt particularly disenchanting by the economic prospects offered by mainstream political parties and came to disproportionately support nativist movements in response.

### **In Summary**

The countries covered in the preceding discussion have witnessed a common emergence of nativist political movements over the recent period. While these contexts differ tremendously along economic, political, and historical lines, I have been able to exploit cross-country differences in the sociodemographic origins of nativist support to argue that economic factors play a critical role in explaining the rise of such parties. Looking first at Latin America, I have identified strong positive cleavages in nativist support between high- and low-income voters in Brazil and Chile, which align with the unambiguously pro-rich economic outlooks of nativist candidates in these settings. Drawing on prior arguments from Piketty (2020) to explain the pre-eminence of nativist politics in Hungary and Poland today, I find evidence consistent with the notion that broad dissatisfaction with pro-EU policies, rooted in aspects of the countries' transitions to market economies, is a key driver of this development. The diversity observed in patterns of support for Western nativist movements is also instructive. In Italy and Spain, strong positive income cleavages are consistent with the concentrated economic appeal of Lega and Vox to high-income voters. More generally, the lack of any cross-country pattern in generational support for Western nativist parties casts doubt on the idea that working-class voters have gravitated to these movements in an act of protest against progressive cultural change. Instead, the economic thesis—arguing that nativist support can be attributed to economic disillusionment among the traditional left-wing electorate—finds clear support in countries where these parties have largely emerged as working-class movements. In Brazil, Chile, Italy, and Spain, on the other hand, we see a critical role of economic factors in driving high-income voters to these parties at disproportionate rates, further attesting to the importance of economic factors in the rise of nativist politics.

# Part 3: Vote Switching, Nativism, and Abstention In Comparative Perspective

## The Party Origins of the Nativist Movements In Comparative Perspective

Part 2 of this paper has outlined a number of key similarities and differences in the sociodemographic origins of support for nativist parties across a collection of WPID countries. An important question that remains, however, is whether the electoral implications of these movements for mainstream political parties display similarities across these settings. In other words, has the rise of nativism been most harmful to the success of left-wing or mainstream right-wing parties, and does the answer to this question depend on country-specific factors that can shed further light on the drivers of nativist support? In Western European countries, where the nativist electorate is often disproportionately comprised of low-income and low-education voters, one might expect the growth of these movements to have primarily occurred at the expense of support for the left (thereby contributing to the trends in the education and income cleavages documented by the WPID). However, it could be that vote switchers to nativist parties largely consist of long-standing working-class supporters of mainstream right-wing parties that fundamentally differ from members of the traditional left-wing electorate, and who are drawn to these movements for the same reasons that led them to support the mainstream right in the first place. In cases where these movements have effectively emerged as parties of the financial upper and middle classes, the party origins of their supporters may also differ markedly from settings where nativist voters are disproportionately found among low earners.

To carry out the investigation of vote switchers and nativist support, I will take advantage of the fact that many of the recent electoral surveys used to construct the WPID systematically inquire about the party that respondents voted for in the preceding election, and not just the current one. This information allows for a clear mapping of voters for nativist movements to their party allegiances in the prior electoral cycle. I will also consider whether the tendency for these voters to originate

more heavily from left-wing parties or right-wing parties may be related to the ideological stances of nativist parties on economic policy issues. While these movements share a common opposition to immigration (and typically broader forms of progressive cultural change), their respective economic positions, as we will see below, vary substantially along the left-right spectrum and do not differ markedly from those of the left-wing parties in some cases. This observation naturally raises the question of whether vote switchers to nativist movements may be more likely to originate from the left when the nativist party under consideration either: 1) is more left-wing on economic policy issues; or 2) does not differ strongly from the economic policy stances of the left. I am able to investigate these questions by combining the WPID with data from the MPD on party positions across elections. If present, such relationships would be consistent with the notion that economic policy considerations are an important driver of the decision to support nativist parties, and that left-wing parties have disproportionately lost these voters in certain countries by either supporting more liberal economic policies or simply failing to sufficiently distinguish themselves from nativist parties on economic issues.

### **Further Data Considerations**

I follow the same method as above in only considering elections with prominent nativist movements (i.e. those where a nativist party gained over 5% of the vote, focusing only on parties meeting this criteria) since the year 2000. This approach yields precisely one nativist party in each qualifying election with sufficient data, and a list of the parties and election years that I include in the analysis is provided in Table A4 of the Appendix. Unfortunately, data on past vote choice is only available for a subset of the elections analyzed in Part 2, and only for Western countries. Still, the limited sample on which this analysis is performed reveals particularly interesting disparities in the extent to which nativist movements in different countries have derived support from former voters for the left and the mainstream right.

It is important to note that the electoral surveys that comprise the WPID only allow for the study of vote switchers from the most recent prior election to the cycle under consideration. As such, I cannot untangle how party support at the individual level has evolved over the course of successive past elections. A longstanding supporter of a left-wing party may, for instance, have voted for the mainstream right for just one electoral cycle before ultimately switching to a nativist party in the survey under study. Individuals that undertake such intermediary steps in their transition from left-wing voters to supporters of nativist parties would therefore be classified as vote switchers from the right, despite the fact that their overall trajectory illustrates a loss for the traditional left-wing electorate. Given the long-term evolutions of the income and education cleavages outlined by the WPID, it seems more common that a former voter for the left would first switch to the mainstream right before ultimately backing a nativist movement, rather than a former supporter of the mainstream right switching to vote for a left-wing party before eventually voting

for a nativist party. While it is impossible to confirm the frequency of these cases in the data, assuming that the first trajectory is more prevalent than the second would mean that the following analysis provides a conservative estimate of the share of vote switchers to nativist parties from the traditional left-wing voter base.

### Vote Switching and Party Polarization

Table 2 presents the mean share of vote switchers to nativist movements from left-wing parties (out of the total number originating from the left and the right) over all elections under consideration,<sup>44</sup> weighted by the proportion of all voters who switched to nativist parties from the right or left in a given election.<sup>45</sup> In other words, it displays the share of vote switchers to nativist parties originating from the left during this period. In most countries, the mainstream right has provided a greater source of new voters for nativist movements than have left-wing parties over the past two decades. This observation is not particularly surprising given that the reversal of the education cleavage in Western countries is a long-term processes that is robust to the exclusion of nativist parties (Gethin, Martínez-Toledano, and Piketty, 2022). Thus, voters corresponding to the traditional left-wing voter profile in Western countries (such as those found among the educational lower classes) will often have already supported the mainstream right in recent decades and may shift their allegiance to nativist parties from there. Still, there is considerable heterogeneity across the countries in this sample. In Spain, for instance, support for the emerging Vox party has almost entirely come from the mainstream right since its first significant electoral showing in 2019. In Finland, on the other hand, the True Finns have derived roughly two-thirds of new support from former left-wing voters over the period under consideration.

Stark cross-country variation in the party origins of nativist voters raises the question of whether positional differences between these movements on economic policy issues could help to explain the trends noted above. Indeed, the MPD reveals vast disparities in the extent to which their economic policy proposals advocate for a reliance on free markets versus an implementation of redistributive measures.<sup>46</sup> With this variation in mind, Figure 30 plots the relationship between the mean share of nativist vote switchers originating from the left and the mean economic ideology score of each country's nativist movement under consideration. As in Table 2, these averages are calculated by weighting each election by its corresponding proportion

<sup>44</sup>I exclude vote switchers from parties falling under the "other" category of the WPID in this analysis, as well as those who did not vote in the preceding election. Thus, when I discuss the share of nativist vote switchers originating from the left, this should be interpreted as the share out of all nativist vote switchers from left- and right-wing parties.

<sup>45</sup>The weights therefore correspond to the vote share of the nativist party multiplied by the share of its voters who switched from left- or right-wing parties in that election.

<sup>46</sup>The economic ideology index score for each far-right party included in this analysis can be found in Table A4 of the Appendix. To see how these scores vary relative to non-nativist parties, Figure A16 in the Appendix overlays histograms of nativist and non-nativist party scores over all elections under consideration.

TABLE 2: Share of Nativist Vote Switchers from Left-Wing Parties

Country	Left Share
Austria	53.6%
Denmark	42.8%
Finland	66.3%
Germany	27.2%
Italy	37.4%
Netherlands	39.8%
New Zealand	58.2%
Norway	33.2%
Spain	11.2%
Sweden	38.2%
Switzerland	21.0%
United Kingdom	43.5%


*Data source:* WPID

*Note:* This table presents the share of vote switchers to nativist parties that have originated from the left (out of the total originating from the left and right), averaged over elections since 2000 where a nativist party received more than 5% of the vote. Only parties above this 5% threshold are included. The mean is weighted by the share of nativist vote switchers in each election.

of nativist vote switchers among voters. This image reveals a clear negative relationship between the share of nativist vote switchers from left-wing parties and the extent to which nativist party manifestos advocate for pro-market measures. Finland and New Zealand—the countries where nativist movements have found greatest success among former left-wing voters (accounting for 66.3% and 58.2% of nativist vote switchers, respectively)—are cases where economic policies proposed by nativist parties have been situated towards the left. In Switzerland, on the other hand, the fervently free-market brand of nativist politics championed by the Swiss People’s Party has hardly resonated with left-wing voters, who account for just 21.0% of these switchers. The case of Spain is similar, consistent with my prior conclusion that voters for Vox—which is disproportionately popular among economic elites—are strongly attracted by this party’s right-wing economic platform. Overall, these results help to further substantiate the notion that economic issues tend to be an important driver of nativist voting, thereby providing support for the economic thesis discussed above.

Of course, voters may not respond to the policy proposals of a single party on a given issue but instead consider the range of positions taken across the party landscape. Accordingly, electoral platforms are designed by parties with the policy stances of competitors in mind, as they seek to occupy strategic positions within the realm of issue competition (Adams and Somer-Topcu, 2009; Budge, 1994). It is therefore interesting to consider whether the party origins of nativist vote switchers are not just linked to the absolute position of nativist parties on economic issues but also reflect the relative distance of this position from the policy stances of left-wing parties.

FIGURE 30: Share of Nativist Vote Switchers from Left-Wing Parties vs. Right-Left Economic Ideology of Nativist Parties



Data sources: WPID and MPD.


Note: This figure shows the share of vote switchers to nativist parties that originate from the left (out of the total originating from the left and right) and the MPD right-left economic index of nativist party manifestos, averaged over elections with available data since 2000 where a nativist party received more than 5% of the vote. Only parties above this 5% threshold are included. The mean is weighted by the share of nativist vote switchers in each election. More negative values along the x-axis correspond to more favourable manifesto emphasis on economic redistribution.

To do so, Figure 31 plots the mean share of nativist vote switchers from left-wing parties and the mean difference in economic policy index scores between a country's nativist party and its left-wing party average, following the same approach to weighting as above.<sup>47</sup> It is clear from this graph that, among the Western countries under consideration, the extent to which vote switchers to nativist parties have come from the left is clearly associated with the average level of economic polarization between nativist and left-wing parties over the past two decades. In other words, the countries where nativist movements have posed the greatest threat to left-wing parties tend to be those where the left has failed to provide distinctly left-wing economic policy alternatives. Consistent with the economic thesis of nativist support, working-class voters faced with little perceived difference in economic prospects from left-wing and nativist governments are much more likely to opt for the latter than similar voters in contexts where there are clear disparities in these parties' stances over redistributive issues.

For completeness, it is worth repeating this analysis using additional MPD data to consider how party polarization over sociocultural issues may also relate to the

<sup>47</sup>For the left-wing party average, I consider all left-wing parties in the WPID that have manifesto information available in the MPD.

FIGURE 31: Share of Nativist Vote Switchers from Left-Wing Parties vs. Economic Polarization Between Nativist and Left-Wing Parties




Data sources: WPID and MPD.

Note: This figure shows the share of vote switchers to nativist parties that originate from the left (out of the total originating from the left and right) and the difference in the MPD right-left economic index between nativist party manifestos and left-wing party manifestos, averaged over elections since 2000 where a nativist party received more than 5% of the vote. Only parties above this 5% threshold are included. The mean is weighted by the share of nativist vote switchers in each election. The left-wing party manifesto score for each election is calculated as the average over all left-wing parties, weighted by party vote shares. More positive values along the x-axis correspond to greater polarization over economic redistribution.

composition of vote switchers. To do so, I have chosen to display the difference between nativist party scores and average left-wing party scores over two different indicators in Figure 32 below: a measure of the ideology expressed in party manifestos with regards to broad sociocultural issues (i.e. either more progressive or more conservative) and a measure of the extent to which party manifestos contain statements for or against multiculturalism (as a proxy for their attitudes towards immigration). As we can see, there is no indication from this figure that nativist support is more likely to emerge from the left in countries where the cultural stances of left-wing parties, both broadly and with respect to multiculturalism in particular, have been further away from the positions of their nativist competitors. The notion that the decline in social democracy and corresponding rise of nativist movements has been principally rooted in working-class backlash against the progressive values typically promoted by modern left-wing movements does not find support in this data.

FIGURE 32: Share of Nativist Vote Switchers from Left-Wing Parties vs. Sociocultural/Multicultural Polarization Between Nativist and Left-Wing Parties



Data sources: WPID and MPD.

Note: This figure shows the share of vote switchers to nativist parties that originate from the left (out of the total originating from the left and right) and difference in the MPD progressive-conservative sociocultural index (upper panel) and multicultural index (bottom panel) between nativist party manifestos and left-wing party manifestos, averaged over elections since 2000 where a nativist party received more than 5% of the vote. Only parties above this 5% threshold are included. The mean is weighted by the share of nativist vote switchers in each election. The left-wing party manifesto score is calculated as the average over all left-wing parties in each election, weighted by party vote shares. More positive values along the x-axis correspond to greater polarization over broad sociocultural issues/multiculturalism.



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## The Party Origins of Voter Abstention In Comparative Perspective

The rising electoral success of nativist politics in recent years suggests that a sizeable share of the electorate in modern democratic societies has grown disillusioned with mainstream political parties. As noted previously, while voters may act on these sentiments by switching their support to nativist parties, some might prefer to refrain from voting altogether. Given that electoral turnout has declined substantially in many contemporary democracies over the recent period (Hooghe and Kern, 2017), and that abstention is disproportionately found amongst lower classes (Blais, Gidengil, and Nevitte, 2004; Piketty, 2018), it is worth investigating whether similar economic factors suggested above in the context of nativist movements may serve as potential drivers of this phenomenon. In other words, does the degree of redistributive conflict in the political sphere present clear links to voter abstention patterns in the recent period? To do so, I will repeat part of the preceding analysis for "abstention switchers", looking at whether meaningful patterns may be observed between the relative share of abstention originating from the left and the relative positioning of political parties on economic policy issues.

### Further Data Considerations

A note of caution is warranted here due to the fact that electoral surveys typically do not provide adequate coverage of the population of abstainers, owing to a range of potential factors such as imperfect sampling and non-response, recall errors among respondents, or deliberate misreporting given societal pressures to vote (Selb and Munzert, 2013; Zeglovits and Kritzinger, 2014). The reality of such turnout overrepresentation poses a clear challenge for attempts to characterize abstainers in relation to the voting population with this type of data. That being said, I am specifically interested in the relative degree of abstention from former left- and right-wing party voters rather than in describing abstainers more generally. To proceed with this analysis, I will assume that there is no difference in the extent to which abstention switchers from left- and right-wing parties are accurately covered by electoral surveys. In other words, among those who recently switched to abstaining, past party choice has no systematic bearing on their inclusion in the sample nor on the quality of their response. This supposition is, of course, untestable with the data at hand, but there is no obvious reason why the coverage of abstainers would differ substantially according to their past party choice given the common causes of survey turnout bias noted above. Still, these results should be interpreted with caution, and could be improved upon in future research linking electoral surveys to administrative data on voter participation in countries where this information is available.

It also bears mentioning that, while this analysis would ideally take a long-run perspective on trends in abstention switching from the earliest electoral surveys to the present (or at least, since electoral turnout started trending downwards in each

country), the availability and quality of the data does not allow for such an approach. Some countries' surveys have only begun to ask about previous voting behaviour in recent decades, while many others display particularly small numbers of abstention switchers in earlier data (typically in surveys from the 1980s and before) that raise clear small sample concerns. I will therefore only consider elections from the year 1990 onward, when the overall quality of the data shows a clear and sustained improvement from the prior decades and most surveys have started inquiring about prior vote choice.<sup>48</sup> I will also take the simple (unweighted) average across elections rather than weighting each election by its share of abstention switchers, since the presence of turnout overrepresentation in electoral surveys prevents me from clearly determining the true level of abstention switchers. Finally, I drop Australia from this analysis due to mandatory turnout laws in place in this country.

### **Abstention Switching and Party Polarization**

Table 3 presents the mean share of abstention switchers originating from the left for all Western countries in the WPID with survey data on past vote choices, across available elections since 1990. These findings reveal that, as expected, voter abstention has been more likely to arise from former left-wing voters than their right-wing counterparts during this period. That being said, there is a fair amount of variation in the left-wing abstention switcher share—ranging from 35% in Switzerland to 75% in Canada—which brings to mind the extent of differences observed above in the party origins of nativist vote switchers. I will thus consider whether similar economic explanations might underlie this parallel phenomenon, with higher relative abstention from the left-wing electorate when these parties hold less distinct ideological stances from their right-wing competitors on redistributive issues

To investigate the relationship between the party origins of abstention switchers and electoral polarization on economic issues, I will take the difference between the mean right-left economic index scores of all left-wing parties and right-wing parties for each election in this analysis, with party's scores weighted by their vote shares when calculating the mean at the group level.<sup>49</sup> This measure of polarization is plotted alongside the left-wing abstention switcher share in Figure 33, averaged over all elections under consideration. From this graph, we indeed observe that abstainers have more often originated from left-wing parties in countries where left- and right-wing parties have been less polarized on economic policy issues, consistent with the idea that low levels of redistributive conflict engender disillusionment among the traditional left-wing electorate and diminish political participation in much the same way that it appeared to foster nativist voting. I must re-iterate, however, that these results should be viewed with caution, owing to the inherent challenges in studying voter abstention with electoral surveys. Still, the patterns under display

<sup>48</sup>The countries and election years considered can be found in A5 of the Appendix

<sup>49</sup>Again, for the party group averages, I consider all corresponding parties in the WPID that have manifesto information available in the MPD.

TABLE 3: Share of Abstention Switchers from Left-Wing Parties


Country	Left Share
Austria	49.4%
Canada	70.0%
Denmark	55.7%
Finland	62.6%
Germany	54.0%
Iceland	42.1%
Italy	48.4%
Netherlands	48.8%
New Zealand	54.2%
Norway	52.5%
Portugal	63.6%
Spain	63.5%
Sweden	58.2%
Switzerland	34.7%
USA	54.7%
United Kingdom	56.1%

*Data source:* WPID

*Note:* This table presents the share of abstention switchers originating from the left (out of the total originating from the left and right), averaged over available elections since 1990.

can be expected to the extent that voter disgruntlement with the declining importance of left-wing economic policies in modern political competition has indeed led to disproportionate disaffection among left-wing voters.

FIGURE 33: Share of Abstention Switchers from Left-Wing Parties vs. Economic Polarization Between Right and Left-Wing Parties



Data sources: WPID and MPD.

Note: This figure presents the share of abstention switchers originating from the left (out of the total originating from the left and right), as well as the difference in the mean right-left economic index score between left-wing party manifestos and right-wing parties manifestos, averaged over available elections since 1990. The mean economic index score for left- and right-wing parties in each election is weighted by the share of votes received by each party in the corresponding group. More positive values along the x-axis correspond to greater polarization on economic redistribution.

## Discussion: Electoral Behaviour and Party Polarization in a Broad Perspective

The analyses presented in this section reveal a clear association between party positions on redistributive issues and vote switching behaviour. In the first case, I have demonstrated that electoral gains made by nativist movements tend to draw more heavily from the left-wing electorate when nativist parties have a stronger redistributive outlook. This pattern becomes even more apparent when considering not just the absolute ideological stance of nativist movements in this regard, but their positions relative to left-wing opponents. In the second case, despite data limitations, I then identify what appears to be an analogous pattern between the share of left-wing abstention switchers and the degree of economic polarization between left- and right-wing parties.


These two findings are consistent with the notion that the progressive emergence of multiple-elite party systems in Western countries has led a portion of the working class—which forms the traditional left-wing voter base—to feel left behind by mainstream parties in light of the declining importance of redistributive conflict in

contemporary political debate. More specifically, the evidence suggests that the relative supply of left-wing economic policy is a key determinant of voting behaviour. Accordingly, left-wing parties that are unable to propose a promising economic alternative to their competitors have suffered more (in relation to the losses faced by their right-wing counterparts) at the hands of emergent nativist movements and rising voter apathy. These findings lend clear support to the economic thesis of nativist voting while also holding broader relevance for the long-term trends documented by the WPID, given that declining political conflict over redistributive issues is a convincing mechanism for the larger evolutions in class-based voting illustrated by this database.

Of course, the above results might not be as meaningful if left-wing parties were systematically more popular than mainstream right-wing parties in countries with lower economic polarization between the left and its opponents. If this were the case, higher relative shares of left-wing vote switchers to both nativist movements and abstention could simply reflect the fact that voters in these countries were more likely to support left-wing parties in the prior election regardless. As a robustness check, I investigate this possibility by looking separately at the relative probabilities of former voters for left- and right-wing parties to either defect to nativist parties or to abstain. The question then becomes whether, among left- and right-wing voters from the previous election, the relative likelihoods of switching to nativist parties or abstention are linked to the degree of party conflict over redistributive issues. These analyses are presented in Figures A17 and A18 of the Appendix and, indeed, the patterns observed are generally similar to those presented in the graphs above, although with more apparent variation in the case of abstention switchers. Such analyses suggest that a low level of economic polarization among political parties is indeed linked to a higher relative loss of voters for left-wing parties, in particular to nativist movements.

Finally, it is worth taking a moment to also discuss the temporal interaction of these two phenomena. In many countries with consistent information on abstention switchers since the start of the 1990s, there seems to have been a rise in the share of abstention switchers from the left during the 2000s, which often attenuated in the following decade when nativist parties typically gained increasing electoral prominence (Figure 34). Has the emergence of nativist parties thus served as a substitute to voter abstention for the politically-disaffected left, leading to lower levels of left-wing abstention? Looking at the election level to best capture this temporal dimension, Figure 35 plots the share of vote switchers to nativist parties originating from the left and the share of abstention switchers originating from the level in all elections with available data since 2000, pointing to a positive relationship between the two measures. While I will leave a more precise investigation of the apparent trends in the party origins of abstention switching open to future research with better quality data, the fact that left-wing vote switching to nativist parties seem to occur at higher rates when the left-wing abstention share is also high suggests that these two


FIGURE 34: Share of Abstention Switchers from Left-Wing Parties



Data sources: WPID and MPD.

Note: This figure presents the share of abstention switchers originating from the left (out of the total originating from the left and right), averaged over elections at the decade level since 1990. Only countries with continuous data on abstention switchers over this period are included.

FIGURE 35: Relative Vote Switching Rates at the Election Level



Data sources: WPID and MPD.

Note: This figure presents the share of vote switchers to nativist parties originating from the left versus the share of abstention switchers originating from the left at the election level, for elections with sufficient data (and prominent nativist movements) since 2000.

phenomena have been complementary, and supports the idea that disillusionment among the left-wing electorate has jointly fueled both developments.

## Conclusion

Through this paper, I have sought to expand on a promising avenue of existing research in hopes of shedding further light on the intersection of sociodemographic inequalities, redistributive conflict, and political transformations. Although my investigation has involved several distinct tasks—updating the WPID to look at recent evolutions of voter cleavages, characterizing the sociodemographic sources of nativist support across countries, and studying individual switches in voting behaviour to nativist parties and abstention—these analyses are inextricably linked, and together lend support to the notion that political conflicts (or a lack thereof) over economic policy issues have often played a critical role in driving modern political developments.

Despite the long-run nature of the trends outlined by the WPID, the newly-available surveys included in my update point to a deepening over recent years of the education, gender, and generational cleavages among the Western countries under consideration. The apparent strengthening of multiple-elite party systems in several cases—exemplified by increasing shares of high-educated voters among left-wing party bases—will likely continue to steer the political debate away from a focus on redistributive issues. In the non-Western countries under consideration, on the other hand, we tend to observe more country-specific divisions along sociodemographic lines that reflect the tremendous historical and political diversity of these settings.

The plethora of nativist movements that have emerged across the globe in recent decades show clear variation in their origins of support across societal groups. Taking contextual insights into consideration, I am nonetheless able to provide plausible explanations for these differences that typically relate to economically-oriented voter incentives. Expanding on this investigation by looking at the origins of party support among nativist voters switchers indeed suggests that the extent of party competition on redistributive issues is an important determinant of whether these parties draw support from the mainstream right or the left. This observation reinforces the idea that the political transformations documented by the WPID—including but not limited to the rise of nativist movements—reflect the declining emphasis of left-wing parties on redistributive policy issues. Unsurprisingly, my look at voter abstention reveals similar patterns between left-wing voter disengagement and economic polarization.

Given the inherent limitations of electoral survey data, important contributions



may come from the use of more granular sources (e.g. administrative data) to derive clearer causal links between the prevalence/intensity of redistributive conflict and sociodemographic voting patterns across modern democratic countries. Such research would be a particularly welcome complement to the rich documentation of evolving political cleavages provided by the WPID.

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# Appendix

TABLE A1: Main Left/Pro-Poor Parties and Coalitions Considered in Part 1

<b>Western Countries</b>	<b>Main Left Parties/Coalitions</b>
Australia	Labor Party, Greens
Austria	Social Democratic Party, KPÖ, Greens, NEOS, Other left
Belgium	Socialist Party, Socialist Party Differently, Ecolo, Agalev, PTB
Canada	Liberal Party, Green Party, New Democratic Party
Denmark	Social Democrats, SF, Social Liberal Party, Red-Green Alliance
Finland	Social Democratic Party, Green League, Left Alliance, Other left
Germany	Social Democratic Party, Alliance 90/The Greens, Die Linke
Netherlands	Labour Party, Socialist Party, D66, Greens, Other left
New Zealand	Labour Party, Greens, Other left
Portugal	Socialist Party, Left Bloc, Unitary Democratic Coalition
Sweden	Social Democratic Party, Left Party, Green Party
United Kingdom	Labour Party
<b>Non-Western Countries</b>	<b>Pro-Poor Parties/Coalitions</b>
Chile	Approve Dignity, Broad Front, Progressive Party, País
Israel	Likud, Other conservative and ultra-orthodox parties
Malaysia	Barisan Nasional
Poland	Law and Justice
Taiwan	Democratic Progressive Party
Thailand	Pheu Thai, Future Forward Party

TABLE A2: Recent Cleavage Estimates in Part 1, Pre-Update 2010s  
and Updated Survey Values

Country	Cleavage	2010s	Update	Difference
Australia	Education	.057*** (.014)	.11*** (.03)	.054 (.033)
Austria	Education	.124*** (.032)	.141*** (.038)	.017 (.05)
Belgium	Education	.013 (.013)	.128*** (.047)	.115** (.048)
Canada	Education	.077*** (.016)	.081*** (.012)	.004 (.02)
Chile	Education	-.059*** (.019)	-.023 (.017)	.036 (.026)
Denmark	Education	.04*** (.014)	.031** (.015)	-.009 (.02)
Finland	Education	-.026* (.014)	-.034 (.021)	-.008 (.025)
Germany	Education	.101*** (.027)	.119*** (.021)	.018 (.034)
Israel	Education	-.059*** (.011)	-.127*** (.024)	-.068*** (.026)
Malaysia	Education	-.063 (.044)	-.062* (.035)	.001 (.056)
Netherlands	Education	.109*** (.014)	.129*** (.026)	.02 (.03)
New Zealand	Education	.142*** (.016)	.113*** (.027)	-.029 (.031)
Poland	Education	-.09*** (.019)	-.104*** (.022)	-.014 (.029)
Portugal	Education	-.157*** (.037)	-.104* (.054)	.053 (.066)
Sweden	Education	-.009 (.029)	.059*** (.015)	.067** (.033)
Taiwan	Education	.025 (.026)	-.008 (.043)	-.033 (.05)
Thailand	Education	-.068 (.045)	-.024 (.037)	.044 (.059)
United Kingdom	Education	.02 (.015)	.074*** (.028)	.054* (.032)
Australia	Income	-.099*** (.018)	-.106*** (.041)	-.008 (.044)

Austria	Income	-.091*** (.035)	.029 (.028)	.12*** (.045)
Belgium	Income	-.084*** (.017)	-.086 (.058)	-.002 (.06)
Canada	Income	-.071*** (.018)	-.039*** (.015)	.032 (.023)
Chile	Income	-.085** (.042)	-.029 (.073)	.056 (.084)
Denmark	Income	-.143*** (.028)	-.149*** (.038)	-.006 (.047)
Finland	Income	-.072*** (.018)	.011 (.022)	.083*** (.028)
Germany	Income	-.143*** (.033)	-.113*** (.027)	.03 (.042)
Malaysia	Income	-.042 (.049)	-.074* (.041)	-.032 (.064)
Netherlands	Income	-.088*** (.018)	-.14*** (.027)	-.052 (.032)
New Zealand	Income	-.124*** (.023)	-.123*** (.035)	.001 (.042)
Poland	Income	-.075*** (.023)	-.016 (.039)	.059 (.045)
Portugal	Income	-.079 (.052)	-.035 (.06)	.043 (.079)
Sweden	Income	-.174*** (.021)	-.233*** (.023)	-.059* (.032)
Taiwan	Income	-.054* (.028)	.053 (.044)	.107** (.052)
Thailand	Income	-.111** (.044)	-.047 (.056)	.064 (.071)
United Kingdom	Income	-.077*** (.018)	-.109*** (.028)	-.032 (.034)
Australia	Age	.072*** (.025)	.154*** (.059)	.081 (.064)
Austria	Age	.1** (.048)	.219*** (.037)	.119** (.06)
Belgium	Age	-.016 (.023)	.038 (.071)	.054 (.075)
Canada	Age	.079*** (.023)	.113*** (.023)	.034 (.033)
Chile	Age	.086**	.182**	.096



		(.043)	(.072)	(.084)
Denmark	Age	-.099*** (.027)	-.033 (.043)	.066 (.051)
Finland	Age	.1** (.04)	-.03 (.059)	-.13* (.071)
Germany	Age	.031 (.042)	-.051 (.044)	-.082 (.061)
Netherlands	Age	.014 (.025)	.062* (.036)	.048 (.044)
New Zealand	Age	.039 (.026)	.017 (.03)	-.022 (.039)
Poland	Age	-.056* (.03)	-.142*** (.05)	-.086 (.058)
Sweden	Age	-.076* (.042)	-.059* (.032)	.018 (.053)
Taiwan	Age	.106*** (.038)	.214*** (.058)	.108 (.07)
Thailand	Age	.111 (.076)	.117* (.07)	.006 (.103)
United Kingdom	Age	.069*** (.025)	.193*** (.04)	.125*** (.047)
Australia	Gender	.065*** (.011)	.076*** (.027)	.011 (.029)
Austria	Gender	.065*** (.024)	.02 (.025)	-.044 (.035)
Belgium	Gender	.036*** (.012)	.022 (.036)	-.014 (.038)
Canada	Gender	.066*** (.011)	.105*** (.011)	.038** (.016)
Chile	Gender	-.022 (.03)	.051 (.049)	.072 (.058)
Denmark	Gender	.06*** (.017)	.095*** (.022)	.035 (.028)
Finland	Gender	.043** (.021)	.161*** (.031)	.117*** (.038)
Germany	Gender	.035* (.021)	.089*** (.022)	.053* (.03)
Israel	Gender	-.05*** (.016)	-.039 (.032)	.012 (.036)
Malaysia	Gender	.102*** (.038)	.125*** (.037)	.024 (.053)
Netherlands	Gender	.07***	.105***	.035

		(.013)	(.017)	(.022)
New Zealand	Gender	.033** (.014)	.077*** (.019)	.044* (.024)
Poland	Gender	-.008 (.016)	-.043* (.024)	-.035 (.029)
Portugal	Gender	.029 (.03)	.098* (.052)	.069 (.06)
Sweden	Gender	.005 (.021)	.048*** (.017)	.043 (.027)
Taiwan	Gender	-.052*** (.019)	.027 (.028)	.079** (.034)
Thailand	Gender	-.02 (.029)	-.085*** (.03)	-.065 (.042)
United Kingdom	Gender	.024** (.011)	.046** (.018)	.022 (.021)
Australia	Religious	-.143*** (.014)	-.124*** (.035)	.019 (.038)
Austria	Religious	-.154*** (.04)	-.126*** (.037)	.028 (.054)
Belgium	Religious	-.203*** (.017)	-.196*** (.051)	.007 (.054)
Canada	Religious	-.147*** (.018)	-.12*** (.016)	.027 (.024)
Chile	Religious	.054 (.043)	-.203*** (.063)	-.257*** (.076)
Finland	Religious	-.111*** (.029)	.043 (.044)	.154*** (.052)
Germany	Religious	-.081*** (.028)	-.042 (.028)	.039 (.04)
Malaysia	Religious	.132*** (.039)	.363*** (.038)	.23*** (.054)
Netherlands	Religious	-.164*** (.018)	-.16*** (.021)	.004 (.028)
New Zealand	Religious	-.103*** (.018)	-.148*** (.026)	-.045 (.032)
Poland	Religious	.069 (.06)	.127 (.079)	.058 (.1)
Portugal	Religious	-.103** (.051)	-.122 (.08)	-.019 (.095)
Sweden	Religious	.031 (.053)	-.073** (.03)	-.104* (.061)
Taiwan	Religious	.039* (.039)	.059** (.039)	.02 (.039)

		(.022)	(.028)	(.036)
Thailand	Religious	.028 (.039)	.108** (.046)	.08 (.06)
United Kingdom	Religious	-.081*** (.012)	-.1*** (.021)	-.019 (.024)
Belgium	Race/Ethnicity	.088 (.075)	.151** (.067)	.063 (.1)
Canada	Race/Ethnicity	.032** (.015)	.069*** (.018)	.036 (.023)
Malaysia	Race/Ethnicity	-.125*** (.039)	-.363*** (.038)	-.237*** (.054)
New Zealand	Race/Ethnicity	.215*** (.02)	.117*** (.022)	-.098*** (.03)
Taiwan	Race/Ethnicity	-.352*** (.024)	-.334*** (.035)	.018 (.042)
United Kingdom	Race/Ethnicity	.275*** (.024)	.219*** (.036)	-.056 (.043)
Australia	Rural/Urban	-.07*** (.013)	-.082** (.033)	-.012 (.035)
Austria	Rural/Urban	-.069*** (.025)	-.072*** (.026)	-.003 (.036)
Canada	Rural/Urban	-.06*** (.017)	-.086*** (.014)	-.026 (.022)
Denmark	Rural/Urban	-.109*** (.017)	-.114*** (.023)	-.005 (.028)
Finland	Rural/Urban	-.08*** (.023)	-.044 (.036)	.036 (.042)
Malaysia	Rural/Urban	.081** (.04)	.041 (.04)	-.04 (.056)
Netherlands	Rural/Urban	-.041*** (.014)	-.061*** (.018)	-.02 (.022)
New Zealand	Rural/Urban	-.076*** (.02)	-.183*** (.026)	-.107*** (.032)
Portugal	Rural/Urban	-.054* (.032)	-.13** (.053)	-.076 (.062)
Sweden	Rural/Urban	-.053** (.027)	-.068*** (.018)	-.015 (.033)
Thailand	Rural/Urban	-.05 (.042)	-.153*** (.043)	-.104* (.06)
Austria	Center-Periphery	.073* (.04)	.053* (.031)	-.019 (.051)
Belgium	Center-Periphery	.073***	.064	-.008

		(.028)	(.084)	(.088)
Denmark	Center-Periphery	.084*** (.026)	.113*** (.023)	.029 (.035)
New Zealand	Center-Periphery	.001 (.015)	.026 (.02)	.025 (.025)
Portugal	Center-Periphery	.104*** (.033)	.157*** (.054)	.054 (.063)
Thailand	Center-Periphery	-.017 (.046)	.104 (.066)	.12 (.081)
United Kingdom	Center-Periphery	.086*** (.022)	.076** (.032)	-.01 (.039)
Australia	Public/Private Sector	.111*** (.013)	.031 (.032)	-.08** (.034)
Denmark	Public/Private Sector	.272*** (.034)	.25*** (.032)	-.022 (.047)
Finland	Public/Private Sector	.006 (.032)	.086* (.047)	.08 (.057)
Netherlands	Public/Private Sector	.066** (.03)	.125*** (.028)	.059 (.041)
New Zealand	Public/Private Sector	.126*** (.02)	.146*** (.029)	.02 (.035)
Poland	Public/Private Sector	.046* (.024)	-.025 (.081)	-.071 (.085)
Portugal	Public/Private Sector	.06 (.052)	.127* (.07)	.066 (.087)
Sweden	Public/Private Sector	.131*** (.031)	.118*** (.026)	-.013 (.04)
Taiwan	Public/Private Sector	-.119*** (.035)	-.089* (.05)	.03 (.061)
Australia	Union	.214*** (.013)	.19*** (.034)	-.024 (.036)
Austria	Union	.204*** (.027)	.092*** (.029)	-.112*** (.04)
Belgium	Union	.071*** (.014)	.112*** (.038)	.042 (.041)
Canada	Union	.053*** (.013)	.048*** (.015)	-.006 (.019)
Denmark	Union	.157*** (.027)	.132*** (.026)	-.025 (.037)
Finland	Union	.128*** (.021)	.151*** (.034)	.022 (.04)
Germany	Union	.172***	.054	-.118**

		(.032)	(.038)	(.049)
Netherlands	Union	.128*** (.016)	.103*** (.024)	-.024 (.029)
New Zealand	Union	.192*** (.023)	.171*** (.028)	-.021 (.036)
Poland	Union	.067** (.031)	.073 (.052)	.005 (.06)
Portugal	Union	.174*** (.054)	.075 (.095)	-.099 (.11)
Sweden	Union	.186*** (.022)	.188*** (.018)	.002 (.028)
Taiwan	Union	.01 (.024)	-.088** (.038)	-.098** (.046)
United Kingdom	Union	.148*** (.016)	.124*** (.026)	-.024 (.031)
Australia	Subjective Class	.098*** (.012)	.057* (.031)	-.041 (.033)
Denmark	Subjective Class	.079** (.036)	.063 (.038)	-.015 (.053)
Finland	Subjective Class	.181*** (.027)	.23*** (.039)	.049 (.047)
Netherlands	Subjective Class	.079*** (.021)	.023 (.034)	-.056 (.04)
United Kingdom	Subjective Class	.15*** (.012)	.085*** (.02)	-.066*** (.023)

*Data source:* WPID.

*Note:* The estimates for each cleavage correspond to the last two series points in the relevant graph in Part 1. Standard errors are included in parentheses and clustered at the individual level. "Update" refers to the most recent election with available survey data in each country, while "2010s" corresponds to the last point in this series in the original version of the WPID.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

TABLE A3: Nativist Parties and Election Years Considered in Part 2

Country	Year	Party	Vote Share
Austria	2002	Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)	10
Austria	2006	Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)	11.04
Austria	2008	Alliance for the Future of Austria	10.7
Austria	2008	Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)	17.54
Austria	2013	Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)	20.51
Austria	2017	Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)	26
Austria	2019	Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)	16.17
Belgium	2003	Vlaams Block	11.68
Belgium	2007	Vlaams Block	11.99
Belgium	2010	Vlaams Block	7.76
Belgium	2019	Vlaams Block	11.95
Brazil	2018	Social Liberal Party (PSL)	46.03
Chile	2017	Independent (Jose Antonio Kast)	7.93
Chile	2021	Christian Social Front	27.91
Denmark	2001	Danish People's Party	12
Denmark	2005	Danish People's Party	13.3
Denmark	2007	Danish People's Party	13.9
Denmark	2011	Danish People's Party	12.3
Denmark	2015	Danish People's Party	21.1
Denmark	2019	Danish People's Party	8.7
Finland	2011	True Finns	19.1
Finland	2015	True Finns	17.65
Finland	2019	True Finns	17.48
France	2017	National Front (FN)	21.3
Germany	2017	Alternative for Germany (AfD)	11.5
Germany	2021	Alternative for Germany (AfD)	10.13
Hungary	2010	Jobbik	16.7
Hungary	2014	Fidesz	44.87
Hungary	2014	Jobbik	20.22
Hungary	2018	Fidesz	49.27
Hungary	2018	Jobbik	19.06
Italy	2018	Lega	17.4
Netherlands	2002	Pim Fortuyn List (LPF)	17
Netherlands	2003	Pim Fortuyn List (LPF)	5.6
Netherlands	2006	Party for Freedom (PVV)	5.9
Netherlands	2010	Party for Freedom (PVV)	15.4
Netherlands	2012	Party for Freedom (PVV)	10.1
Netherlands	2017	Party for Freedom (PVV)	13.1
Netherlands	2021	Party for Freedom (PVV)	10.8
New Zealand	2002	New Zealand First	10.38
New Zealand	2005	New Zealand First	5.72
New Zealand	2011	New Zealand First	6.59
New Zealand	2014	New Zealand First	8.66

New Zealand	2017	New Zealand First	7.2
Norway	2001	Progress Party	14.6
Norway	2005	Progress Party	22.1
Norway	2009	Progress Party	22.9
Norway	2013	Progress Party	16.3
Norway	2017	Progress Party	15.2
Poland	2015	Kukiz'15	8.81
Poland	2015	Law and Justice (PiS)	37.58
Poland	2019	Konfederacja	6.81
Poland	2019	Law and Justice (PiS)	43.59
Spain	2019	Vox (April Election)	10.26
Spain	2019	Vox (November Election)	15.09
Sweden	2010	Sweden Democrats	5.7
Sweden	2014	Sweden Democrats	12.86
Sweden	2018	Sweden Democrats	17.53
Switzerland	2003	Swiss People's Party (SVP/UDC)	26.7
Switzerland	2007	Swiss People's Party (SVP/UDC)	28.9
Switzerland	2011	Swiss People's Party (SVP/UDC)	26.6
Switzerland	2015	Swiss People's Party (SVP/UDC)	29.4
Switzerland	2019	Swiss People's Party (SVP/UDC)	25.6
United Kingdom	2015	UK Independence Party (UKIP)	12.6

*Note:* The 2001 Polish election and 2002 French election were omitted due to considerable differences and long durations between the nativist parties in these elections (the League of Polish Families and the National Front, respectively) and the nativist movements that re-emerged later in the period under consideration. The 2008 Italian election was not included due to the lack of income data in this survey. Fidesz in Hungary and PiS in Poland are only classified as nativist from 2014 and 2015 onward, respectively.

TABLE A4: Nativist Parties and Election Years for Nativist Vote Switcher Analysis in Part 3, with MPD Economic Ideology Score

Country	Year	Party	Score
Austria	2013	Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)	-13.913
Austria	2017	Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)	-9.513
Austria	2019	Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)	-11.261
Denmark	2001	Danish People's Party	0
Denmark	2005	Danish People's Party	-10
Denmark	2007	Danish People's Party	-8.511
Denmark	2011	Danish People's Party	-13.294
Denmark	2015	Danish People's Party	-25
Denmark	2019	Danish People's Party	-14.894
Finland	2011	True Finns	-15.578
Finland	2015	True Finns	-25.624
Finland	2019	True Finns	-28.539
Germany	2017	Alternative for Germany (AfD)	-6.972
Germany	2021	Alternative for Germany (AfD)	.001
Italy	2008	Lega	-24.167
Italy	2018	Lega	-12.901
Netherlands	2002	Pim Fortuyn List (LPF)	-1.575
Netherlands	2006	Party for Freedom (PVV)	.73
Netherlands	2010	Party for Freedom (PVV)	-2.36
Netherlands	2012	Party for Freedom (PVV)	-7.227
Netherlands	2017	Party for Freedom (PVV)	-12
Netherlands	2021	Party for Freedom (PVV)	-18.331
New Zealand	2002	New Zealand First	-12.178
New Zealand	2011	New Zealand First	-13.242
New Zealand	2014	New Zealand First	-23.469
New Zealand	2017	New Zealand First	-24.034
Norway	2001	Progress Party	7.79
Norway	2005	Progress Party	.987
Norway	2009	Progress Party	-2.784
Norway	2013	Progress Party	-15.918
Norway	2017	Progress Party	-.64
Spain	2019	Vox (April election)	-3.163
Spain	2019	Vox (November election)	-3.939
Sweden	2010	Sweden Democrats	-11.274
Sweden	2014	Sweden Democrats	-26.984
Sweden	2018	Sweden Democrats	-26.807
Switzerland	2003	Swiss People's Party (SVP/UDC)	19.197
Switzerland	2007	Swiss People's Party (SVP/UDC)	16.508
Switzerland	2011	Swiss People's Party (SVP/UDC)	1.666
Switzerland	2015	Swiss People's Party (SVP/UDC)	9.556
Switzerland	2019	Swiss People's Party (SVP/UDC)	16.105
United Kingdom	2015	UK Independence Party (UKIP)	-23.963




*Data source:* MPD.

*Note:* MPD data was unavailable for New Zealand First in the 2005 New Zealand general election. More negative scores correspond to more left-wing positions on redistribution.

TABLE A5: List of Countries and Elections for Abstention Switcher  
Analysis in Part 3

<b>Country</b>	<b>Elections</b>
Austria	2013, 2017, 2019
Canada	1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2011, 2015
Denmark	1990, 1994, 1998, 2001, 2005, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2019
Finland	2003, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2019
Germany	2009, 2013, 2017, 2021
Iceland	1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2009, 2013, 2016, 2017
Italy	1994, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008, 2013, 2018
Netherlands	1994, 1998, 2010, 2012, 2017, 2021
New Zealand	1990, 1993, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014, 2017, 2020
Norway	1993, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2017
Portugal	1991, 2002, 2005, 2015, 2019
Spain	1993, 1996, 2008, 2011, 2015, 2016, 2019, 2020
Sweden	1991, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014, 2018
Switzerland	1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2019
United Kingdom	1992, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2010, 2015, 2017, 2019
United States	1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020


FIGURE A1: Updated Educational Cleavages (Top 50% vs. Bottom 50%)



Data source: WPID.

Note: This figure displays the difference between the share of voters in the top 50% and the share of voters in the bottom 50% of the education distribution voting for left-wing parties in Western countries (top panel) and for pro-poor parties in non-Western countries (bottom panel). The estimates control for income, age, gender, religion, worship frequency, rural/urban location, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status, in country-years where available. "Update" refers to the most recent election with available survey data in each country, while "2010s" corresponds to the last point in this series in the original version of the WPID. AD: Approve Dignity; FA: Broad Front; PRO: Progressive Party; BN: Barisan Nasional; PiS: Law and Justice; DPP: Democratic Progressive Party; PTP: Pheu Thai Party.


FIGURE A2: Updated Income Cleavages (Top 50% vs. Bottom 50%)



*Data source: WPID.*


*Note:* This figure displays the difference between the share of voters in the top 50% and the share of voters in the bottom 50% of the income distribution voting for left-wing parties in Western countries (top panel) and for pro-poor parties in non-Western countries (bottom panel). The estimates control for education, age, gender, religion, worship frequency, rural/urban location, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status, in country-years where available. "Update" refers to the most recent election with available survey data in each country, while "2010s" corresponds to the last point in this series in the original version of the WPID. AD: Approve Dignity; FA: Broad Front; PRO: Progressive Party; BN: Barisan Nasional; PiS: Law and Justice; DPP: Democratic Progressive Party; PTP: Pheu Thai Party.

FIGURE A3: Updated Generational Cleavages (Bottom 50% vs. Top 50%)



*Note:* This figure displays the difference between the share of voters in the bottom 50% and the share of voters in the top 50% of the age distribution voting for left-wing parties in Western countries (top panel) and for pro-poor parties in non-Western countries (bottom panel). The estimates control for income, education, gender, religion, worship frequency, rural/urban location, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status, in country-years where available. "Update" refers to the most recent election with available survey data in each country, while "2010s" corresponds to the last point in this series in the original version of the WPID. AD: Approve Dignity; FA: Broad Front; PRO: Progressive Party; PiS: Law and Justice; DPP: Democratic Progressive Party; PTP: Pheu Thai Party.


FIGURE A4: Support For Green and Traditional Left Parties by Age



*Data source:* WPID.

*Note:* This figure displays the average vote shares by age for green parties and for traditional left parties among voters in Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Sweden. "Update" refers to the most recent election in each country, while "2010s" corresponds to the last point in this series in the original version of the WPID.


FIGURE A5: Updated Centre-Periphery Cleavage, Thailand



*Data source:* WPID.

*Note:* This figure displays the difference between the share of voters living in Bangkok and the share of voters living elsewhere voting for the Pheu Thai Party (PTP), the Thai "pro-poor" party. The estimates control for income, education, age, gender, religion, worship frequency, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status, in country-years where available. "Update" refers to the 2019 Thai general election, while "2010s" corresponds to the last point in this series in the original version of the WPID.

FIGURE A6: Updated Public/Private Sector Cleavages, Poland and Taiwan




*Data source:* WPID.

*Note:* This figure displays the difference between the share of voters working in the public sector and the share of voters working in the private sector voting for pro-poor parties in Poland and Taiwan. The estimates control for income, education, age, gender, religion, worship frequency, rural/urban location, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status, in country-years where available. "Update" refers to the most recent election with available survey data in each country, while "2010s" corresponds to the last point in this series in the original version of the WPID. PiS: Law and Justice; DPP: Democratic Progressive Part.




FIGURE A7: Updated Union Member/Non-Union Member Cleavages



*Data source:* WPID.

*Note:* This figure displays the difference between the share of unionized voters and the share of non-union members voting for pro-poor parties in Poland and Taiwan. The estimates control for income, education, age, gender, religion, worship frequency, rural/urban location, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status, in country-years where available. "Update" refers to the most recent election with available survey data in each country, while "2010s" corresponds to the last point in this series in the original version of the WPID. PiS: Law and Justice; DPP: Democratic Progressive Part.


FIGURE A8: Probability of Voting for Nativist Parties, by Voter Education Group



*Data source:* WPID.

*Note:* This figure shows the share of voters voting for nativist parties by education group in each country, averaged over elections since 2000 where a nativist party received more than 5% of the vote. Only parties above this 5% threshold are included.


FIGURE A9: Relative Likelihood of Voting for Nativist Parties,  
Primary-Educated vs. Tertiary-Educated Voters



*Data source:* WPID.

*Note:* This figure shows the relative likelihood of voting for nativist parties between voters with just a primary education and those with a tertiary education distribution, averaged over elections since 2000 where a nativist party received more than 5% of the vote. Only parties above this 5% threshold are included.


FIGURE A10: Relative Likelihood of Voting for Nativist Parties,  
Secondary-Educated vs. Tertiary-Educated Voters



*Data source:* WPID.

*Note:* This figure shows the relative likelihood of voting for nativist parties between voters with just a secondary education and those with a tertiary education distribution, averaged over elections since 2000 where a nativist party received more than 5% of the vote. Only parties above this 5% threshold are included.

FIGURE A11: Probability of Voting for Nativist Parties, by Voter Income Group



Data source: WPID.

Note: This figure shows the share of voters voting for nativist parties by income group in each country, averaged over elections since 2000 where a nativist party received more than 5% of the vote. Only parties above this 5% threshold are included.


FIGURE A12: Composition of Nativist Electorates, Middle 40% Education vs. Middle 40% Income



Data source: WPID.

Note: This figure shows the share of voters for nativist parties that have come from the middle 40% (i.e. the 50th to 90th percentile) of the education distribution and the share that have come from the middle 40% of the income distribution in each country, averaged over elections since 2000 where a nativist party received more than 5% of the vote. Only parties above this 5% threshold are included. The mean is weighted by the nativist vote share in each election.


FIGURE A13: Composition of Nativist Electorates, Top 10% Education vs. Top 10% Income



*Data source:* WPID.

*Note:* This figure shows the share of voters for nativist parties that have come from the top 10% of the education distribution and the share that have come from the top 10% of the income distribution in each country, averaged over elections since 2000 where a nativist party received more than 5% of the vote. Only parties above this 5% threshold are included. The mean is weighted by the nativist vote share in each election.

FIGURE A14: Probability of Voting for Nativist Parties, by Voter Age Group




Data source: WPID.

Note: This figure shows the share of voters voting for nativist parties by age group in each country, averaged over elections since 2000 where a nativist party received more than 5% of the vote. Only parties above this 5% threshold are included.




FIGURE A15: Average Difference In Right-Left Economic Ideology Score Between Nativist and Mainstream Right-Wing Parties



*Data source:* MPD.

*Note:* This figure shows the difference in the right-left economic ideology score between nativist and mainstream right parties, averaged over elections since 2000 where a nativist party received more than 5% of the vote. Only parties above this 5% threshold are included. The mean is weighted by the nativist vote share in each election. Nativist and mainstream right group scores in a given election are averaged over all parties belonging to these categories, weighted by their respective vote shares. Hungary is removed due to the lack of significant mainstream right parties and concurrent nativist parties.


FIGURE A16: Party Distributions of Right-Left Economic Ideology Scores for Elections Considered in Part 3



*Data source:* MPD.

*Note:* This figure shows a histogram of party scores on the right-left economic index for all significant (>5% of the vote share) nativist and non-nativist parties in the elections considered in Part 3.


FIGURE A17: Relative Shares of Former Left- and Right-Wing Electorates Switching to Nativist Parties vs. Nativist and Left-Wing Party Economic Polarization



*Data sources:* WPID and MPD.

*Note:* This figure shows the relative shares of the previous left and mainstream right electorates that switched to nativist parties in subsequent elections. A value above 1 means that a larger share of former left-wing party voters switched to nativist parties than the corresponding share of former mainstream right-wing party voters. The values are averaged over elections since 2000 where a nativist party received more than 5% of the vote, and the relative share between party groups is then calculated. Only parties above this 5% threshold are included. Vote switchers from "Other" parties, and those who did not participate in the previous election, are excluded. The left-wing party manifesto score is calculated as the average over all left-wing parties in each election, weighted by party vote shares. More positive values along the x-axis correspond to greater polarization on economic redistribution.

FIGURE A18: Relative Shares of Former Left- and Right-Wing Electorates Switching to Abstention vs. Left- and Right-Wing Party Economic Polarization



*Data sources:* WPID and MPD.

*Note:* This figure shows the relative shares of the previous left and mainstream right electorates that chose to abstain in subsequent elections, as well as the difference in the mean right-left economic index score between left-wing party manifestos and right-wing parties manifestos. A value above 1 means that a larger share of former left-wing party voters switched to abstention than the corresponding share of former right-wing party voters. The values are averaged over elections with available data since 1990. Vote switchers from "Other" parties, and those who did not participate in the previous election, are excluded. The mean right-left economic index score for left- and right-wing parties in each election is weighted by the share of votes received by each party in the corresponding group. More positive values along the x-axis correspond to greater polarization on economic redistribution.